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2A bstract
The Brazilian Health Care System involves a large variety of sources of fi­
nance and methods of organising medical care. Inpatient care in the country 
is mainly financed by a compulsory insurance scheme -  IN  AMPS. The most 
relevant providers of inpatient care for INAMPS are contracted private hos­
pitals which are reimbursed on a prospective payment scheme. Hospitals’ 
claims -  AIH  forms are processed by a central computer system.
This study aimed to investigate inequalities in health care in Brazil -  
more specifically, to assess inequalities in the use of contracted private hos­
pitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1986. The main hypothesis was that 
contracted private hospitals would be treating selective groups within the 
population and that the pattern of use of these services would vary across 
social groups.
This investigation was based on data originated from the AIH forms and 
a study was conducted to assess the reliability of these data.
Contracted private hospitals were shown to treat a limited and selective 
share of the health care market in the city of Rio de Janeiro -  split between 
the areas of maternity and geriatric care using low technology.
Variations in the patterns of use between the social groups are discussed 
in relation to age and sex distribution, case-mix, process and outcome of 
care. The explanatory role of the social variable (payment status) was 
tested. Payment status was shown to be a significant variable in explaining 
variations in use between patients. The less prestigious social groups, such 
as the unemployed, appeared less likely to receive appropriate care. Varia­
tions between the payment groups could also be the result of supply-induced 
demand or even fraud.
3To my father 
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Chapter 1
Inequalities and H ealth  
Care Services
1.1 Presentation  of th e Study
This study is primarily concerned with inequalities in the use of health 
care services in Brazil, and more specifically, with inequalities in the use 
of inpatient services. The pattern of use of inpatient services across social 
groups will be explored and such pattern as can seen will then be related 
both to the characteristics of the providers of care and to such inequalities 
in health which can be seen to exist.
The main hypothesis is that the patterns of use of inpatient services re­
produce the appalling and persistent social inequalities existing in Brazilian 
society. Inequalities are reproduced in the use of services through a variety of 
selection mechanisms which lead to social stratification in the use of health 
care services. This means to say that individuals’ chances of getting access 
(utilization) and benefiting from health care (process of care) are limited by 
their social position.
This hypothesis was tested by looking at variations (if any) in the pat­
terns of use in relation to the distribution of reasons for discharge (Principal 
Diagnosis), and also in relation to process and outcome of care across the 
social groups controlled by sector of care.
In this first chapter inequity is conceptualized and the theoretical frame­
work for the analysis of inequalities in the use of health care services is 
represented in a model of determination of the use of health care services. 
Operational definitions of equity in the use of health care services are pre­
sented and policies directed at reducing inequalities are discussed.
The second chapter presents the Brazilian health care system by focusing 
on inequalities generated by the way services are structured, financed and
15
16
distributed.
The third chapter discusses methodological approaches to tackling the 
research question. The methodology selected was a cross sectional study 
based on data from insurance claims filled in for reimbursement purposes by 
private hospitals contracted by the compulsory insurance scheme existing in 
Brazil (contracted private hospitals). The study was, therefore, limited to 
the assessment of inequalities in the use of contracted private hospitals in 
the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1986. Furthermore, a study of the quality of 
the data in the insurance claims became essential since these data are used 
mainly for payment purpose. In this third chapter therefore the data source, 
the study population and the methodology used to test variations in the use 
of contracted private hospitals are presented.
The fourth chapter describes in detail the payment scheme adopted by 
the Brazilian compulsory insurance scheme to reimburse contracted private 
hospitals and also discusses control mechanisms, problems with the method 
used to classify patients and the incentives brought about by the payment 
scheme in the delivery of services. ,
The fifth chapter concentrates on the reliability study performed to test 
the quality of data in the insurance claims. The methodology of the study 
and the field work are presented and the results are discussed. The use of 
the data set based on the collection of the insurance claims for the analysis 
of inequalities is reviewed on the basis of the limitations imposed by the 
quality of the data.
The sixth chapter briefly presents the city of Rio de Janeiro, the city’s 
hospital market and the social structure and health status of the population 
living in the Rio. The role played by contracted private hospitals in this 
city is analyzed on the basis of the social and demographic characteristics of 
patients discharged. The hypothesis tested in this chapter is that contracted 
private hospitals treat a selective population within the working population 
and their dependents. .
The seventh, eighth and ninth chapters further ascertain the role of con­
tracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro by looking at the 
case-mix of patients discharged, the pattern of care delivered to patients 
and the quality of care as measured by hospital mortality rates. The main 
research question, regarding the existence of variations in patterns of use 
across the social groups, is tested for each of the elements referred to above 
and the results are discussed.
The final chapter presents the conclusions of the study, reviews the 
methodology and presents recommendations regarding the implementation
17
of regulatory measures directed to minimize the sources of inequalities and 
suggests further areas of research.
1.2 T he Concept o f Equity
The concept of equity is related to social justice. It is related to fairness 
in the distribution of social and economic goods in society. Societies are 
defined by social relations which determine the processes through which 
people obtain access to material resources and obtain access to the social 
products resulting from the use of these resources. Inequalities in the chance 
of obtaining access to material resources and access to the social products 
are the basis of social stratification.
In spite of the fact that individuals might share similar material interests 
(interests in welfare), what differentiates the social classes (and, to a certain 
extent, the social groups e.g. gender and race) are the distinctive differences 
between individuals in respect of their life experiences and means of achiev­
ing their material interests (welfare). Welfare refers not only to income and 
consumption but to the total package of work, leisure and services available 
to a person.
There are two conflicting classical theories in sociology regarding the 
causes of social stratification -  the Weberian and the Marxist theories. We­
berian theories concentrate on how social classes are produced as a result of 
the way rewards are acquired and distributed while Marxist theories empha­
size the way in which particular social relations within production create and 
reproduce social classes[4]. The debate on causes of social stratification is be­
yond the scope of this study. However, as Erik Olin Wright[199] argues there 
are no marked differences in the nature of empirical class structure variables 
among Neo-Weberians and Neo-Marxists: both class concepts accept that 
differences in property, skills/credentials/autonomy and authority are bases 
for differentiating the social classes. Neo-Weberians and Neo-Marxists vary 
in regard to their conceptual framework.
The point to be made here is that inequality is intrinsically related to 
social stratification. Therefore, policies to reduce inequalities have to be di­
rected at minimizing existing differences in welfare between the social classes 
(and the social groups), as a means of reducing variations between individ­
uals in their chances of improving their welfare. Therefore, the main ex­
planatory variable for the assessment of inequalities is social class (or social 
groups).
In a different approach, Julian Le Grand looked at inequalities between
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individuals. He proposed the use of Gini Coefficients to measure inequalities 
in health. Gini coefficients give a measure of differences between individ­
uals -  a global measure of dispersion between individuals. Le Grand[104] 
observed that measures of variations in the age of death for different dates in 
this century have decreased in Britain. However, as argued by Wilkinson[195], 
these measures reflect the changes in the pattern of causes of death -  In­
fectious Diseases, for instance, which were responsible for a large number of 
deaths at the young ages have given way to Cancer and Chronic Degener­
ative Diseases which affect people in their later lives. Le Grand’s approach 
indicates an improvement in the age of death across individuals -  this means 
an improvement in the welfare of people. However, such an approach cannot 
distinguish how this improvement was distributed across the social groups. 
Therefore it has nothing to say about the impact of general changes in the 
disease pattern in the population on existing inequalities in health, as mea­
sured by the age of death.
1.3 U se o f H ealth Care Services -  a M odel
In regard to health, it is necessary to distinguish the concept of equity in 
health from the concept of equity in health care. The main reason for this 
distinction is that the determinants of inequalities in health are not the 
same as the determinants for inequalities in the use of health care services. 
Moreover, equity in the use of health care services per se, does not necessarily 
result in equity in health.
Determinants of the distribution of diseases in populations go beyond 
the scope of the impact of health care interventions. They axe primarily 
determined by social relations and the stock of social products available in 
particular societies, particularly their distribution and, by environmental 
causes which also tend to affect societies and social groups in a selective 
fashion.
Use of health care services might impact positively on the health of the 
populations by preventing the incidence of diseases or even eradicating dis­
eases (e.g. vaccination), reducing death rates among some specific diseases 
(e.g. antibiotics) and enlarging the survival rates (e.g. some cancer treat­
ments). Moreover, health care services should be seen as playing the relevant 
role of increasing comfort and diminishing suffering among the ill. However, 
information on the probabilities of treatment outcome under controlled ex­
periments seldom exits. Moreover, use of health care services might have 
a negative impact on the health of populations due to low quality of care,
i19
unnecessary care and the use of ineffective and potentially dangerous diag­
nostic and therapeutical interventions.
In this study, the use of health care services is related to getting access to 
services (utilization) and receiving the necessary treatment (process of care). 
The causes associated with use of the health care services are represented 
in a model of determination (see page 20, figure 1.1). It is necessary to 
emphasize, however, that the model suggested is a very basic representation 
of the determinants of the complex social and biological processes pertaining 
to the use of health care services. Nonetheless, it is thought that a more 
complex model can be developed from this one.
T h e  assum ptions in th e  m odel The model is centred around two cen­
tral assumptions:
• Health ‘need1 is socially determined.
• Use of health care services is determined both by health need in the 
population and the characteristics of thq supply side of the health care 
market (Health Policy).
Need in the population is not homogeneous between the social groups. 
The risk of getting ill or dying is determined by biological factors (e.g. age) 
in the sense that biological factors define the range of possible outcomes in 
terms of health. For instance, ageing is associated with increasing morbidity 
and mortality. However, within defined biological constraints the chance of 
getting ill and dying will be systematically different across social positions 
leading to social class (and social group) differentials in the need for health 
care service. Therefore, variations in the use of health care services are to 
a great extent related to variations in need between the social classes. But, 
there are other factors that influence people to become a ‘patient’ and to 
benefit from health care utilization. The availability 1 of health services is 
an essential ingredient to transform demand into utilization of health care 
services (enabling factor). i
The role of health care services changes in time and across property and 
financing mechanisms, in terms of their objectives and the organization of 
work. The structure of health care services in terms of public/private mix in 
the finance and the provision of services impacts on the level of availability 
of resources between regions and the social classes. Moreover, the pay­
ment scheme, autonomy and ideology of individual professionals also shape
1 Availability is concerned with the overall level of health care resources and whether 
specific services or treatments are available locally and to what extent [85],
20
Figure 1.1: Model of the determination of the use of health care services.
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the relationship of medical knowledge/clinical decision thereby determining 
variations in use patterns.
Therefore, class differentials in seeking, getting access to and benefit- 
ting from health care services are not only determined by variations in need 
and behaviour between the social classes and social groups, but are also de­
termined by the specific characteristics of the finance, supply of resources, 
organization of care, professionals’ experience, autonomy and ideology which 
define the performance of direct providers of care. The following two sections 
discuss in more detail the two basic assumptions in the model of determina­
tion of the use of health care services and its relationship with inequalities.
1 .3 .1  In e q u a lit ie s  in H e a lth  ‘N e e d ’
Health and illness are complex phenomena which show extensive variability 
in relation to their definitions across disciplines (medicine, sociology) and 
socio-cultural context. Throughout this study, health and illness will be 
approached mainly in a technical (medical) sense and quantitative way: rates 
of incidence and prevalence of diseases and death. This approach limits the 
scope of this discussion of inequalities as it can be perceived and assessed 
from the perspective of orthodox medicine.
In a great large number of studies of equity, health ‘need’ has been 
based on mortality data. However, when analysing mortality data one must 
be cautious -  death is a negative indicator of health. It is not a measure of 
health status. Moreover, mortality data do not account for the whole range 
and magnitude of existing morbidity in populations.
Inequalities in health can be approached on the basis of variations in 
health between countries. There are large variations in health across coun­
tries, particularly, between First and Third World countries. Nonetheless, 
it has been suggested that average income and income distribution alone 
explain a large proportion of differences in life expectancy between the de­
veloped world and Third World countries[194].
Infant mortality rates have been used as a classical indicator of social 
deprivation. Differences in mortality between developed countries and Third 
World countries are very large and influence variations in the average life 
expectancy. In wealthy countries, such as Japan, infant mortality rate is 
about 5 deaths per 1000 live births in a year, while in some regions in Africa 
and Latin America infant mortality rates might reach 100 to 200 deaths per 
1000 live births.
Differences in infant mortality rates between Brazil and Sweden have 
increased in the last few decades. Infant mortality rate was 5.5 times larger
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in the State of Sao Paulo (the richest and most developed state in Brazil) 
than in Sweden in 1950. By 1982, this difference had increased to 7.0. 
Comparison with infant mortality rate in the United States of America shows 
that during the same period differences remained about the same -  infant 
mortality rates being 4.8 times larger in the state of Sao Paulo[102].
Comparisons between countries (variations between populations), how­
ever, do not account for within country variations (social class variations). 
Ulsley[81] using data from WHO for European countries (those with avail­
able data) showed that all countries analyzed present within inequalities in 
health (measured by occupational class). Even those countries experiencing 
the highest life expectancies such as Sweden, Switzerland and the Nether­
lands have inequalities in death rates across the social classes.
England, with a long tradition in class analysis, as measured by occupa­
tion, has a large number of studies on inequalities in health. Marmot[110] 
using data for England and Wales shows that the disadvantage in health 
of the lower occupational groups is observed from a variety of indicators 
such as low birthweight (1980) with an incidence of 5.3 per cent among chil­
dren from families in the upper occupational group and 8.1 per cent among 
children from families in the lowest occupational group. A similar gradi­
ent is observed for standardized mortality rate, maternal death, perinatal 
mortality, some diseases such as coronary heart disease and respiratory dis­
eases and self-reported long-standing illness. This evidence was summarized 
by Whitehead[192]. Inequalities in health are reflected by a disproportion­
ate burden of disease, death and risk factors among the lower occupational 
groups.
One relevant feature observed in inequalities in health is that inequalities 
tend to hold across all causes of deaths. People in the lower social positions 
tend to experience the largest death rates for almost all causes of death. This 
permanent pattern of inequality in mortality across a variety of diseases with 
very different aetiology, would seen to point .towards the predominance of 
social position (life experiences and welfare) in mortality in the explanation 
of variations in death rates.
Mortality differentials within European countries occur for almost all 
causes of death, despite the fact that differences are more striking for some 
particular causes of death such as: Infectious Diseases, Respiratory Diseases, 
Alcoholism and also for infant deaths. Previous evidence of the fact that 
inequalities in health appear to remain constant across all causes of death -  
one exception being Malignant Melanoma -  has been reported[110].
The past experience observed in England and Wales (1931) when Is­
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chemic Heart Diseases among men was more prevalent in the upper occu­
pational groups is at present suggested to have been related to the fact that 
diagnostic usage varied by class. Changes over time in the labelling of heart 
diseases is the most likely explanation of the fact that deaths from heart dis­
eases in men aged 35 -  64 increased more rapidly in the lower occupational 
groups than in the upper occupational groups between 1931 and 1971[110].
In Brazil a similar pattern is likely to occur. An ecological analysis of 
the relationship between mortality and average income developed by the 
World Bank[197] suggested variations in the causes of death for low and 
high income countries of the Americas and state capital cities in Brazil. This 
study used two samples: one with data for countries of the Americas from 
1981 to 1984 and the other used data for the nineteen largest state capital 
cities of Brazil from 1977. Age-adjusted specific death rates were regressed 
against countries and cities’ average income level. This showed that some 
causes of deaths within specific age groups were more associated with high 
per capita income while others were more associated with low per capita 
income. Lung Cancer (over 45 years older), Colon Cancer (all ages), Breast 
Cancer (all ages), Cerebrovascular Diseases (45 years and old), Suicide and 
traffic death (per capita) appeared more strongly associated with the richer 
populations while Stomach Cancer (all ages), Cervical Cancer (all ages) 
Cerebrovascular Diseases (15 to 24 years old), Chronic Obstructive Lung 
Diseases and traffic death (per vehicle) appeared more associated with the 
poorer populations.
The methodological approach used in this study, however, provides a 
very broad assessment of the distribution of causes of mortality between 
‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries and capital cities., Income inequalities in Latin 
American countries and, particularly, in Brazil are very large. Therefore per 
capita income poorly reflects within country and city inequalities. Moreover, 
the reliability of data on Death Certificates and variations in coding practices 
are also likely to vary across countries and cities bringing further limitations 
to the study.
Another ecological study[197] based on more homogeneous populations 
provides a more reliable picture of inequalities in health across populations 
with different income levels in Brazil. Inequalities in health measured by 
differences in mortality between populations was assessed in Porto Alegre, 
the capital city of a developed state in the south region. This study com­
pared mortality between poor and rich areas in the city. Infant mortality 
rates in the poor areas were more than double the figures observed for the 
rich areas. Death rates were also higher for all age groups (1 to 14 years old,
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15 to 44 years old and 45 to 64 years old) and for all causes of deaths among 
those living in the poor areas. Mortality rates for specific causes of disease 
(Cancer, Cerebrovascular Diseases and Respiratory Diseases) among adult 
men (45 to 64 years old) were larger for those living in the poorer areas, 
while for adult women living in the poor areas the major differences were 
concentrated in Cerebrovascular diseases.
The mechanisms present in the relationship between class position and 
morbidity and mortality can be further assessed by the interaction between 
social position and age. Ageing is associated with increasing morbidity 
and mortality. The theory of epidemiological transition points to a new 
scenario based on the recent pattern of low mortality/low fertility observed 
in developed countries named as the Age of Delayed Degenerative Disease 
[142,182] which is characterized by a rapid decline in the major degenerative 
diseases. However, the recent distribution of the onset of chronic conditions 
across the social classes suggests that without changes in the social relations, 
social selection will act, limiting the entry of delayed degenerative disease 
to some social groups in this recent epidemiological transition.
Studying a cross section of the North American adult population (25 
years and older), J. S. House[77] has shown that age interacts with social 
condition (measured by income and education) in relation to the onset of 
chronic conditions. This author observed large disparities across the social 
groups in the prevalence of chronic conditions in the early middle ages (35 
-  44 years old), even larger among people of middle age, (45 -  54 years old) 
and early-old age (55 -  64 and 65 -  74 years old) and smaller again among 
people older than 75. These results were consistent across a range of chronic 
conditions with various levels of severity -  potentially life threatening con­
ditions (cancer, heart attack/trouble and stroke), serious chronic conditions 
(arthritis, lung disease and urinary incontinence) and others (fracture and 
foot problems). The observed contrast between the social groups was such 
that the lowest social group manifested a prevalence of chronic conditions 
at ages 35 to 44 which was not observed in the highest social group until 
the age of 75.
It appears that the relative biological strength in the early ages (25 to 34 
years old) dominates over social disadvantages, shown by the low variations 
between the social groups for the young adult. Social determinants, how­
ever, tend to predominate with ageing. For the very old, low variations are 
probably the effect of selective mortality -  people in the low social groups 
die earlier. The average prevalence of morbidity and functional limitations 
for those 65 years and older is no greater than for those below 65 among the
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low social groups.
Health disadvantages expressed by premature illness and death among 
people in low social positions are also suggested by a study based on Brazil­
ian data. J.S. Yaslle Rocha[200] studying inpatient admissions from Cardio­
vascular Diseases in Ribeirao Preto (Brazil) observed variation in the age 
of admission across the social groups (payment categories). Those patients 
admitted free of charge were much younger than the other payment groups, 
suggesting differences in the onset of Cardiovascular Diseases between the 
social groups. Moreover, the mean age for patients dying in hospital was 
12 years less for those admitted free of charge (not-insured patients) when 
compared with patients who paid their own bills (private patients).
The predominance of life experiences and welfare upon biological deter­
minants of mortality is also suggested by the present knowledge related to 
the incidence and survival rates for Breast Cancer. Breast Cancer is a dis­
ease with a positive social gradient, with higher risk among women in the 
upper occupational classes. Nonetheless, survival rates have been observed 
to be lower for women in a low social position. In Finland[93], it was ob­
served that women classified in the lowest occupational group had about
1.3 times higher relative risk of dying of Breast Cancer than women in the 
highest occupational groups. Their risk of Breast Cancer is apparently due 
to differences in the reproductive history of women in different social po­
sitions. Therefore, even when life experiences might result in less risk of 
specific illness for women in lower social positions, the outcome of disease 
is likely to be less favourable. The outcome of positive habits and health 
styles is jeopardized by the limited welfare of those at the bottom of the 
social stratification.
* * *
A longitudinal study of children born in 1982 in the city of Pelotas -  a 
city with 250,000 inhabitants in a developed state in the south of Brazil -  
was undertaken aiming to assess the influence of social factors on the health 
status of children[186]. Social position was measured by income (groups of 
legal minimum wages). The results of this study, some of which are presented 
below, show that social position interferes in all intermediary variables in­
fluencing the health status of children.
Some risk factors appeared to affect disproportionately low income moth­
ers. The average height of low income mothers was 5 cm less than the av­
erage height of high income mothers, thus increasing the risk of perinatal 
complications among low income mothers, because there is a relationship
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between low height and perinatal complications. Smoking habits were also 
significantly more prevalent among low income mothers (44 per cent) when 
compared with high income mothers (25 per cent). Low birthweight, which 
influences the early years of life and presents a higher risk of death and ill­
ness showed a high incidence (15 per cent) among those babies in very low 
income families (1 or less legal minimum wage). However, it was relatively 
low among the other income groups.
Maternal mental disorders represent another circumstance very likely to 
affect child health. The prevalence of mental disorders as measured by a 
psychiatric screening questionnaire (SRQ -  20) was six times greater among 
low income mothers, suggesting a relationship between social deprivation 
and mental illness. Another study[155] using the same instrument to assess 
the prevalence of mental disorders among mothers living in the largest favela 
(squatter settlement) in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Rocinha) also observed 
a very high prevalence of mental disorders (36 per cent). This latter study, 
highlights the fact that, although squatter dwellers tend to be poor, social 
stratification is also observed within the population living in favelas which 
implies that slum residence does not equate with equality of social position 
and health status. Those mothers living in Rocinha with income in the 
lowest 25 per cent showed a prevalence of mental disorders (47.3 per cent) 
much larger than those in the highest 25 per cent income (30.0 per cent).
Another interesting finding of this Longitudinal Study of Pelotas is the 
relationship between race, income and health in Brazilian society. A re­
lationship was observed between race and birthweight among babies born 
from white mothers who showed a significantly lower incidence of low birth­
weight than non-white mothers. However, these differences disappear when 
race is controlled for levels of income. These results reflect the fact that 
income inequalities are one aspect associated with racial discrimination in 
Brazil, as is probably the case in other multi-racial societies. That suggests 
an interaction between class position and race.
Infant mortality rate in Pelotas also appeared to have an important social 
gradient with children in low income families experiencing a disproportion­
ate share in morbidity and mortality. Adverse circumstances at early ages 
have been shown by some recent studies to be likely to affect health sta­
tus in later life[150, 8]. Short stature has also been associated with higher 
mortality risk in adult life and is influenced both by genetic and childhood 
life experiences[174]. A cross-sectional study[121] in the city of Sao Paulo 
in Brazil, showed large differences in the growth of children from families in 
different social classes. The social class classification used in this study was
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based on the social relation to production and income. Unlike the children 
from the bourgeoisie and the new petit bourgeoisie families who showed a 
normal height distribution, a large growth deficit was observed for the chil­
dren from families classified in the three categories of the proletariat (typical, 
non-typical and sub-proletariat). This results in the large inequalities in the 
distribution of material advantages across the social classes in Brazil. The 
possibility of acquiring food, a basic material good for health and life, is 
limited among proletariat families living in this developed and highly indus­
trialized city, leading to a high prevalence of malnutrition among children 
born in these families.
In the longitudinal study of Pelotas, income also appeared to interact 
with birthweight regarding the risk of dying. This means that children from 
low income families born with adequate birthweight experienced a larger 
chance of dying than children born in the same circumstances in a high 
income family. It suggests that adverse social conditions (welfare) undermine 
the biological advantages of having had a normal weight at birth. These 
results would also seem to support the assumptions in the model, where 
biological factors act as selecting the possible health outcomes but the actual 
occurrence of disease and health is ultimately determined by the social class 
position of individuals.
Inequalities in material welfare and life experiences between individu­
als have an impact on health, creating differences in the life span and in 
the chance of postponing the onset of morbidity and disability. Early so­
cial disadvantages axe a risk factor in relation to health status in adult life. 
Therefore, the outcome of disease and death throughout life has to be ex­
plained in the context of the life experiences of individuals with regard to 
their social position.
There are few studies in the Brazilian context relating to inequalities 
in health among the adult population. Ramos[154] carried out a survey 
on the elderly population living in three areas in the city of Sao Paulo. 
Areas were chosen according to the average wealth of the population (rich, 
intermediate and poor). His study observed that the prevalence of chronic 
conditions was very large among the elderly (78 per cent). Hypertension 
appeared as the commonest chronic disease. A previous study[197] in a 
predominantly working class town in the state of Rio de Janeiro observed 
that the prevalence of high blood pressure was much lower among the more 
educated than the less educated. Ramos’ study also observed that chronic 
diseases were more prevalent in the less wealthy areas, particularly multiple 
chronic conditions.
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In general, older people have lower incomes than younger age groups. 
When individuals retire they lose earnings and become dependent upon so­
cial security. Renato Veras[182], in a survey of the elderly people living in the 
city of Rio de Janeiro observed that the low-income elderly presented signif­
icantly higher prevalence of Dementia and Depression than the high-income 
elderly. These variations would again seem to support the hypothesis that 
class differences remain among the elderly, generating health inequalities 
among this age group.
* * *
T im e tren d s  in health  inequalities In 1980, the report of the Research 
Working Group on Inequalities in Health issued by the British Department 
of Health and Social Security (known as the Black Report) raised the point 
that mortality differentials in health for England and Wales were still large 
across the occupational groups in 1970 -  1972 and that those differentials 
were widening[179]. In a more recent assessment [135] based on cross sec­
tional data from the General Household Survey, 0 . O’Donell and C. Prop- 
per observed that inequalities in health as measured by self-reporting acute 
and/or long standing illness have reduced between 1978 and 1985. How­
ever, this reduction occurred at the expense of an increase in self-reported 
morbidity in all occupational groups.
The analysis of time trends to assess differentials in health across social 
classes (or social groups), however, presents some methodological difficulties 
due to:
• Changes in the proportions of the population in different social classes.
• Changes in the classification of social position.
• Errors in the classification.
Some methodological approaches have been proposed to overcome some 
of these problems[110, 23]. A more consistent assessment in inequalities 
in death by occupational group is the longitudinal study of the Office of 
Population Census and Survey (OPCS)[16]. This is a longitudinal study 
which used occupation declared in the census throughout the study while 
the Black Report relied on occupation data from death certificates which 
are likely to be misleading due to misreporting at death. The results of the 
OPCS Longitudinal study are consistent with that of the Black Report[123].
I29
The Whitehall study [111] covered two cohorts of British civil servants 
with an interval of 20 years between them. The first study demonstrated af­
ter ten years of follow-up that, even among a group of civil servants who are 
a group of people in stable employment, the top employment status group 
presented about one third of the mortality rate of the low employment sta­
tus group. Gradients in morbidity rates between employment status were 
similar to those in mortality rates. Risk factors account for only part of 
the differences observed. Differences in morbidity between the employment 
groups persisted over the time separating the two studies. Ischemia, angina 
pectoris, chronic bronchitis, long-standing illness, self-rated health as aver­
age or worse all present a gradient between the employment categories.
This study also assessed some explanatory factors for health inequalities: 
clear differentials in welfare (work-leisure-income) appeared between the 
employment groups. Individuals in the lower employment status groups 
were less satisfied with their jobs, had less varied work, were involved in 
less hobbies and received less practical support. Moreover, individuals in 
the lower employment status groups were more likely to report potentially 
stressful life events in the previous year and to report difficulties in paying 
bills and with money in general.
The persistence in health differentials in countries with comprehensive 
and largely ‘free’ health care systems such as Sweden and England strongly 
suggests that health care is not sufficient to fully reduce inequalities in 
health, which reflects the different life experiences and welfare across the 
social classes and social groups. Wilkinson[194] suggested that for Britain, 
income transfers between the rich and the poor are likely to bring substan­
tial health benefits to the poor without having any substantial impact on 
the health of the high income groups. The reduction in income inequali­
ties within and between countries would have a positive impact on health 
inequalities.
1 .3 .2  In e q u a lit ie s  in  th e  U se  o f  H ea lth  C are S erv ices
Equity in the use of health care services is defined as the equality in the 
chance of getting access (utilization) and receiving the adequate treatment 
(process and outcome of care) across the social classes (or social groups).
Health ‘need’ (perceived morbidity and/or medically identified morbid­
ity) is one major determinant of the use of health care services, particularly 
in regard to non-preventive services. For inpatient care, need is an im­
portant determinant and use is ultimately defined by the doctor. Barbara 
Hulka and John Wheat[79], reviewing the literature on, the determinants
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of consumer behaviour in utilizing health care, concluded that the primary 
determinant of utilization of services was need. Based on the ‘need model’, 
variations in the use of health care services would basically reflect the struc­
ture of need in the population. Inequalities in the use of health services 
would, therefore stem primarily from variations between the social groups 
and the social classes in relation to enabling factors (costs and availability 
of services) and to predisposing factors (variations in the acceptability2 and 
information about existing resources and their usefulness).
E nab ling  factors The organization of the delivery of care to a given pop­
ulation reflects the public/private mix in the finance and provision of health 
care services and existing regulatory mechanisms. Health policy defines the 
structure of the health care system in terms of financing mechanisms, the 
supply and distribution of facilities, equipment and manpower, complexity 
and payment mechanisms.
Countries vary considerably in their health care policies and, hence, in 
the way health care services are financed, distributed and delivered to pa­
tients. Therefore, countries vary in the pattern of equity in the use of health 
care services.
The removal (or reduction) of price barriers through the provision of free 
services or through subsidies and the distribution of facilities and manpower 
in regard to need are not sufficient, but necessary, elements for equity in the 
use of health care services.
The experience of most developed western countries demonstrates that 
State intervention has been necessary to reduce inequalities in the use of 
health care services[113]. However, the scope and the characteristics of 
regulatory measures adopted by individual countries have varied largely. In 
countries with systems with universal access where care is provided to all at 
the time of use almost free of charge such as,in the case with the National 
Health System in Britain and other such countries which have removed most 
price barriers for the utilization of health care services, policy measures have 
still had to be adopted to improve equity in the distribution of beds. This is 
because the historical distribution of health care services was based on the 
distribution of wealth, leading to geographical inequalities.
In Britain the Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) developed 
a method of approaching geographical equity by calculating each Regional 
Health Authority’s (RHA) fair share of the total cash available to all re­
gions. The method adopted was based on the population’s relative risk of
2 Acceptability refers to choices regarding type of medicine and treatments
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needing health care, estimated by age, sex and Standardized Mortality Ra­
tios (SMRs). As measured by RAWP, regional inequalities in health care 
diminished markedly between 1977/1978 and 1986/1987. Actually, England 
at present, appears to have one of the lowest geographical inequalities in 
Europe [14].
On the other hand, the United States with a market-based health care 
system (actually the only major western industrialized country without a 
comprehensive and universal government health programme) has had to 
adopt special programmes to finance the use of services for those people 
unable to purchase them in the market-place -  the Medicare Programme 
for the elderly and the Medicaid Programme for the poor. The health care 
system of the United States appears to suffer from higher costs and less 
access than countries with National Health Systems such as England.
Bombardier[18] observed a large increase in surgical utilization among 
the elderly population of the United States between 1963 and 1970, par­
ticularly, for the non-white urban and low-educated elderly -  a reflection 
of the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid Programmes between these 
years. Nonetheless, figures for 1970 still showed large variations in surgical 
utilization with income having a strong positive effect on utilization. More 
recently, Yelin[201], observed that lack of insurance in the United States ap­
peared to be associated with a lower chance of getting hospital treatment, 
for some specific chronic conditions.
The extent to which health care services can be bought in the market 
place, through private insurance mechanisms and out-of-pocket, is reflected 
by the plurality of financing mechanisms, payment mechanisms of direct 
providers of care, modes of organization of medical practice and regulatory 
powers. Pluralistic systems tend to generate social stratification in access 
to the different sectors of care, leading to greater inequalities in terms of 
availability, type, volume and quality of services consumed by the different 
social classes and social groups. Market-based health systems are also likely 
to raise the overall cost of health care.
Hart[72] stated his Inverse Care Law, in 1971 -  “the availability of good 
medical care tends to vary inversely with the need of the population served” . 
He suggested that the Inverse Care Law operates more completely where 
medical care is exposed to market forces, and less where such exposure is 
reduced.
S upply-induced factors John E. Wennberg[188] argued that Hulka’s 
‘need model’ was developed, based on the review of large studies of uti­
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lization of health care services in which supply factors are held constant. By 
reviewing studies based on local hospital market factors such as supply of 
beds, personnel and professional practice style the important role of supply 
factors in explaining variations in utilization (supply- induced demand) was 
suggested.
For several decades already, several studies have observed large varia­
tions in inpatient care between and within countries. Variations of rates of 
inpatient admissions between local hospital markets for treatment of minor 
surgical and medical procedures such as teeth extraction, curettage, breast 
biopsies, pneumonia and chronic lung disease have shown 4 to 20 fold vari­
ations. The extent of observed variations cannot be explained only on the 
basis of differences in health need in the population[48]. Therefore, supply- 
induced demand has been suggested as another (or, the dominant[188]) fac­
tor to explain variations in use.
The medical decision-making process and the local supply of resources 
are the main factors in supply-induced demand. Variations in inpatient 
admissions between local health markets for minor surgery are strongly as­
sociated with the supply of beds and, to a lesser extent, with the supply of 
doctors[188].
Nonetheless, the final decision for generating an admission has to be that 
of doctors. Eisenberg[48] argues that in many aspects of medical practice 
such as surgery, hospitalization, length of stay, diagnostic tests and drug 
prescription there are wide variations in doctors’ performance. Professional 
uncertainty[189] is suggested by Wenneberg to be the main explanation for 
variations in doctors’ performance.
Wennberg identified three sources of uncertainty:
1. Difficulties in classifying a particular patient, so that the probabili­
ties of existence of disease, extent of disease, prognosis and treatment 
outcomes are reasonably ascertained.
2. Limited valid information on the probabilities of treatment outcomes.
3. Utility of doctors, assumed by Wennberg to make vicarious decisions, 
may not correspond to the patient’s utility.
Actually, as Eisenberg argues[48] uncertainty in clinical decisions will 
always remain as long as medical care is a probabilistic process. However, 
because all doctors face uncertainty in their practice, it is such variations 
in the way they respond to uncertainty which raise clues for other factors 
influencing medical practice. To cope with uncertainty, doctors might tend
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to establish routines and are influenced by a variety of sources from peers, 
scientific information, commercial sources (drug companies representatives) 
etc.
Physician’s behaviour is assumed by functionalist theory to be collec­
tively orientated. Parsons[145] considers that the doctor emphasizes the 
technical basis of the role in his or her relationship with patients and col­
leagues to the exclusion of non-technical considerations. Critics of the above 
theory[178, 100] argue that a doctor’s performance is not neutral as ideally 
presented by professional associations and functionalist theory, as it is influ­
enced by the doctor’s ideology and self-interest as well as by the organization 
of work.
Financial incentives upon doctors also influence their performance at 
least marginally. The way that doctors are compensated tends to produce 
specific patterns of resource consumption, quality of services and geograph­
ical distribution of doctors[3].
Moreover, the social classes and the social groups also tend to vary in 
regard to their access to medical information, their ability to choose the 
service and/or doctor on the basis of the assessment of quality or to exercise 
control over the medical practice[17]. The upper social groups have more 
familiarity with professionals and with institutions, increasing their ability 
to influence services and doctors’ decision processes.
The process of institutionalized medical work, in opposition to the tra­
ditional autonomous fee-for-service doctors, introduces various degrees of 
constraints on doctors decision-making through control over workload, tim­
ing and the setting of practice standards. Control over medical practice 
has been a major trend recently, regarding mainly the achievement of more 
efficiency in the production of medical services.
In short, under the limits of structural uncertainty of medical care, an in­
dividual doctor’s decision process is shaped by financial incentives and class 
interests and ideology. Moreover, the degree of autonomy in the decision 
process of doctors is selected by payment mechanisms, characteristics and 
the status of the practice setting, managerial control, supply of resources 
and the demand exercised by patients. Therefore, supply-induced demand 
is also likely to explain inequalities in the use of health care services.
* * *
Cartwright[24] studying the British National Health Service (NHS) ob­
served that middle class patients experienced larger average consultation 
time and a larger opportunity to communicate with their General Practi­
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tioners (GPs) than working class patients. Her study suggests that GPs 
have a rather less sympathetic and understanding relationship with their 
working class patients.
A study[159] assessing the relationship between hospital characteristics 
and patient characteristics in Pittsburgh (USA) observed that demographic 
and socio-economic variables did explain more of the variation in hospital 
use of individual patients than individual hospital characteristics (measured 
in this study by number of facilities, number of employees per bed, teaching 
activities and presence of outpatient services). Patients’ demographic and 
socio-economic variables appeared as the most relevant variables in shaping 
the doctor-patient relationship and determining the amount and type of 
care provided to individual patients. Variations were observed for payment 
mechanisms with those paid by government using more hospital care than 
those paying their own bills. However, as the author points out, payment 
mechanisms cannot be interpreted as purely price elasticity due to the strong 
relationship between payment mechanisms and income, occupation etc, that 
is to be found in relation to health ‘need’. After adjusting for diagnosis non­
white patients stayed longer, received a greater number of special services 
and were charged more than white patients. However, when controlled for 
the characteristics of the place of residence, non-white patients living in 
predominantly non-white areas were hospitalized for more serious illnesses 
and stayed for shorter periods and paid less than white patients living in 
predominantly white areas, indicating an interaction between race, social 
position (as defined by area of residence) andi the use of hospital services.
Enders[50], studying the relationship between subjective preferences and 
hospital selection in a community in the capital city of Porto Alegre (Brazil), 
observed an inverse trend between the perceived quality of services and the 
actual utilization of services. Ability to pay for better quality services did 
not appear to be the principal barrier to access to services perceived as better 
quality, since the great majority of people in the sample were insured by the 
compulsory insurance system existing in the country (see chapter II). This 
study sample excluded those at the bottom of the social stratification who 
were not covered by the compulsory insurance scheme. The author suggested 
then that the main barrier was a social barrier. Hospitals of perceived higher 
quality would use strategies, such as alleging no vacancy, to refuse access 
to the low socio-economic groups (social classification was based on the 
identification of three major groups -  high, middle and low by using a large 
range of social, economic and demographic variables). However, the author 
indicates that the most important barrier was exercised by doctors:
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“Not wanting to damage their relationship with the hospitals with 
which they are associated, the physicians screen each patient before re­
ferral. Patients can, and based on the interviews frequently do, refuse 
to enter the recommended hospital. In this case, the physicians who 
have no personal attachment to lower class clients, recommend an al­
ternative hospital but again of their choice” .
Enders’ research is important because it exposes the mechanisms through 
which the self-interests of doctors (and, services’ vested interests) act so as 
to create inequalities in the use of health care services and reproduce the 
social stratification existing in society in the stratification in the use of health 
care services. This study also demonstrated that, for people living in large 
metropolitan areas, the quality of inpatient care is a more important element 
in individual’s choice of hospital than accessibility. However, individuals’ 
choices were limited by their class position.
As shown previously in this chapter, the survival rate for Breast Cancer 
is lower among the less skilled manual occupations. Lower survival rates are 
also observed for black women. A study in the United States[41] refers to the 
fact that black women with breast cancer experience lower access and use of 
services. It observed that black women received less than appropriate care 
for 4 out of 10 patterns of care. The study also showed that black women 
were more likely to be treated by more recently trained surgeons than white 
patients, suggesting that, at least in the United States, variations in survival 
rates across white and non-white women are influenced by supply-induced 
practices which negatively affect those less prestigious social groups.
Another study[46] based on data from the United States showed that 
black patients were two to four times more likely to have their Gallbladder 
or Inguinal Hernia Repair surgeries performed by a surgeon in training than 
by a staff surgeon. This trend remained for emergency patients. It also 
remained among patients paying their own bill or financed by private insur­
ance, suggesting that better trained doctors tended to discriminate against 
black patients. However, differences disappeared among patients financed 
by Medicaid. The major provider of care for both black and non-black 
Medicaid patients was a surgeon in training. This suggests that selection 
mechanisms operate in the very diversified health care market of the United 
States in such a way as to allow the better trained doctors to choose their 
‘preferred patients’. The recently graduated doctor, with lower competitive­
ness in the labour market, would be the main provider of care for the socially 
underprivileged patient. The greater likelihood of black and poor patients 
being treated by less skilled professionals might also negatively impact on
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the outcome of care.
The longitudinal study of Pelotas (Brazil), previously mentioned in this 
chapter, also observed similar variations in the provider of care across the 
social groups: while 54.0 per cent of deliveries in the low income groups 
were performed by a midwife or a medical student, 93.0 per cent of deliveries 
among the high income groups were performed by a qualified doctor. The 
quality of ante-natal care varied across financing mechanisms: by measuring 
low quality by the first ante-natal care after the fifth month of pregnancy 
and less than five consultations during pregnancy, it was observed that 77.0 
per cent of those mothers receiving free care received low quality of care,
22.0 per cent of those financed by the compulsory insurance scheme (see 
chapter II) and only 5.5 per cent amongst those mothers paying for private 
care.
Interaction between financing mechanisms and the process of care, in 
relation to inequalities in the use of health care services, has been clearly 
demonstrated in the study of Abnoel[176] This study analyzed inequalities 
in the use of psychiatric inpatient care in the capital city of the state of 
Bahia (Brazil). The plural characteristics of the Brazilian health care system 
(see chapter II) result in the social stratification of patients across sectors 
of care (public hospital, teaching hospital, contracted private hospitals and 
independent private hospitals3). The unemployed, the non-paid workers and 
the not-insured (workers in the informal labour market) patients were more 
likely to be treated by the public hospital, where the process of care was 
based on old-fashioned and low-quality treatment leading to the chronicity 
of mental problems. Those patients employed in the formal labour market 
were more likely to be treated in the teaching and private hospitals where the 
therapeutical patterns adopted were of greater efficacy. Quality of care was 
also judged to be low in the psychiatric contracted private hospital where 
the less skilled employed patients were more likely to receive care.
Most Western European countries have accepted the principle of health 
as a right before Latin American countries[3]„ and shaped their more equal- 
itarian health care policies. Universal and comprehensive health care sys­
tems are the bases for reducing inequalities in the use of health care services. 
However, the principle of health as a right, needs also to become a consen­
sus among direct providers of care to reduce the impact of supply-induced 
inequalities.
3The financing mechanisms associated with each one of these services are presented in 
chapter II.
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1.4 O perational Definitions o f Equity in H ealth  
Care
This study is concerned with the analysis of inequalities in the use of health 
care service, particularly with inequalities in the use of inpatient services. 
In the first section of this chapter, the concept of equity was approached 
as a principle -  the fairness in the social distribution of social products. 
To transform this principal into policies, more operational definitions are 
needed. Some of the approaches suggested by Mooney[122] and Julian Le 
Grand[105] are presented and discussed. They can be formulated on the 
basis of two characteristics, which are not exclusive:
1. Policies formulated on the basis of the geographical distribution of 
resources.
2. Policies formulated on the basis of need.
The geographical distribution approaches are aimed at increasing the 
equality in the allocation of financial resources and health trained manpower 
between regions and areas. Public spending should be distributed pro rata 
with the size of the population. Mooney further suggests that the distribu­
tion of financial resources should account for differences in prices (labour, 
land and capital) between regions by proposing the concept of Equality of 
Inputs (resources) per Capita. Geographical distribution policies will pos­
itively impact on situations of large regional inequalities, as is the case of 
Brazil (see chapter II). However, this approach does not account for differ- 
ences within regions limiting, therefore, its scope in reducing inequalities, 
j^s pointed out by Le Grand[105], “regional reallocations will not affect class 
differences within regions” .
The need-based approach is stated by Mooney as Equality of Input for 
Equal Need which implies distribution of bed and manpower according to 
variations in the need as measured by the age and sex structure of the pop­
ulation. However, in spite of existing differences in the use of health services 
between the age groups and the sexes, age and sex interacts with class po­
sition as discussed previously, with a lower social class position getting a 
disproportionate share of existing morbidity in a population. Indeed, dif­
ferences in morbidity across the social classes point to variations in need 
for health care services. Since health ‘need’ is not randomly distributed in 
the population, equity in the use of health care services has to account for 
differences between the social classes.
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The RAWP formula discussed earlier, adopted age, sex and SMRs as a 
proxy of need since morbidity data is scarcely available. Social class has been 
suggested as the best predictor of the use of inpatient care[95]. Therefore, a 
further development of a formula to calculate a population’s relative risk of 
needing to use inpatient services would be to include in the formula social 
class as measured by variables in the Census and/or General Household 
Survey.
A further need-based approach was suggested by Mooney and by J. 
Muurinen and Le Grand[129] as Equality of Access for Equal Need in which 
individuals should face the same ‘price’ of medical care. This would include 
the costs faced by the patient such as travelling, waiting for treatment, 
amount of income loss associated with receiving medical treatment. Since 
these costs are likely to be higher for workers than professionals, the former 
would need to be compensated for their higher costs. The implementation 
of measures to equalize costs by means of awarding greater sickness benefits 
to workers, for instance, would be of low practicality in Brazil. One main 
difficulty is the existence in the country of a large informal labour market (see 
chapter VI). Improvements in the distribution and availability of services for 
different groups in the population, achieved through policies of equality in 
the distribution of resources, however, could reduce travelling and waiting 
costs and have a positive impact on inequalities.
Mooney argues that, as supply is associated with demand, the impact of 
equality policies on the utilization of services will depend on the response 
from individuals in using the services available to them. Individuals vary 
in their preferences and tastes, argues Mooney, hence they have distinctive 
acceptability to services available to them. However, relevant aspects of 
the supply side of the health care market are also likely to have a negative 
impact on utilization, as previously discussed. Therefore, even under policies 
directed at equalizing opportunity of access, inequalities might remain due 
to supply-induced social selection.
A further operational definition of equity in health care based on need 
is Equality of Treatment for Equal Need. This is one of the operational def­
initions of equity present in the objectives of the British National Health 
Service. This policy has been assessed by Julian Le Grand[105] as the ratio 
of public health care expenditure per person reporting sick. He observed 
important differences between the top and the bottom occupational groups, 
with professionals receiving over 40.0 per cent more than the lowest occu­
pational group.
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A more recent assessment[135] of equality of treatment for equal need in 
Britain has been developed. In this study the above policy was approached 
from the consideration of equality in the utilization of services. Need was 
measured by self-report morbidity and individuals were discriminated by 
income. It observed an equitable pattern in utilization across income groups. 
The results of this study are in contradiction with the findings of Julian 
Le Grand. These two studies did use different methodological approaches, 
however this does not seem to wholly cancel the findings of the more recent 
study [135].
The measurement of equality in utilization, however, should also con­
sider the ratio of utilization for those people not referring illness across the 
social classes. Measurement of illness has problems of validity and relia­
bility, indicating the need to compare the ratios of people classified as not 
ill, but who used services. Moreover, when looking at average utilization 
rates, as was the case in the latter study, one has to take into account that 
people in low class positions are likely to present multiple and more serious 
conditions leading to a greater number of GP visits, outpatient visits and 
inpatient care. This will lead to higher ratios of utilization.
It is suggested that equity of treatment for equal need could also be ap­
proached as -  Equality in the Quality of Care4. In spite of the existing large 
methodological difficulties in measuring quality of care, this does not imply 
that it should not be assessed by means of some accessible indirect indica­
tors such as hospital mortality rates and sentinel events (see chapter IX). 
The quality of care is an extremely relevant element regarding inequalities 
in health care. It refers to the extent to which systems, services and direct 
providers of care distinguish individuals in the delivery of services in regard 
to their social position. The assessment of Equality in the Quality of Care 
implies monitoring the production of health care services.
Finally, these operational definitions of equity in access, utilization, and 
quality of care should be considered not as isolated objectives but as asso­
ciated objectives which should be pursued in a combined fashion. Previous 
experience in Brazil[22] has shown that the increase in the supply of health 
care units had little impact on utilization due to the fact that services were 
perceived by the population as low quality health services.
4Donabedian points out that ‘quality is a property of, and a judgement upon, some 
definable unit of care, and that care is divisible into at least two parts: technical and 
interpersonal’. He suggests a unifying concept of quality as ‘that kind of care which is 
expected to maximize an inclusive measure of patient welfare, after one has taken account 
of the balance of expected gains and losses that attend the process of care in all parts[42].
Chapter 2
Inequalities and the H ealth  
Sector in Brazil
2.1 B rief D escription o f the Country
Brazil is a large country (8,511,957 square kilometres) with population esti­
mated at 138 million in 1986. The country has been going through impor­
tant demographic and socio-economic changes. The population growth rate 
started to decline in the 1960s; this rate was estimated as 2.3 per cent in 
1985. It is estimated that in that year 36.4 per cent of the population were 
under 14 years old and 6.6 per cent aged 60 years or more. It is expected 
that the proportion of population falling within this older age group will in­
crease. By the year two thousand, it is estimated by the Brazilian Institute 
of Statistics and Geography (IBGE) that about 14.5 million people will be 
over the age of 60.
Brazil is a Federal State divided into 26 states (1988) and a Federal 
District (Brasilia). The states are divided into 4,491 municipalities, which 
are the lowest level of the political-administrative division of the country.
During the 1960s and 1970s Brazil showed an extremely good economic 
performance with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increasing five fold during 
this period. It was a period of soaring industrial production. The so called 
‘economic miracle’ was directed by the military dictatorship that ruled the 
country from 1964 to the end of 1984.
However, the benefits of this period of prosperity in the Brazilian econ­
omy were very unevenly distributed between regions and social groups, 
building up a country which shows, nowadays, levels of social inequalities 
which are among the greatest in the world.
The average income in the country in 1987 was 2,020 USA dollar per 
head. However, wealth is extremely poorly distributed. The legal minimum
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wage in the country is about forty pounds sterling per month. In 1983, 
about 33.5 per cent of people in employment earned about a minimum legal 
wage. During the ‘economic miracle’, the richest 10 per cent of the popula­
tion absorbed about 50 per cent of GDP. In 1960, the richest 1.0 per cent 
people within the economically active population accounted for 12.0 per cent 
of the national income. This increased to 17.0 per cent in 1980[185]. In­
equalities are also widespread between regions, with the southeast and the 
south having a large proportion of the country’s wealth.
Migration from rural and poor regions (the north and northeast) to more 
developed urban areas, mainly in the southeast region, increased dramati­
cally during the decades of economic growth. In 1980, 67 per cent of the 
Brazilian population was already living in urban areas.
The military government was characterized by a large concentration of 
resources and power in the executive branch of the Federal Government, 
leaving local governments largely dependent on the central government. The 
authoritarian and centralized government gaye incentives for political bar­
gaining with the military government as the main route for the distribution 
of financial resources from the Federal government to the local governments.
In 1985, the first civilian President took office. The era of economic 
growth came to an end in the final years of the 1970s. The economy of the 
eighties was characterized by rising inflation (by 1989 the annual inflation 
rate was about 1800 per cent), increasing social problems and by the country 
having to face a large foreign debt, mainly created by money being borrowed 
from international banks by the military government and by the rise in 
interest rates on the international market.
During the nineteen-eighties, the economy showed signs of recovery es­
pecially in the years of 1985 and 1986, following the optimism in the country 
with regard to the policies of the new civilian government. However, in the 
last years of the 1980s, it became evident that the social and economic prob­
lems were deepening and that the government had not been able to prevent 
this situation from getting worse.
One indicator of the seriousness of the social problems of the country is 
the high infant mortality rate. In 1980, the infant mortality rate (77 per 
1,000) was larger than that found in other middle-income Latin American 
countries[197]. It was much larger than the infant mortality rate observed 
for Costa Rica (17 per 1,000). Although much smaller, it is a poorer Latin 
American country, but with a long-standing tradition of investing in social 
policy[2]. In 1985, expenditure on health in Costa Rica was 7.8 per cent of 
GDP and on education it was 3.7 per cent of GDP.
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The infant mortality rate also presents a large regional gradient, ranging 
from 121 per 1,000 in the northeast region to 75 per 1,000 in the southeast 
region. However, within regions variations also exist, with the high-income 
groups presenting lower rates.
Social inequalities existing throughout the country are also expressed 
by other health indicators. Life expectancy varies markedly between geo­
graphical regions and family income groups. In 1980, life expectancy was 
52 years in the northeast region and 64 years in the southeast, showing that 
the population living in the more developed regions were likely to live much 
longer. The same is true for the higher income groups with a life expectancy 
of about 70 years, while the lower income groups were experiencing a life 
expectancy of less then 55 years.
Causes of death also vary by geographical regions. In the north and 
northeast regions there is a great number of deaths associated with Infectious 
Diseases. On the other hand, in the southeast, one third of deaths are caused 
by Diseases of the Circulatory System. Nevertheless, a high frequency of 
deaths caused by Diseases of the Circulatory System in the poorest regions 
can be observed.
Violence has also increased sharply in the last decade. Deaths due to 
injuries account for about 13.0 per cent of all deaths in the country. Motor 
vehicle accidents and homicides are the two most predominant causes of 
death from injuries.
The mixed pattern of mortality characterized by large mortality rates 
from diseases of underdevelopment such as Infectious Diseases associated 
with large rates of Chronic Diseases, Cancer and the high level of violence 
in the country are indicators of the outcome of the development process that 
kept important groups in Brazilian society living in very deprived conditions.
2.2 T he Brazilian H ealth Care System
In 1988, the new Brazilian Constitution was promulgated. It contained 
important changes regarding the conception of the Brazilian Health Care 
System. The new constitution holds the State responsible for the health 
of all citizens. The principle of equity was established. Access to health 
care became universal with access to publicly financed services becoming a 
constitutional right. Related changes in the administrative structure of the 
health sector greatly augmented the participation of local governments and 
the integration of publicly financed services.
Important changes in the finance of the health sector were also intro-
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duced by the new constitution. A social security budget was established to 
finance the areas of health, social benefits and social services.
In spite of these historical developments, this section aimed to provide 
an outline of the Brazilian Health Care System at the time of this empir­
ical study. Therefore, it concentrates on presenting the system as it was 
characterized in 1986.
* * *
The main feature of the Brazilian Health Care System has been a compul­
sory insurance scheme established in the country in 1923. Authors such as: 
Cecilia Donnangelo[44], Cristina Possas[149], Malloy[108], Hesio Cordeiro[31], 
Jaime de Oliveira and Sonia Fleury[141], among others, have studied the his­
torical developments of social security in Brazil. Having started as a scheme 
restricted to a few occupational groups (initially for the railway workers) 
it went gradually, in the course of more than 60 years, in the direction of 
expanding its coverage.
Nonetheless, the structure of services, developed throughout these years, 
as a result of the social security policy adopted in the country, is character­
ized by a very inequitable provision of services.
The highly selective structure of the Brazilian system is based on the 
pluralistic participation of various public and private institutions or services 
in the provision of health care to the population. The division of labour 
between and within the public and private sectors is defined by the existing 
variety of health care markets in the Brazilian Health Care System. This 
means different providers responded to particular demands for health care 
services. Roughly speaking, the privately-owned services were used by the 
better off and the public services by the more deprived social groups.
The criteria of ownership of services give a general classification of providers 
of care in the health care market, between public and private institutions. 
The financing of services, however, allows a further specification of these 
markets. In the Brazilian Health Care System, the major source of finance 
has been the governmental compulsory social security scheme. Therefore, 
private health care services were further divided in regard to their reliance 
on social security financing:
• The dependent private sector (financed by social security)
• The independent private sector (financed by private sources)
In 1986, there were also various public institutions associated with the 
provision of health care services. These were:
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• The Ministry of Health and the States’ and the Municipalities’ Health 
Departments.
• The Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MPAS)
• The Ministry of Education
As will be discussed later on in this chapter, since the second half of the 
1970s, social security slowly started to finance services delivered by public 
health institutions owned by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Edu­
cation and the local Health Departments. This trend received great inputs 
from the health care reforms introduced during the nineteen-eighties.
2 .2 .1  T h e  F in a n c in g  o f  th e  B razilian  H e a lth  C are S y s te m
In 1987, Brazil was spending an estimated 4.0 per cent of Gross Domestic 
Product on health services. It is estimated that this expenditure is about 
equally divided between public and private sources. The bill for health care 
grew, in real terms, by 20.0 per cent annually in the 1970s. This bill was 
estimated to be about 13,650 billion US dollars in 1989.
What do these figures indicate? Is Brazil’s level of expenditure on health 
services low or excessive? There is no straightforward answer to this ques­
tion and a better way to approach it is by comparison with other countries. 
Nevertheless, comparison also faces certain limitations. Given the exist­
ing system in Brazil, countries which have a National Health System (low- 
expenditure) such as Britain, do not provide a good source for comparison. 
West Germany, which has a system based on compulsory insurance and the 
United States, with a large private (for-profit) sector, are better sources. 
These two countries spent a high share of the GDP on health (11.2 per for 
the United States of America and 8.2 per cent for West Germany in 1987). 
Both the United States and West Germany have a structure of health care 
services that puts them amongst those countries with the highest levels of 
expenditure per capita in the world.
Differences between Brazil and the developed countries include those 
relating to morbidity, mortality and population structure, thus limiting the 
possibility of comparison. On top of this, there are large differences in 
wealth, which is positively correlated with levels of health care expenditure. 
Nevertheless, comparing the relationship between health care expenditure 
and GDP per head in Brazil with that of developed countries, the level 
of expenditure on health in the country is considered very low, even when
45
taking a low expenditure developed country such as Britain (6.1 per cent of 
GDP in 1987) as a basis for comparison.
Expenditure per capita in Brazil in 1987, was also much lower (80.8 
dollars) than other middle-income countries such as Portugal (170 dollars) or 
Venezuela (258.4 dollars)[119]. In 1976, the expenditure per capita in Brazil 
was estimated to be 28 dollars. Therefore, despite the increase experienced 
between 1976 and 1987, there still remains a need for a large increase in 
health care expenditure in the country, in order to respond to the health 
care needs of the population.
On the other hand, when one considers the structure of the existing 
health care system in Brazil, with some sectors of care providing services at 
a similar stage of development to that observed for the developed countries, 
one has to expect that expenditure will vary substantially between social 
groups within Brazilian society.
Data from the National Household Survey (PNAD -  1981) showed that 
the out-of-pocket expenditure on health for the Brazilian population is 
greater for the higher income groups. However, the low income groups were 
expending a higher proportion of their income on health care than the rich. 
The pattern of services purchased also varied * with the poor spending more 
on unprescribed medicines while the high income groups were spending more 
on the purchase of services provided by doctors[197]. It reflects the pattern 
of inequalities existing in the country with the high-income groups making a 
more intensive use of official medicine, in spite of carrying a relatively lower 
burden in the finance of health services.
* * *
The compulsory social security scheme in Brazil was run by the Ministry 
of Welfare and Social Security -  MPAS. Social security agencies were inte­
grated in the National Social Insurance and Assistance System- SINPAS, 
established by law in 1978 -  as shown by table 2.1.
The scheme is maintained by revenues from social security contributions, 
federal government contributions and other contributions. Contributions are 
made compulsorily by salaried employees, employers (directors who receive 
honoraria and associates of firms were made compulsory contributors to 
social security in 1960), self-employed people, domestic workers and com­
pulsory contributions which are levied on the pay-roll of urban companies.
Since 1974, the population covered by social security has included every 
self-employed person and everyone with a legal contract of work. It also 
includes the rural population -  rural employers, peasants and fishermen.
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Table 2.1: Social Insurance and Assistance System- SINPAS. 1982.
Function Organ Structure of Expenditure
Social Security INPS 72.2%
Medical and Dental 
Assistance INAMPS 23.3%
Pharmaceutical
Assistance CEME not included
Fiscal and Finance 
Administration IAPAS 3.0%
Data Processing DATAPREV not included
Social Assistance
Needy
Minors
LBA
FUNABEM
1.0%
0.4%
The percentage figures of compulsory contributions to social security has 
increased throughout the years. The last change in these figures was in 1982, 
as one of the ways utilized to control the existing deficit. Urban companies’ 
contributions were raised from 8 to 10 per cent and employees’ contributions 
from 8.0 per cent to a higher contribution which varies according to the wage 
level.
There is no minimum contribution as such for compulsory contributors. 
The minimum contribution is based on the minimum legal wage which is the 
minimum remuneration a person can receive by law when employed. The 
minimum legal wage is based on a maximum of eight hours of work per 
day. With few exceptions, one of which happens with doctors1, there is no 
regulation for part-time jobs in the Brazilian law. But, there is a ceiling for 
compulsory contributions which is based on twenty minimum legal wages.
Urban companies are levied at 10.0 per cent of the pay-roll up to a ceiling 
of 20 minimum legal wages. Self-employed people pay 19.2 per cent of their 
earnings according to a table of base-wages, which increases progressively, 
depending on time of contribution. Every urban company pays a rural wel­
fare contribution of 2.4 per cent levied on the pay-roll and rural companies
1 For doctors, however, a minimum wage is established for part-time work (three legal 
minimum wages)
(
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Table 2.2: Levels of contributions to social security according to salaries. 
1982.
Legal Minimum Wage Contribution Percentage
Up to 3 times 8.50%
3 - 5  times 8.75%
5 - 1 0  times 9.00%
10 -  15 times 9.50%
1 5 - 2 0  times 10.00%
Table 2.3: Participation of contributions in SINPAS revenue. 1979.
Total Revenue 100.0%
Compulsory Contributions 94.0%
Others 1.0%
Funds from Federal Government 5.0%
pay to social security 2.5 per cent of the value of their production when it 
is sold. In 1985, the percentage figures of these contributions are shown in 
table 2.2. The proportional participation of these contributions, in 1979, in 
SINPAS revenue were as shown in table 2.3.
Social security’s contributions are very much based on contributions 
levied on the pay-roll of urban companies (62.0 per cent of compulsory 
contributions) and employers’ and workers’ contributions (32.0 per cent of 
compulsory contributions). The participation of the federal government in 
the scheme is very low, despite the range of social programmes provided by 
the system.
The way the Brazilian compulsory insurance system was financed put 
much more pressure on labour intensive companies than on capital inten­
sive ones. Moreover, the system’s finance was heavily dependent on existing 
levels of employment. SINPAS was mainly financed by the urban workers 
and the population in general, since companies’ contributions to social se­
curity have repercussions on the price of goods and services. This financing 
structure minimizes the redistributional impact of social security.
The treasury budget participation was low due to the low participation 
in SINPAS revenue, the low share of the Ministry of Health in the treasury 
budget and the high concentration of money at the national level, leaving 
states and municipalities with limited scope to finance social policy.
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INAMPS has the biggest budget within governmental health institutions 
in Brazil. In 1982 it was eight times bigger than that of the Ministry of 
Health. The participation of INAMPS in SINPAS’ expenditure attained a 
high level during the 1970s, going beyond 30.0 per cent in 1976 and 1977.
* * *
At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the country was 
facing an important social crisis and economic recession (GNP in 1981 fell 
by 1.9 per cent). This slowing down of the economy has had a considerable 
effect on the employment rate and the value of wages in real terms, thereby 
affecting social security revenue.
Since 1979 social security has been in deficit, with the deficit increasing 
year by year. In 1981 the annual accumulated deficit amounted to 360 
billion cruzeiros (exclusive of treasury transfers), equivalent to 1.3 per cent 
of the GDP. In this year the deficit of SINPAS was met by transfers from 
the treasury and credit resources. In 1982, the gap was closed by raising 
social security taxes by the equivalent of 1.3 per cent of GNP. Nevertheless, 
in 1983 the financial situation of social security started to deteriorate again 
to recover only in 1985. SINPAS closed the year of 1985 with a surplus[88]. 
The reason for the better performance of SINPAS, during the year 1985 
was related to the policies adopted by the new civilian government. The 
economy started to grow again and the unemployment rate underwent a 
decline.
The health sector was specifically penalized during the first years of 
the economic recession in the early eighties. Financial cuts in this sector 
were larger than those observed in other sectors. INAMPS’ participation in 
SINPAS expenditure dropped from 29.4 per cent in 1980 to 22.0 per cent 
in 1983. The health care share in total federal expenditure also decreased 
from 21.5 per cent in 1978 to 19.4 per cent in 1980.
In the years between 1984 and 1987 there was a slow recovery of total 
federal expenditure with health, however, once again showing signs of decline 
in 1988.
Therefore, during the economic recession of the late 1970s and early 
1980s there was a decline in the financial resources available to the health 
sector. At the same time, wages deteriorated and contributions to social 
security increased, worsening even more the social condition of the popula­
tion.
Governmental reforms (which will be discussed later in this chapter) 
within the health care sector started to cope with these financial constraints
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together with pressures from groups in society for a more effective and eq­
uitable health care policy.
In summary, despite the participation of various institutions in the de­
livery of health care, the finance of the system is mainly supported by the 
urban workers through the compulsory insurance scheme. The treasury 
budget participation is low and health policy has a low impact on the redis­
tribution of income, in a society with very large income inequalities such as 
Brazil. The way social security was financed made it extremely vulnerable 
at times of economic recession. The allocation of limited financial resources 
discriminates in favour of the wealthier regions and the high-income groups. 
Criteria for the allocation of financial resources were largely based on the 
political pressure of interest groups which ended up having a poor impact 
on the equity of the system and the health status of the population.
2.3 The Public Sector
2 .3 .1  T h e  M in is tr y  o f  W elfare and  S o c ia l S ecu r ity  — M P A S
The Social Security Scheme is run by the Ministry of Welfare and Social 
Security
Coverage In 1986 the number of contributors to the system was 27,479,500(59]. 
But, the population covered by the system was much larger and also included 
contributors’ dependents, rural employees and, since 1974, the elderly (over 
seventy years old) and the disabled. The System considers as contributors’
dependents the following:
\
• The wife, the disabled husband, the female companion for more than 
five years of the contributor, any son under eighteen years old (older 
if disabled), and single daughters under twenty years old or older if 
disabled.
• Designated person; if male only under eighteen years old or above sixty 
years old or disabled.
• A disabled father and/or mother.
• Brother under eighteen years old or disabled and a single sister under 
twenty one years old or other if disabled.
The System has a discriminatory definition of dependents in that wives 
cannot claim their husbands as their dependents, unless disabled. In terms
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of the Institute for Health Care -  IN AMPS, the contributor who leaves the 
System will still be covered, including his or her dependents, for a period 
of up to two years. In 1974, it was established that in case of emergency, 
anyone could use the health services financed by IN AMP S.
The MPAS estimate in 1979[126] was that 87.0 per cent of the economi­
cally active population (EAP) was covered by social security, 100.0 per cent 
of the rural population and a somewhat smaller proportion of the urban 
population. These figures were, however, over-estimated since they do not 
account for the real size of the informal labour market in Brazilian society. 
Research indicates that about 50.0 per cent of the economically active popu­
lation in the country did not have a legal contract of work in 1985[89]. This 
means to say that 50.0 per cent of the EAP were not-insured. Moreover, 
coverage to social security did not mean access to health care services, since 
the availability of services varied largely between the regions and areas in 
the country as a whole.
* * *
In 1981, as a result of the economic recession, the Ministry of Welfare and 
Social Security created a consultative council -  CONASP with the objective 
of devising the guidelines for the reorganization of social security health care 
policy. CONASP’s guidelines, issued in 1982, were mainly directed at cost 
control measures based on:
• Emphasis on primary and ambulatory care.
• Higher participation and integration of public services.
• Change in the reimbursement scheme used to pay contracted private 
hospitals.
• Increase in the regulation of services contracted-out.
• Increase in the control on high technology treatments, mainly through 
controlling referrals to these services.
These reforms were also directed at increasing the access of the not- 
insured population to services financed by INAMPS. CONASP’s guidelines 
started to be implemented at the beginning of 1983. To increase the partic­
ipation and integration of public institutions, the Integrated Health Actions 
(AIS) were established with the aim of providing in each state a commission 
with the participation of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Welfare
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and Social Security and the State Health Department to plan and manage 
the health care activities at this level. The objective was progressively to 
create similar commissions at the municipal level. This policy aimed at the 
establishment of a more coordinated, decentralized and democratic system. 
The structure of AIS also included as members, representatives of the local 
community such as voluntary associations, trade unions etc.
There was no well defined structure for the finance of AIS. INAMPS par­
ticipation included the remuneration of curative services delivered by local 
health secretaries. The remuneration scheme was basically designed to pay 
for each activity according to pre-established values (fee-for-service). Ser­
vices were to be organized on the basis of the principles of regionalization 
with universal access. CONASP’s guidelines for the reorganization process 
of INAMPS’ medical care also put INAMPS’ self-owned services under uni­
versal access.
Finally, amidst the reforms initiated in the 1980s, CIPLAN, the inter- 
ministerial coordinating group which included the Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security, designed to discuss the major 
organizational issues in the health sector decided, in 1984, that access to 
services financed by social security should become universal. However, the 
implementation of this occurred at a different pace in each state, follow­
ing the guidelines of and development of AIS[52]. This policy was further 
developed with a decree signed in 1987 which created the Unified and De­
centralized Health System -  SUDS. SUDS established the integration at the 
state level of all publicly financed health care services, which were to have 
universal access.
S tru c tu re  o f care The structure of care of INAMPS’ health care system is 
presented by each health care institution. This is because INAMPS structure 
is complex and articulated with almost every health care institution (sub­
sector of care) existing in the country.
Inam ps Self-Owned Services
IN AMPS’ self-owned services can be classified into two categories:
1. Hospitals (36 hospitals with 8,000 beds)
2. Polyclinics (ambulatory care -  PAM).
S tru c tu re  o f care PAMs are, in general, large health services which pro­
vide specialized ambulatory services. They have on average 15 consulting
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rooms per establishment. They are known in the country for their long 
queues and waiting lists.
Self-owned hospitals are mainly large hospitals providing specialized care 
and high technology diagnosis and treatment. Self-owned services, such as is 
the case with private hospitals, are more concentrated in the more developed 
areas of the country -  the southeast and south regions.
This sector of care has shown virtually no increase in the last two 
decades. There is also evidence indicating that self-owned hospitals in the 
major cities in the country were being under-utilized as was the case with 
other public services in the country as a whole[114].
In 1982, the division of labour between INAMPS’ self-owned hospitals 
and contracted private hospitals was such that the former were responsible 
for only 2.3 per cent of all hospital admissions financed by INAMPS and 27 
per cent of all ambulatory services2
The major aspect to bear in mind, however, is that services provided by 
self-owned services are concentrated in areas of more specialized care, which 
also tend to be more costly. In 1981, self-owned services were responsible for 
46 per cent of specialized ambulatory service consultations[70]. Self-owned 
hospitals are also responsible for one of the highest proportions of surgical 
discharges among those financed by INAMPS.
The private sector profits from the production of services by INAMPS 
self-owned services. The former has the major share of the market for the 
provision of laboratory examinations, X Ray and other diagnostic examina­
tions. The demand for these examinations generated by self-owned services 
(mainly by PAMs) are partially provided by private services.
The high use of drugs and the high consumption of medical technol­
ogy has large acceptability among the Brazilian population. The growth of 
the consumption of medical technology was associated with many different 
aspects:
• The payment of services contracted out on a fee-for-services basis.
• The existence in the country of a sizeable medical industrial complex 
promoting the market for their products.
• The expansion of the private sector for new areas of care.
• The prevalent medical practice in the public services of a very short 
consultation time.
2Other relevant providers of ambulatory services in the Brazilian Health Care System  
at that time were contracted private hospitals, private practices, group medical plans and 
local Health Departments.
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As previously presented, at the beginning of the 1970s, there was an im­
portant increase in the population covered by social security. This increase 
in coverage was followed by an even larger increase in the delivery of ser­
vices financed by INAMPS. Between 1970 and 1981, the number of hospital 
admissions, consultations and laboratory examinations increased by about
350.0 per cent each and X Ray examinations increased by 700.0 per cent 
during the same period. The rate of consultation per head of population 
increased in the country from 0.53 in 1973 to 1.46 in 1980. The proportion of 
the population admitted to hospital doubled between 1973 and 1983 (from 
6 to 12 per cent).
Nevertheless, the participation of self-owned services in the provision of 
services declined in relative terms, defining the main characteristics of this 
expansion of services which was concentrated in the private sector. The 
participation of self-owned services in hospital admissions decreased from 
4.6 per cent in 1971 to 2.3 in 1983, in the delivery of consultations from
83.0 to 27.0 per cent and in the delivery of laboratory examinations from
48.0 to 17.0 per cent. Despite this decline in the provision of care, the 
share of these services in IN AMPS expenditure remained almost the same 
(20 per cent in 1971 and 18 per cent in 1982), suggesting among other 
issues, a concentration of IN AMPS self-owned services in the delivery of 
more complex and expensive care.
P rov iders  o f care Doctors working in self-owned services are contracted 
by INAMPS and paid on a salaried basis. Contracts are part-time, although 
it is possible to have two contracts. Within the public sector, INAMPS 
doctors receive the best salaries. They are recognized by the Medical Unions 
as attractive salaries. ;
Nonetheless, it is widely known in the country[86] that INAMPS’ doctors 
work less than the contracted number of hours per week. The INAMPS 
administration has had enormous difficulties in decentralizing doctors to 
the hospitals located in the less developed districts within the Metropolitan 
Regions. Actually, the lobby of doctors to maintain their privileges has 
played an important role in undermining the success of reforms within the 
health sector.
The Brazilian constitution does not allow most people to have more than 
one public job, but doctors are permitted to hold two. There is also no legal 
restriction for doctors to work in the private sector and hold a public job. 
A large proportion of doctors in the country as a whole work for at least 
one public service. Furthermore, the trend in the country is for doctors
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to hold more than one job. In 1981, doctors in the Metropolitan Region 
of Sao Paulo had on average 3.5 separate employments[43] The manpower 
structure of self-owned services accounts for a higher proportion of skilled 
workers, when compared with the other institutions in the health care field.
2 .3 .2  T h e  M in istr y  o f  H e a lth  and  th e  s ta t e ’s H e a lth  D e p a r t­
m en ts
T h e  M in istry  o f H ealth
The institution in Brazil that was traditionally involved with the provision 
of health care to the poor has been the Ministry of Health. This Ministry 
was also responsible for defining and implementing Public Health Policy.
In 1953, the Ministry of Education and Health created in 1930 split into 
two, one of which became the Ministry of Health. With the creation of 
the Ministry of Health, the National Department of Public Health, which 
was the first government administrative structure for health, was dissolved. 
Paradoxically, since the creation of the Ministry of Health as an independent 
organ, the Public Health Sector started to lose place in the government’s 
policy. Budget constraints, internal political crises and low coordination 
between vertical programs became elements associated with the Ministry of 
Heath, from this period onwards.
F inance The Ministry of Health was financed by tax revenues which with 
other financial resources, constituted the Treasury Budget. From 1970 to 
1982, the Ministry of Health has received a low share of Treasury expendi­
ture, with extremes between: 1.1 per cent in 1970 and 1.8 per cent in 1979. 
In 1982 the share was still below that of 1979. The share of the financial 
pie given to the Ministry of Health was kept at very low levels even during 
the period of the ‘economic miracle’. So, the thin budget of the Ministry 
of Health is not only related to periods of economic recession, but is also 
the result of the health policy adopted in the country as a whole, directed 
toward curative and hospital care financed by social security.
Actually, a small increase in the finance of the Ministry of Health was 
only achieved just after the short period of economic ‘boom’ of the Brazilian 
economy. Reforms occurred just after this period, among them, the creation 
of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MPAS). These reforms were 
related to the political weakness of the Military Regime and the worsening 
health status of the Brazilian population. There is research evidence that 
in Sao Paulo, during the period of economic growth, there was an increase
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in infant mortality rates[196].
The economic recession of the early 1980s brought severe financial con­
straints to this Ministry, minimizing still further the scope of the Public 
Health Programme[197]. The impact of cuts, in the share of financial re­
sources from the Treasury Budget, was only not more dramatic due to finan­
cial resources from the Social Development Fund (FINSOCIAL) -  a compul­
sory fund created in 1982 by the government to finance programmes in the 
social sectors. The fund was administrated by the National Economic and 
Social Development Bank (BNDES), with resources derived from an ear­
marked gross sales tax. A large part of programmes funded by FINSOCIAL 
make up current expenditures.
FINSOCIAL started to participate in the finance of the Ministry of 
Health from 1982, allocating financial resources to programmes directed to 
primary care and the control of Infectious Diseases.
S tru c tu re  o f care, coverage and  financing Traditionally, the partic­
ipation of the Ministry of Health in the provision of health care has been 
based on inpatient care for the poor, related to special health problems such 
as tuberculosis, leprosy and mental illness. A few hospitals are directed to­
wards high technology care such as the Hospital of Cancer (INCA) in the 
city of Rio de Janeiro.
With few exceptions, public hospitals are known to be under-utilized 
and inefficient. Public hospitals are financed on an annual budget basis.
P ro v id er o f care Doctors and other para-medical professionals are paid 
on a salaried basis. Doctors are generally contracted part-time but full­
time contracts do also exist, although in a lower proportion. Problems of 
absenteeism among doctors in the public sector is high.
S ta te  and  M unicipalities H ealth  D epartm en ts
The public health policy defined at Ministry level was implemented by State 
and Municipality Departments of Health (Secretarias de Saude). Local Gov­
ernment was also responsible for providing Emergency Services.
I
F inancing  Health Departments were financed to a great extent by local 
taxation. Local financial resources were strongly constrained during the 
Military Government by a high concentration of financial resources at the 
national level. Participation of the Ministry of Health in local Health De­
partments’ finance is uneven throughout the country. The distribution of
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financial resources, from national to local levels, tended to follow more po­
litical rather than technical criteria.
Until the creation of CONASP in 1982, INAMPS participation in the 
finance of services provided by local Secretaries was very small. Agreements 
with IN AMPS used to involve only a few of the existing local public services. 
Agreement between these two institutions was rarely established despite the 
fact that the population covered by INAMPS were utilizing Health Depart­
ments’ services. Insured lower occupational and income groups and the 
people living in less developed regions are likely to have less access to IN­
AMPS’ self-owned services which tend to be concentrated in the cities of 
the more developed regions and municipalities.
These contracts implied that INAMPS would reimburse the Health De­
partment for services provided to the social security covered population. In 
1981, participation of other public services in IN AMPS expenditure (not in­
cluding teaching hospitals) was only 4.7 per cent. Nonetheless, of the total 
contracts established by INAMPS with other public institutions, 95.0 per 
cent were contracts with Health Departments.
However, the reforms initiated by CONASP and initially implemented 
by AIS, defined the basic principles of the reformulation process to occur in 
the Brazilian health sector during the 1980s. One major objective of these 
reforms was to increase the role of local governments in the organization, 
financing and provision of health care services. Throughout this decade, 
mainly between 1984 and 1989, there was a steady rise in the transfer of 
resources from IN AMPS to the local Health Departments [119].
S tru c tu re  o f C are The range of care and accessibility to services vary 
between Health Departments. It depends on the size and wealth of states 
and municipalities and on the level of success of local politicians in their 
bargaining for the transfer of federal resources.
On average, services are provided through a network of public heath ser­
vices directed at public health activities and basic curative services. Health 
Departments’ services tend to be underdeveloped and of low quality. Gen­
erally, services are small in size (a mean of 2.4 consulting rooms per service) 
and are located at the community level. Given the existing low level of 
coordination between institutions in the Brazilian Health Care System, the 
population dependent on services provided by the Health Departments have 
little access to secondary and tertiary care.
Until CONASP’s guidelines there was no formal agreement amongst pub­
lic institutions with regard to referrals of patients to different levels of care.
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The situation was so dramatic that generally there were not even formal 
procedures for referring patients between the Health Department’s own ser­
vices.
In summary, services provided by Health Departments were community- 
based, of low technical complexity and not integrated with secondary and 
tertiary levels of care. Moreover, access to local services tended also to be 
insufficient. Low availability of services at the community level generated 
pressure of demand on emergency services, located in emergency hospitals, 
where the bulk of patients with acute and chronic conditions end up. As a 
result, groups within the Brazilian population, dependent on these services, 
were getting access at more advanced stages of illness. They were the low 
income groups [173] and not-insured population. When one considers that 
the incidence of almost all diseases is higher in lower social class groups, 
the effect of this structure was to aggravate the selective risk of unnecessary 
death and suffering among those deprived and less prestigious social groups.
* * *
During the second half of the 1970s, the Health Departments, specially in 
the north and northeast regions (the poorest in the country), increased their 
capacity to deliver health care, stimulated by PIASS, a large programme 
carried out by the Ministry of Health since 1976. PIASS was financed by 
the Social Assistance Fund (FAS) -  see page 59 -  and by financial aid 
provided by international organizations. PIASS was directed to cover all 
northeastern towns and villages of up to 20,000 people. The programme 
aimed to provide basic health and sanitation services. By the early 1980s, 
about 4800 health posts, 4300 health centres and 310 rural hospitals had 
been constructed or rebuilt. The operation of PIASS involved 30,000 village 
health workers and health attendants, 7,800 health technicians and 13,500 
nurses, doctors and other professionals. But, there is evidence that PIASS 
services were generally unsatisfactory and gained little public acceptance[22].
The failure of PIASS was mainly related to the underdevelopment of 
services, but the programme has had an impact in terms of generating pres­
sure on INAMPS to participate more effectively in the finance of the Health 
Departments’ services.
P rov iders  o f care Doctors contracted by the Health Departments are 
paid on a salaried basis. Doctors’ salaries tend to be very low, with Local 
Health Departments, in general, paying salaries much lower than those paid
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by INAMPS. The imbalance of salary levels has been another great difficulty 
for the process of integration of public services.
Contracts can be full and/or part-time. Criteria are seen to vary locally. 
The manpower structure is based on less qualified human resources and tends 
to recruit professionals of lower prestige in the health care field. There is a 
low proportion of graduate nurses and a high concentration of non-qualified 
nurses (with 3 to 6 months training). In some areas, health workers (local 
people trained to provide health care services) also participate. Among 
doctors, there is a comparatively higher concentration of women and young 
doctors[132].
2 .3 .3  T h e  M in istr y  o f  E d u ca tio n
Besides the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security and Ministry of Health 
as public institutions associated with the provision of health care services, 
there is also the Ministry of Education. This is responsible for the Teaching 
Hospitals.
F inancing  Teaching hospitals started to be highly financed by social se­
curity in 1974. By 1981, these hospitals consumed 2.2 per cent of INAMPS 
expenditure. The payment scheme adopted to remunerate these hospitals 
was based on fee-for-services. This scheme was a special one devised to remu­
nerate teaching hospitals. Services were paid by the number of discharges, 
grouped in classes by type of treatment provided. Payment of hospital bills 
was dependent on the achievement by the hospital of a pre-established rate 
of consultations per inpatient admission.
Since 1987, however, teaching hospitals have started to be financed by a 
similar payment mechanism used to reimburse private hospitals contracted 
by IN AMPS, adopting the AIH form as the instrument for reimbursement 
(see chapters III and IV).
In 1985, in line with the universalization policy established by CONASP’s 
guidelines, IN AMPS started to pay for every discharge in teaching hospitals 
regardless of the insurance status of the patient. One observed impact of this 
change was that the demand for basic care upon these high-technology hos­
pitals has increased, possibly indicating a change in the social structure of 
patients demanding care at teaching hospitals. Between 1985 and 1987, the 
number of teaching hospital discharges also increased by 13.0 per cent[197].
S tru c tu re  o f C are Teaching hospitals are, generally, tertiary hospitals, 
providing specialized care and emergency seryices. Their patients’ case-mix
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tends to be slightly more costly than patients admitted to private hospitals 
financed by IN AMPS and they appear to be significantly sicker than those 
treated at private hospitals[197].
P rovider o f  care Doctors in public teaching hospitals are paid, on a 
salaried basis, by the Ministry of Education. In the case of full-time con­
tracts this does not directly imply any restriction on private practice.
* * *
It is important to highlight, also, another feature present in a few public hos­
pitals, which provide specialized and costly care. These are public services 
which provide a range of their beds for private patients. The best exam­
ple is The Heart Institute (INCOR) -  a high-technology and high-quality 
hospital owned by the University of the State of Sao Paulo. INCOR has 
mixed finance both from public funds and from agreements established with 
companies and group health plans. However, the main beneficiaries of such 
high-technology services are the higher income groups in society.
2.4 T he Private Sector
The private sector in Brazil is a very important provider of health care 
services. It has become the major owner of health care services in the 
country. In 1985 it owned 78.0 per cent of all national hospitals but, a lower 
proportion of ambulatory services.
Data from 1967 show that already the private sector was even then 
the major owner of beds in the country. Between 1967 and 1979 about 
two hundred thousand new beds were built, of which 95.0 per cent were 
in the private sector[70]. The distribution of these private beds was highly 
concentrated in the south and southeast regions (72.0 per cent) in spite of 
these regions having about 59.0 per cent of the population.
The power of the private sector to increase its participation in the Brazil­
ian health care sector has been such that between 1967 and 1979, in the 
southeast region, there was a decrease of about 9000 public beds and an 
increase of about one hundred thousand new private beds[70].
This expansion of private beds was basically financed by the Social As­
sistance Fund (FAS) created by the government in 1974 to finance the social 
development of more deprived areas and populations. Actually its funds 
were mainly directed to finance the expansion of private beds[19].
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Within the private sector, 50.0 per cent of hospitals are profit-making. 
Some of them are owned by doctors. The profit-making private sector has 
also been the major cause of the growth in the number of hospital beds 
during the decade of the 1970s[70]. In recent years, the charity non-profit 
making services have lost place, in the relative number of beds, to the profit- 
making hospitals.
2 .4 .1  T h e  D e p e n d e n t P r iv a te  S ecto r
The dependent private sector is constituted by private hospitals which have 
services paid by INAMPS. These are the so called contracted private hospi­
tals.
The dependent private sector has been the major provider of inpatient 
care in the country. In 1978, 67.0 per cent of the private health services ex­
isting in the country had a contract with INAMPS[118]. In 1981, contracted 
private hospitals were responsible for 56.0 per cent of IN AMPS’ expenditure. 
They were responsible for 75.4 per cent of admissions financed by INAMPS 
in 1986.
To better understand the predominance of the dependent private sector 
in the Brazilian Health Care System one must go back to the 1950s, when 
the health care sector within social security started to expand.
The decade of the 1950s was a period of intensive industrialization in 
the country. The industrialization process, concentrated in the major cities 
of the southeast region, stimulated the increasing migration of people from 
rural and less developed areas to these cites. The concentration of pop­
ulation in the industrial cities, representing the potential labour force of 
the emergent economic process, generated increasingly greater pressure for 
health care services.
Social security, concerned with the provision of social benefits for the 
working population, was the governmental institution which responded to 
this demand. At the same time as health care provision increased, pub­
lic health and preventive activities started to lose place in the Brazilian 
Health System. Ambulatory and preventive services lost place to hospital 
services[19].
The emphasis on inpatient services (the hospital model) was not followed 
by an expansion of social security self-owned hospitals. Increasingly, services 
started to be contracted out, particularly, to for-profit hospitals, generating 
demand for the private sector.
Actually, the expansion of this sector is a result of the conception of social 
security by its technocracy, which shared the idea that health care should
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not represent an important fraction of social security benefits[141]. To avoid 
a high level of investment in this sector, there should not be an expansion 
of services but rather a purchase of services from other institutions.
Therefore, the origin of the dependent private sector’s expansion was 
pressure from inside the social security administration. Later on, in the 
1960s, the Brazilian Federation of Hospitals (FBH) was created to lobby for 
the interests of contracted private hospitals.
Another important aspect to be considered is that the private sector 
exerted pressure on the social security administration through what came to 
be known as the ‘amphibious bureaucrat’. That is, the presence in the social 
security administration of doctor owners of contracted private hospitals and 
of people directly linked with the interests of this sector.
The unification of the social security schemes in 1967 and the Plan for 
Immediate Action (PPA) in 1974 acted as new stimuli for the growth of the 
dependent private sector. For a long period, the characteristics of INAMPS 
health care provision was to be shaped by the strong participation of this 
sector.
The great predominance of INAMPS in the Brazilian Health System 
meant that its characteristics were also the characteristics of the over all 
system. A high concentration of hospitals on the one hand, and a low 
availability of primary services on the other,, are the characteristics of the 
hospital model adopted until the late 1970s in Brazil.
In 1982, admissions in the country as a whole accounted for 12.0 per 
cent of the Brazilian population. This proportion was even higher in areas 
where there was a large concentration of private services such as the south 
region (16.0 per cent). This excess of hospital admissions (given the age 
structure of the Brazilian population) is a result of the hospital model and 
the payment scheme adopted at that time by INAMPS to remunerate these 
hospitals, as presented below.
However, the health policy of the 1980s was directed at changing the 
hospital model established during the 1960s and 1970s. Contracted private 
hospitals started to experience constraints in their relationship with social 
security, which began to get highly involved with the financing of other 
public services. Between 1982 and 1987 there was a reduction in the volume 
of admissions to contracted private hospitals., The share of the expenditure 
of INAMPS with contracted private hospitals dropped from 71.3 per cent in 
1981 to 45.9 in 1987. It is estimated that the amount of money paid by social 
security to contracted private hospitals in 1987 -  2.3 billion dollars[118] -  
represented 27.0 per cent of public expenditure on health in the same year.
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S tru c tu re  o f care The dependent private sector consists of both charity 
and profit-making services. However, in 1986 INAMPS adopted a policy 
which favoured charity-based contracted hospitals[125].
F inancing  The payment scheme to remunerate services provided by con­
tracted private hospitals was based on fee-for-service. This scheme proved 
to be extremely expensive and also difficult to control, allowing serious dis­
tortions and fraud in favour of better remuneration for hospitals including 
unnecessary admissions, a high rate of examinations per patient and so 
on [63].
In 1977, with the first financial deficit of Social Security, the dependent 
private sector began to be the subject of stricter regulatory measures. At 
the beginning, higher control was exercised on hospital bills with the cre­
ation of the social security’s Data Processing Center (DATAPREV). Later 
on, control over the expenditure of contracted private hospitals was also 
tried by INAMPS, by lowering the rate of increase in the value of each unit 
of payment. In 1982, one of the first measures adopted by CONASP was to 
change the payment scheme used to remunerate contracted private hospi­
tals. This new reimbursement mechanism is presented in detail in chapter 
IV. In the two years following the implementation of this new reimburse­
ment mechanism, contracted private hospitals performed 1.5 million fewer 
admissions than in the previous years. Further reductions were obtained by 
CIPLAN’s resolution, signed in March 1985, which established a ceiling on 
admissions for contracted private hospitals below the levels of 1983.
2 .4 .2  T h e  In d e p e n d e n t P r iv a te  S ecto r
Last but not least, there is the private market called in this study the in­
dependent private sector -  independent because it is not financially associ­
ated with government (social security). It is financed directly or indirectly 
(through commercial insurance companies or firms) by the consumer.
Since 1988, expenditure on health care plans has been allowed to be 
deducted from the income tax of individuals. This measure created an in­
centive for the development of this health care market. However, the same is 
not true for companies which are not permitted to deduct from their income 
taxes the expenditure incurred as a result of health care plans for their em­
ployees. Nonetheless, companies are allowed to transfer these expenditures 
to the prices of goods they sell [117].
There are little data about the independent private sector and, only 
recently, more detailed analysis of this sector of care has been produced[118,
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117].
Nonetheless, it is notorious that the last decade has seen an important 
growth in the role of the independent private sector in the finance and 
provision of health care services in Brazil. Actually, therefore, the increasing 
role of the public services in the provision of health care in the country did 
not limit the action of the private sector[118].
In fact, the private sector started a process of transforming itself with 
the creation of new and more modern modes of organization and financing 
of health care services, in the search for new markets outside the scope of 
the governmental insurance scheme.
This action seems to have been facilitated by the apparent shift of a 
relevant proportion of the middle class groups (and employees in more de­
veloped firms) to these new markets, as an alternative to the public service, 
mainly to those financed by social security. Moreover, because of the in­
creasing financial inability of the middle classes to purchase health services 
out-of-pocket, not only have groups within the middle class experienced re­
ductions in their purchasing power during the last decade, but also the levels 
of inflation experienced by the health sector have been higher than average 
inflation in the country[117].
Health plans were estimated to be covering about 20 million people by 
the end of the 1980s[197]. There is a variety of modes of organization of 
institutions offering health plans, as presented below:
• Group Medicine Plans
• Medical Cooperatives
• Private insurance
• Auto-programme
G roup  M edicine P lans These are the most important mode of organiza­
tion of services within the independent private sector. In 1987, the estimated 
population covered by these services was 15.3 million people[117].
Group Medicine Plans (Medicina de Grupo) are non-profit or profit- 
making health companies that mainly cover groups of people through con­
tracts with firms and are paid per insured person. They are the most im­
portant segment within the independent private market.
Most Group Medicine Plans in Brazil contract out services, but 36.0 per 
cent of them are also the providers of services[117]. In the United States, 
similar services are the Health Maintenance Organizations-HMOs. HMOs
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appeared in that country as an attempt by the profit-making private sector 
to ...“achieve greater penetration into the delivery of health care services. 
HMOs were conceived to be the organizational building blocks for a rational, 
corporate-run delivery system. Being designed for profit-making, the HMOs 
costs of rendering services contracted in the benefit packages are deducted 
from prepaid subscriber revenues.”[167].
In Brazil, Group Medicine Plans, are aimed at providing care for a se­
lective group within the population, mainly workers in the formal labour 
market employed by the most highly developed companies. They are mainly 
concentrated in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Group Medicine Plans started 
to appear in the country during the 1960s. The excess supply of doctors dur­
ing the 1960s and, especially, in the 1970s played an important part in the 
development of these organizations, holding down doctors’ salaries.
Financially, they were much weaker than the American HMOs. As men­
tioned above, most Group Medicine Plans have to contract out services in 
spite of being more efficient in providing their own services[117]. Not only 
that, but some Group Medicine Plans had to depend to a great extent, al­
though not entirely, on the financial participation of social security. When­
ever firms established a contract with a Group Medicine Plan, they could 
also extend it to IN AMPS. This meant that INAMPS would refund the firm 
its contributions on the basis of a fixed amount of money per employee. The 
amount of money varies in relation to the range of care and the coverage of 
the firm’s health care plan.
Since 1979, however, INAMPS froze the expansion of these agreements 
with firms. In the mid-eighties, they covered only about 5.0 per cent of 
INAMPS contributors and their dependents. In 1981 the participation of 
refunds to firms on INAMPS expenditure was 3.5 per cent.
One must notice, though, that not all private arrangements between com­
panies and Group Medicine Plans involve the participation of social security. 
In these cases, it meant that employers did not establish an agreement with 
social security to refund money for employees already covered by the firm’s 
health plan. The main reason for this is the high administrative costs in­
volved in including the participation of Social Security. The estimate of the 
Brazilian Society of Medical Groups (ABRAMGE) of private arrangements 
without the participation of social security in the country, was 30.0 in 1979.
Coverage Group Medicine Plans in Brazil offer group plans for com­
panies, but they also sell plans for families and individuals. The plans offered 
might cover only the insured person or might also include the dependents.
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It might provide only ambulatory care or be a comprehensive plan. Most 
of them, however, exclude very costly care, chronic and mental illness and 
some Infectious Diseases such as AIDS. This means that publicly financed 
services have to respond to the more costly care.
S tru c tu re  of C are When compared with other modalities of financ­
ing, HMOs show indications of better efficiency. A randomized control trial 
[109] was conducted to test the existence of variations in hospital use be­
tween services with different financing modalities. Prepaid group practices 
reduced by 40.0 per cent both admissions and length of stay when compared 
with fee-for-service with zero coinsurance. Andre Medici (1990) has shown 
that 50.0 per cent of the costs of the Group Medicine Plans in Brazil are 
related to ambulatory care and that their admissions rate is 7.1 per cent. 
This is a lower rate than the one observed for the population as a whole, 
as shown previously in this chapter. Their average length of stay (3.5 days) 
is also much lower than the average length of stay for contracted private 
hospitals in the country (7.12 days)[127]. This could be partly due to the 
better health status of the population these services cover.
One basic administrative strategy utilized by Group Medicine Plans to 
cut down the costs of services has been the organization of care on a more 
rational basis, namely by lower admission rates, by covering groups within 
the population with better health status and by limiting the coverage of 
high cost patients. Moreover, in Brazil, the allocation of insured people to 
different health care plans has been an additional aspect of the commer­
cial rationality of these enterprises[31, 37]. It reflects the culture of social 
discrimination existing among the high-income groups in Brazilian society. 
Group Medicine Plans offer special health care plans to senior management. 
This assures a different pattern of services and might also work as a way of 
attracting those who decide on the purchase of services.
Selection of health plans implies different patterns in the organization 
and delivery of care. For the high cost health plans, the insured is allowed 
the free choice of services and doctors, which are reimbursed on a fee-for- 
service basis. Patients have a wider range of choices simulating the liberal 
practice of medicine. The range of discretion of doctors is wider for deciding 
on the type and quantity of services to be delivered to patients. Hospital care 
is based on more comfort and privacy. Nevertheless, high cost health plans 
cover a small fraction of the insured population -  in particular, managers, 
professionals and company directors. In short, Group Medicine Plans sell 
health care plans which discriminate, within the insured population, workers
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from the better paid professionals, managers and companies directors.
The bulk of services are to members included in the so called standard 
plans. At this level, the trend is to provide care in self-owned services[31] 
or private practices with some sort of agreement with the Group Medicine 
Plans. At these services, doctors’ practices are generally monitored by a 
medical doctor manager who exercises control over referrals, diagnostic ex­
aminations and dismissal from work. The basic concept of care is to con­
centrate services at the primary and less specialized level and to have well 
defined norms for referrals and specialized care.
Given the selective structure of care, different payment schemes and 
administrative characteristics of care delivered, one might expect that care 
delivered will vary in quantity, quality and comfort across the different plans.
Selection of this type could also be seen, in the past, with INAMPS agree­
ments with third parties for provision of care to the rural population. There 
were two types of contracts -  one for employers and another for employees. 
Each involved a different remuneration scheme.
Group Medicine Plans cover a healthier population -  the skilled working 
force of the more developed companies. Their health services might also par­
ticipate in selecting people employed by companies by screening out people 
in high risk groups which also have an impact in reducing their costs.
M edical C ooperatives. Medical Cooperatives have similar characteris­
tics to those pointed out for the Group Medicine Plans, having the same 
payment scheme. The main difference is that these are services owned by 
the providers of care (doctors).
A u to -p ro g ram m e Auto-programmes are health service groups contracted 
by companies, unions or workers’ associations to provide health services to 
their employees or members and paid on a fee-for-service scheme[197]. There 
are also Auto-programme health services which are self-owned.
P r iv a te  In su ran ce  Private insurance is provided by commercial insur­
ance companies in the country. These companies are in general linked to 
financial firms. At the beginning of the 1980s the two largest banks in the 
country (Itau and Bradesco ) each started a health insurance plan. They, 
however, still have a small share of the private health care market in Brazil.
Generally, private insurance sells plans involving co-payment. They also 
offer plans for companies and individuals. Given their higher costs, they
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tend to cover the higher income groups and those at the top management 
of companies.
T h e L iberal P rivate H ealth  Care M arket
The out-of-pocket purchase of health care services in Brazil has shown a de­
cline between 1979 and 1984. However, this market which includes doctors 
practising liberal medicine still represents an important share of private 
expenditure on health. It is estimated that out-of-pocket expenditure on 
health amounted in 1984 to about 620 million US dollars (excluding the ex­
penditure of the low-income groups)[118], estimated to correspond to about 
20.0 per cent of the private expenditure on health in the same year.
This is clearly a selective market with the social groups purchasing dif­
ferent quantity and quality of services.
2.5 T he R egional D istribution o f H ealth  Care Ser­
vices
Besides selective practices expressed in the division of labour between the 
public and private health care institutions, inequalities can also be assessed 
on the basis of the distribution of services by geographical region and by 
urban and rural populations. Health care services in Brazil tend to be 
concentrated in the southeast and south regions. These regions also present 
the highest concentrations of self-owned and profit-making services. This 
implies a higher availability of specialized and high technology services in 
these regions.
Less developed regions have a greater participation of services from the 
Ministry of Health and local Health Departments within their local health 
systems. In the early eighties [148], INAMPS expenditure per head in the 
northeast was less than half the expenditure per head in the southeast and 
south regions. When one analyses health care between the urban and rural 
populations, major differences are also observed. INAMPS expenditure per 
head on the rural population was one seventh of the expenditure for the 
urban population.
In 1984[25], INAMPS delivered 2.05 consultations per inhabitant per 
year in urban areas and 0.4 consultations per inhabitant per year in rural 
areas. Rural health services were responsible for only 5 per cent of INAMPS’ 
financed provision of laboratory examinations, which is indicative of the low 
complexity of care delivered to this population.
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On the other hand, the relation of hospital admissions per consultation 
for the rural population was twice that observed for the urban population. 
This indicates that the hospital model was even more prevalent in rural 
health services.
2 .5 .1  T h e  E v o lu tio n  o f  th e  S tru ctu re  o f  S erv ices
The inadequacy of the existing structure of services has been under con­
straints for several years. During the second half of the 1970s the Ministry 
of Health was involved in developing the structure and the policy for pri­
mary health care in the country. Previously, some local projects, based on 
the concept of primary care and financed with foreign aid, were tried out in 
the country.
The most important one was the project developed in the north of Minas 
Gerais (Projeto Montes Claros). This project, which was adopted by the 
Ministry of Health, provided the general model for a programme to extend 
health care services to uncovered populations. The programme PIASS, men­
tioned earlier, became the major expression of this policy. It had an impact 
in terms of influencing the prevalent balance of services in favour of primary 
services and in increasing the participation of public services.
It started in the north and northeast regions but, a few years later, be­
came a national programme. PREVSAUDE (1979), a reorganization propo­
sition presented by the Ministry of Health and the local agency of PAHO was 
again an effort to devise a whole system based on the Primary Care Model 
developed by PIASS. PREVSAUDE has had a short life and has been faced 
with strong opposition from different groups, but it had the merit of rein­
troducing the discussion of health policy among different social actors at a 
moment when democratic debate was also being reintroduced in the country 
as a whole.
Actually, the reorganization process was really started when the system, 
and especially the social security system, came under severe pressure due to 
financial constraints.
Despite the non-existence of a national health care policy oriented to­
wards reforms during the decade of the 1970s, changes in a new direction can 
already be observed in the last few years of this decade. At the beginning 
of the 1970s, INAMPS increased its coverage significantly, thus generating 
pressure for the expansion of services. Between 1970 and 1979 an average 
of 750 new health services per year (hospitals, polyclinics and public health 
units) were created in the country. This growth is particularly related (70.0 
per cent) to the increase of ambulatory services. The public sector, the
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major owner of ambulatory services in 1970, almost doubled its capacity 
during this decade. This growth in the number of public ambulatory ser­
vices continued in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1985 the number of public 
ambulatory services in the country almost doubled[118]. This increase was 
caused by services owned by local Health Departments which started to play 
a more important role in the Brazilian Health Care System as a result of 
the policies introduced in the 1980s.
Between 1976 and 1979 the private sector experienced a larger rate of 
increase in the number of ambulatory services than that observed by the 
public sector. The private sector more than doubled its capacity in terms of 
ambulatory services during this period. However, as a result of the policies of 
the eighties, this trend changed in favour of the growth of public ambulatory 
services.
The profit-making private sector with a low participation in the provision 
of ambulatory services in 1970, created 1,280 new services during this decade, 
ending up as the major owner within the private sector.
Regionally, the growth of public services, during the seventies, was con­
centrated in the north and northeast while the private sector in the south 
and southeast reproduced the already existing division of labour between 
the public and private sector. However, this division of labour assumes dif­
ferent characteristics between the regions, indicating large variations in the 
characteristics of the Health Sector at the regional and local level in the 
country as a whole.
The growth of public hospitals was also concentrated in the less devel­
oped areas and is concentrated in small local hospitals (mixed-units) owned 
by local government. On the other hand, the predominant private sector 
which presented an enormous growth in the number of beds, tended to in­
crease the size of its hospitals and expand its role throughout the country, 
maintaining, though, a pattern of higher coricentration in the more devel­
oped areas. As Andre Medici[118] points out, in 1985 the private sector, 
besides being the major owner of hospitals in the country, also showed a 
better regional distribution of services.
So, during the 1970s, there was an increase in the number of ambulatory 
services in the country caused mainly by the growth of local Health Depart­
ments’ services and the profit-making private sector, establishing the initial 
infrastructure for a new model of care which was going to become policy 
from the 1980s.
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2.6 F inal Com m ents
The pluralistic characteristic of the Brazilian Health Care System is associ­
ated with large inequalities. The public/private mix in the health sector is 
shaped by large variations in the distribution of services, financing, payment 
scheme, type, quantity and quality of services between and within the public 
and private institutions. It results in a variety of very selective health care 
markets.
The recent developments in the Brazilian Health care system, however, 
bear witness to an enormous effort in the direction of creating a more ra­
tional, more equitable and universal system. The recent policies and devel­
opments were also rich in highlighting the tension and conflicts existing in 
mixed systems such as the Brazilian one. In contradiction with the aims 
of the most radical reformers in the health policy arena, struggling for the 
construction of a universal system under public control, the expansion of 
the role of the public sector during the 1980s was followed by the creation 
of a selective, autonomous and modern organized private market.
The extent of the reforms of the 1980s with increasing emphasis on the 
public services, despite having changed the face of the Brazilian Health Care 
System, could not overcome the characteristics of a highly selective system. 
As argued by Paulo F. Filho and Pedro J. de Qliveira[53], the recent reforms 
in the health care system in Brazil suggest a process, as they called it, of 
selective universalization -  the process of incorporation of lower-income and 
not-insured groups by the publicly financed services was followed by long 
queues, waiting lists and a lowering of the quality of services, stimulating a 
shift of selected social groups to the private sector, which gained autonomy 
from the State.
The publicly financed services opened up their doors for a large demand 
of low-income and not-insured groups, while the independent private sector 
expanded in new directions stimulated by a new demand of selected groups, 
unsatisfied with the inefficient, overcrowded and ‘second class’ public ser­
vices and increasingly unable to purchase health care services out-of-pocket. 
On top of this rough division between the public and private market, there 
is the limited but, nonetheless successful, mixed financed high-technology 
public services providing costly care for, again, very selective groups, which 
manage to get access to those services.
Undermining the aims of increasing the social justice relating to health 
care in the country, there was the highly inequitable Brazilian society which 
results in large social discrimination, the predominance of political criteria
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for allocation of financial resources, the deepening of the economic crisis 
associated with decades of under-financing in the public health sector and 
the difficulties of overcoming the historical inefficiency of the public institu­
tions and the private sector, as the historically major providers of inpatient 
services in the country.
Chapter 3
M ethodology
This study is concerned with inequalities in the use of health care services 
in Brazil. More particularly, it is concerned with inequalities in the use of 
inpatient care. This chapter will discuss the alternative methods considered 
for investigating the research question, presenting the data source and the 
study population, identifying a record in the data base and describing the 
variables on it. It will also present the approach used for restructuring the 
data set and checking it’s quality. Finally, the methodology for testing the 
existence of differences (if any) in the use of inpatient services between the 
social groups will be discussed.
3.1 R eview ing A lternative M ethods
Before selecting the method used in this study, a review of alternative meth­
ods suitable for tackling the research question was performed which is briefly 
presented below.
3 .1 .1  P o p u la tio n  S u rvey
A population survey is the only approach which is population-based, allow­
ing the direct calculation of utilization rates. It also permits the selection 
of the social variables to be used in the study, since the design of the ques­
tionnaire is under the researcher’s control. Utilization of inpatient care can 
also cover the overall health care system, involving the assessment of uti­
lization of services from every sector and sub-sector of care. It does not, 
however, provide data on the diagnosis and process of care. Moreover, this 
is a costly alternative. A representative sample of social groups, containing 
sufficient numbers of cases of admissions to cover every sub-sector of care 
would need to be very large. This problem could be overcome by restricting 
the study to a few geographic areas in the city under study. But, to limit
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the study to a few areas could be problematic. Utilization varies by social 
groups. Nevertheless, utilization also varies with the geographical accessi­
bility to services, because the utilization pattern is also shaped by the local 
availability of services. On the other hand, the geographical distribution 
of services also tends to vary with the social composition of the population 
living in the area. In short, in relation to the utilization of health care 
services, social class and place of residence are associated. In Brazil, the 
observed trend is for areas with predominantly middle class composition to 
have a larger supply of services than areas with predominantly working class 
groups. Thus, working class people living in predominantly middle class ar­
eas might have different utilization patterns from working class people living 
in predominantly working class areas. Therefore, the better approach would 
be to have a representative sample of social groups, which would increase 
the complexity of the field work and the overall costs of the study.
3 .1 .2  P a tie n t-C e n su s
This methodological approach would be less costly than a population survey. 
In this approach the sample framework could be designed to collect data on 
a typical cross section of patients in hospital on a particular day. It gives 
point prevalence of the social distribution of patients in the hospital on that 
day.
Data collected on a Patient-Census could be linked to data from the 
National Census. This linkage of the patient population with the general 
population (denominator) would provide data for the analysis of differentials 
in utilization rates between the social groups. However, the main problem 
in adopting this alternative in this study is the time gap between the Na­
tional Census (1980) and the Patient-census (1986), which would lead to 
denominator inaccuracy.
Moreover, the option to perform a Patient-Census would tend to limit 
the investigation to the assessment of the social distribution of patients ad­
mitted by hospitals in different sectors and sub-sectors of care. Principal 
Diagnosis is a post-discharge information as well as most process of care 
variables and the outcome variables. Data on diagnosis, process and out­
come of care would require a follow-up of patients, greatly increasing the 
field work. The follow-up would have to rely upon the hospitals’ medical in­
formation. Nonetheless, the collection and gathering of medical data follows 
different criteria between services and is expected to vary largely in quality, 
introducing further difficulties to the study.
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3 .1 .3  S eco n d a ry  D a ta  — A v a ila b le  D a ta  S ou rces
At the time of this study, there were three different sources of data on 
inpatient services at the national level.
1. The National Health Service Census -  AMS.
2. The National Household Survey -  PNAD.
3. The Certification Form for Hospital Admission (AIH form).
T h e N ational H ealth  Service C ensus — AM S
AMS is carried out annually by the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Ge­
ography -  IBGE. This census collects data on a large range of variables 
related to the structure of health care services, such as facilities, equipment, 
specialized services and manpower. It also collects data on the production 
of services -  admissions, discharges, deaths, patient-days and number of 
patients in hospital on the last day of the year. However, it does not col­
lect information on patients’ social, demographic and clinical characteristics, 
which prevents its use for the investigation of differentials in use between 
the social groups. The AMS questionnaire distinguishes services by their 
legal nature and brings information on the existing agreements between in­
stitutions, allowing the identification of how services are financed and the 
payment scheme adopted in case of the participation of a third party. How­
ever, due to confidentiality reasons, IBGE does not permit the disclosure of 
data at the hospital level.
G eneral H ousehold Survey (1981) -  P N A D
PNAD is a continuous household survey carried out by IBGE, on a sample 
basis, at the national level. In the year 1981, a questionnaire on perceived 
morbidity, health care service utilization and health care expenditure was 
added to PNAD’s main questionnaire.
The main strengths of this data source is that it is population-based, 
allowing the linkage of data on the utilization of health service with a large 
range of social and economic variables, such as income, employment status, 
occupation, social security entitlement status, education and housing.
PNAD’s main limitations, however, are the restricted range of informa­
tion on patients’ medical characteristics and the lack of information on the 
process and outcome of care.
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PNAD has information on the length of stay but, the reliability is pre­
sumably low, since this information was collected on the basis of answers 
about the date of admission and discharge given by the respondent, for those 
admissions occurring within a period of time of one year from the interview. 
In addition, information on sub-sectors of care is also considered to have 
low reliability, because the categories in the questionnaire are ambiguous, 
lacking a precise meaning.
T h e C ertification Form for H ospital A dm ission  (A IH  Form)
AIH forms are insurance claims filled in for reimbursement purposes by pri­
vate hospitals contracted by INAMPS. As pointed out earlier, contracted 
private hospitals are the main providers of inpatient care in the country. 
AIH forms are collected and gathered by the Data Processing Centre -  DAT- 
APREV of the Brazilian Ministry of Welfare and Social Security -  MPAS. 
DATAPREV is responsible for collecting, processing and retrieving AIH 
forms. The collection of AIH forms builds up the largest inpatient statistics 
in the country with about 7 million admissions in 1986. As happens with 
inpatient statistics, in general, this source is demand and not population- 
based. AIH forms cover a large range of information about the patient, 
process and outcome of care. It is the single data source which has infor­
mation on the social characteristics of the patient (payment status). One 
important shortcoming, related to this data source, is the reliability of data 
on it, since it is based on information used mainly for payment purposes. 
Moreover, this data set is limited to a single provider of inpatient care -  
Contracted Private Hospitals.
* * *
The final decision for taking the latter alternative as the data source for 
this investigation was based on the type and range of variables existing in 
the AIH form data set, which allows a broad discussion of patterns of use of 
inpatient services. More specifically, it allows the investigation of variations 
in the case-mix and in the process and outcome of care across social groups. 
Despite its limitation to a single sub-sector of care (contracted private hospi­
tals), the analysis of care delivered by contracted private hospitals can raise 
the hypothesis of inequalities occurring elsewhere in the health care system. 
Moreover, very little empirical research has been done about this sub-sector 
of care in the Brazilian health care system. In relation to the reliability of 
the AIH forms’ data, it was considered worthwhile to conduct a reliability 
study with two main objectives:
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1. To test the quality of the variables to be used in this investigation.
2. To provide general information on the reliability of the AIH form data 
set, because of its great potential for health care services and epidemi­
ological research.
3.2 T he D ata Source
Data for this study was provided by DATAPREV. Insurance claims filled 
in by contracted private hospitals are recorded on special forms known as 
AIH  forms. The AIH form is issued by the MPAS’ Institute of Health Care 
- IN AMPS1. This form was established in 1981 to adapt insurance claims 
to the new inpatient care payment scheme, introduced by INAMPS at that 
time.
INAMPS has a set of very detailed written rules, on the flow of patients 
for admission to private hospitals. The request for admission can be made by 
any INAMPS’ doctor. In this case, the doctor himself requests an AIH form 
that corresponds to a passport for admission to the contracted hospitals. 
Whenever a consultation which results in an admission happens outside an 
INAMPS’ unit, the physician must request it by filling in a special form - 
the medical report. This report is given to the patient or someone in charge 
of the patient to be taken to an INAMPS’ unit. In case of approval, an 
IN AMPS’ doctor supplies an AIH form. Otherwise, the IN AMPS’ doctor 
may ask for additional information from the doctor making the request. In 
the case of an elective admission, the AIH FORM is issued with validity for 
15 days, except for admissions for childbirth, where the validity is the date 
of admission[82].
In theory, IN AMPS allows the patient the right of free choice of hospital 
and/or doctor, among those registered with IN AMPS. However, for the great 
majority of admissions, INAMPS chooses the hospital for the patient, as the 
majority of people are not even aware of their right of choice. Actually, there 
is no legal restriction in Brazil for doctors having more than one contract 
with INAMPS -  as salaried doctors working in INAMPS’ self-owned services 
and as contracted doctors working in a contracted private hospital (or, as the 
owner or employee of a contracted private hospital). The lack of restrictions 
in the link between social security and private hospitals puts the referral 
system under the risk of being exposed to the financial interests of doctors
1In March 1990, a ministerial reform was introduced which ended up with MPAS. 
DATAPREV was integrated into the new Ministry of Labour and Social Security and 
INAMPS became part of the Ministry of Health.
I
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and/or hospitals.
3.3 T he Study Population
This study was designed to cover discharges from contracted private hospi­
tals in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1986. The source of information to build 
up the data base was a list of existing contracted private hospitals in the 
city of Rio de Janeiro. In this list hospitals were coded by their income tax 
number - the same code used in the AIH form to identify hospitals.
According to the List of Contracted Private Hospitals issued by the De­
partment of Health Information of the Office of the Director General of IN­
AMPS ', there were seventy-one contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio 
de Janeiro in the year of 1986. The Report on Hospital Data produced by 
DATAPREV and issued on 10/12/1986 indicates that for various reasons, 
six of these hospitals stopped being contracted in that year, leaving only 
sixty-five hospitals.
On the basis of the Report on Hospital Data and, also, the List of Hos­
pital Statistics issued by DATAPREV, a second cut was made leading to 
the exclusion of those hospitals without admission of INAMPS’ beneficiaries 
in 1986. Therefore, five other hospitals were excluded, thus leaving a list of 
sixty contracted private hospitals in 1986.
This list was then submitted to DATAPREV defining the sample frame 
of eligible hospitals, from which the whole range of AIH forms filled in in the 
year of 1986 were to be written on the tape., Therefore, the tape provided 
by DATAPREV contains all the AIH forms filled in by these sixty hospitals, 
during the year 1986 (see Appendix A).
3.4 A  Record in the AIH form D ata B ase
The tape contains 214,222 records, that is to say it contains 214,222 AIH 
forms. Nevertheless, an AIH form cannot be assumed to be an admission.
This is because AIH forms are issued in three different types:
• AIH form type 1
• AIH form type 3
• AIH form type 5
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AIH form Type 1 is the main form and must be issued whenever an admission 
occurs. With few exceptions2, there is one and only one AIH form type 1 
for each admission. Thus, the total number of AIH form type 1 in a given 
period of time equals the total number of admissions, in the same period. 
It must be stressed though, as generally is the case with inpatient statistics, 
that AIH forms are admission and not patient based, which implies that 
readmissions are counted as a new admission.
Each AIH form type 1 has a number, which is used as an identifier for 
that admission. This number will appear whenever an AIH form type 3 or 
type 5 is issued. These two forms are always attached to an AIH form type 
1, which is the initial AIH form. From now on, in this thesis, whenever an 
AIH form is referred to without a specification of type, it will mean an AIH 
form Type 1.
The AIH form type 3 is a continuity of AIH form type 1. It is issued 
whenever the hospital runs out of space in the AIH form’s professional ser­
vices’ subsection, which will be presented in more detail in the following 
section. The AIH form type 3 is also to be issued whenever an error has 
been made in the form type 1. Nevertheless, when inputting the data, DAT­
APREV types the correct information on the AIH form type 1. The AIH 
form type 5 is issued for payment purposes in long term admissions (more 
than forty five days of length of stay by INAMPS’ administrative rules). It 
is mainly issued in admissions related to psychiatric and chronic illnesses.
3.5 D escription of the Variables on th e AIH  form  
D ata Base
The AIH form[84] contains detailed and extensive information about the 
patient’s characteristics, care provided and some data on outcome of care. 
These elements are presented on the form in the following five subsections:
1. AIH form’s identification subsection.
2. Patient’s identification subsection.
3. Auditing subsection.
4. Professional services’ subsection.
2These are Politraumatism and Multiple Surgeries, in which case more than one AIH 
form can be issued during a single admission. The above implies that the total number 
of AIH form Type 1 on the tape is slightly bigger than the real number of admissions. 
However, for the purpose of this study the above difference was not taken into account.
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5. Hospital information subsection.
The first subsection contains the AIH form number and the form’s type 
code. In the form type 1 the number and the code are already printed, 
allowing INAMPS to control the flow of AIH forms through regions and 
hospitals.
The second subsection is divided into three segments:
1. Patient segment
2. Insured segment
3. Admission process segment
This subsection is filled in at the INAMPS unit before the form is sent 
to the hospital.
The Patient segment contains information on3:
• Patient’s name.(*)
• Patient’s address.(*)
• Area code.(*)
• Date of birth.
• Sex.
• Social security status.
(2) Insured
(4) Wife
(6) Child
(8) Other dependent
The Insured Segment contains information on:
• Name.(*)
• Pis/Pasep number.(*)
• Payment Status, (social group)
(1) Employee
3(*) It indicates the information elements in the AIH form which were not being com­
puterised by DATAPREV
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(2) Employer
(3) Self- employed
(5) Unemployed
(7) Retired
(9) Not-insured
• Income tax number of the employer.(*)
The Admission process segment contains information on:
• Income tax number of the physician requesting the admission.
• Procedure Requested - code number4.
• Type of admission.
(1) Elective
(2) Emergency with AIH form issued before admission
(5) Emergency with AIH form issued up to 72 hours after ad­
mission
• Date of issue of AIH form.
• Income Tax number of the physician who authorized the admission 
and signature.
• Information elements in the case of a traffic accident.
The third subsection is supposed to be filled in only when special events 
occur, which invoke a different payment mode, as happens with the fol­
lowing: admission to intensive care units (days of stay); politraumatized 
patients (more than one major procedure performed); provision of special 
services and/or whenever there is a change in the requested procedure, which 
implies an authorized procedure must be filled in on the auditing subsection, 
by an INAMPS’ supervisor or the hospital’s Medical Director.
The fourth subsection contains information on professional services de­
livered during the inpatient stay. It is supposed to have information on 
every single unit of professional care delivered to the patient. On each AIH 
form (type 1 and type 3) there are fourteen lines for filling in the above 
information. The information elements in each line are the followings:
• Type and provider of care.
4 Procedures are coded in seven digits plus one control digit and are displayed on the 
Table of Medical Procedures published by INAMPS.
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(3) Diagnostic or therapeutical examinations -  SADT 
performed by the hospital
(4) Medical procedure performed by a hospital’s salaried doctor
(5) SADT or a medical procedure performed by a 
contracted doctor or service
(8) SADT performed by services without a legal contract with 
the hospital
• Income tax number of provider of care.
• Type of care delivered (coded by the Table of Professional Acts or the 
Table of Medical Procedures published by INAMPS)
• Groups of type of care categories.
(01) Surgeon
(02) First auxiliary surgeon
(03) Second auxiliary surgeon
(04) Third auxiliary surgeon
(05) Others (surgical auxiliaries)
(06) Anaesthetist
(07) Consultation
(08) Pathological anatomy
(09) Ventilator
(10) Cardioversion
(11) Physiotherapy
(12) Haemotherapy
(13) Nebulizer
(14) Nuclear Medicine
(15) Clinical pathology
(16) Radiography
(17) Radiotherapy
(18) Electrocardiogram and Electroencephalogram
• How many times care was delivered.
Finally, there is the fifth subsection which is to be filled in by the hospital, 
only after discharge, containing the following information elements:
• Hospital’s income tax number.
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• Hospital’s Clinical Director income tax number and signature.
• Performed Procedure.
• Specialty.
• Principal Diagnosis and one Secondary Diagnosis coded in ICD-95.
• Date of admission.
• Date of discharge.
• Type of discharge6.
(1) Discharge
(2) Permanence
(3) Transfer
(4) Death with autopsy
(5) Death without autopsy
On admissions for delivery, the hospital has to provide information on 
some additional variables:
• Number of live births.
• Number of stillbirths.
• Number of discharges, transfers or deaths of the newborn.
In addition to the AIH form data, the magnetic tape provided by DAT­
APREV also contains information on the values paid for the admission by 
specific items of reimbursement.
3.6 M ethod for Restructuring th e D ata Set
This analysis was performed by using the software system for data analysis[168] 
-  SAS versions 5.18 and 6.06. Data were processed in a minicomputer VAX 
6330 running the VMS operating system. As this study is based on a large 
data base, some procedures directed to increase computer efficiency had to
5The coding source for diagnosis on the AIH form is a resume published by INAMPS 
of the 9th revision of the Classification of Disease -  WHO[193]. In INAMPS’s resume two 
more digits were introduced completing a total of six digits: one is a control digit and the 
other is a transcription to numerical characters of the classification ‘E’ and ‘V ’.
6This variable is coded in two digits. The second digit is used to provide more detailed 
information in each one of the five types of discharge.
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Table 3.1: Initial data sets by size.
File Name Number of Records
Matrix 214,222
AIH form Type 1 122,142
AIH form Type 2 6,596
AIH form Type 3 85,484
be taken at the very beginning of data processing[30]. These procedures 
were mainly related to the reduction of the size of the data base such as 
sub-setting the data, deleting unnecessary records and eliminating incom­
plete or superfluous variables. The first step in processing the data was 
to create a permanent SAS Data Set followed by the check of the data on 
the tape by looking at frequency distributions and to ascertain the volume 
of missing data and invalid records. It must be noted that going through 
this tape was a very demanding task, particularly because there was very 
limited updated technical information about the AIH form data base. Most 
of the information had to be collected by interviewing INAMPS and DAT- 
APREV’s specialists. Even having established a good relationship with some 
very helpful programmers and data specialists, it was always difficult to find 
someone with a comprehensive and up-dated knowledge about the data set.
The division of labour within these institutions is responsible for split­
ting the knowledge on the data base between departments and institutions, 
leaving the people who work on it with very limited and specific informa­
tion. Moreover, access to DATAPREV’s files has been historically restricted 
to outside users such as the academy, resulting in very little health care re­
search based on AIH form’s data and in very superficial academic experience 
with this data set.
A strategy was also designed for reducing the data. Firstly, the main 
(matrix) data set was broken down into three smaller ones by separating the 
AIH forms by type (see table 3.1 on page 83). The Data Set -  AIH form 
type 1 became the study’s main data base, since it is the only one to contain 
information on all admissions.
The process of reshaping the dataset continued with the deletion of in­
valid records on the Data Set -  AIH form Type 1. Invalid records, in this 
case, are the non-paid AIH forms, rejected by DATAPREV, due to error.
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The existence of error made these records unreliable for this investigation. 
The number of invalid records identified was 11,419 (9.3 per cent of all 
records on Data Set -  AIH form type 1). These records were deleted, leav­
ing the data set with 111,723 records. Further reductions of the size of 
the data set were implemented through deleting non-computerised variables 
(empty variables), empty spaces on the tape such as fillers and non relevant 
variables in regard to the objectives of this investigation.
After having reduced the Data Set -  AIH form Type 1 -  to i t ’s smallest 
possible size, the process of further sub-setting the data was started. This 
was done by separating AIH forms by hospital type, after having classified 
hospitals by type. The grouping of AIH forms by hospital type, was done in 
order to avoid comparison between very unequal subjects (long and short­
term patients).
Hospitals were classified in three different classes:
• Acute Hospitals
• Chronic Hospitals
• Psychiatric Hospitals
The criteria used to classify hospitals were:
1. The percentage of admissions in each hospital with more than forty- 
five days of stay. The cut-off point for acute hospitals was 20 per cent 
or less of admissions with administrative discharge (Permanence).
2. Amongst the remaining hospitals - long-term hospitals - the case-mix, 
measured by the distribution of Principal Diagnosis, was used to dis­
criminate chronic from psychiatric hospitals.
Based on this classification of hospitals, the Data Set -  AIH form type 1 -  
was subdivided into three new data sets, shown in table 3.2 on page 85.
As one of the objectives of this study was to assess in more depth care 
provided to short term patients, further reshaping of the acute hospitals’ 
data set was still required. Firstly, there had to be deleted off this file all 
records which had one or more records in Data Set -  AIH form type 5. The 
identification of admissions in acute hospitals with AIH form type 5 could 
be done by matching the AIH form identification number in the two data 
sets (acute hospitals data set and data set -  AIH form type 5). This meant 
deleting from the acute hospitals’ data set all long term admissions. The 
reasons for deleting these records were:
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Table 3.2: Hospitals’ data sets by size
Data Set Number of Records
Acute Hospitals 88,493
Chronic Hospitals 7,223
Psychiatric Hospitals 15,007
Total 111,723
• AIH form Type 5 are incomplete records in regard to the professional 
services’ and the hospital information subsection.
• To increase patient homogeneity within the acute hospitals data set.
It must be said that there were very few hospitals in the acute hospitals’ 
data set, which had admitted long term patients.
Actually, it only happened in some very unique hospitals such as As- 
sistencia Medico Hospitalar Sao Jorge S/A -  which is a maternity hospital 
and at the same time a hospital for treating chronic illnesses.
There were 692 AIH forms deleted from the acute hospitals data set 
because they were classified as long term admissions. These represented 0.6 
per cent of all records in the data set. After processing the elimination of 
the above records, 87,801 records remained in the acute hospitals’ data 
set.
3.7 A ssessing inequalities
This investigation is based on a cross section of discharges (AIH forms) from 
contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1986. A reliabil­
ity study was conducted to test the quality of data in the AIH form and is 
presented in chapter V. The research design was directed to assess differences 
in use between the social groups (payment status), controlling by selected 
health conditions on the basis of pre-established criteria (tracers[94]).
Nonetheless, the initial analysis demonstrated that levels of use of con­
tracted private hospitals varied largely between the social groups, thus pre­
cluding control by homogeneous health conditions. Analysis of medically 
homogeneous groups of patients would end up with small numbers leading 
to bias. Moreover, the reliability study indicated that analysis based on
8 6
desegregated diagnostic categories (four digits categories) should be avoided 
because in general they have low reliability.
Therefore, the analysis was performed on the overall data set. Discharges 
were controlled by type of hospital and, when it was the case, by type of 
procedure (Medical, Surgical and Delivery).
Social classification of individuals (patients) in this study had to be based 
on the social variable available in the AIH form. This variable is related to 
different contribution mechanisms to social security and it is called Payment 
Status. Payment status categories correspond to different positions in the 
social relations of production and in the labour market.
• Employers have control over labour power.
• Employees sell their labour power in the labour market.
• Self-employed constitute a less homogeneous group, specially in the 
case of Brazilian society -  broadly speaking self-employed are those 
people who do not sell their labour power in the labour market and 
do not employ (or only a few) people. This category actually includes 
a broad range of social positions from the liberal doctor to the street 
dealer.
i
• Retired people are considered by E. 0 . Wright[198] as a post-class 
position, in the sense that their actual social class can only be defined 
by the assessment of their temporal job trajectory.
• Unemployed for social security are those temporary unemployed. This 
includes those people previously working (in the last two years) in the 
formal labour market.
• Not-insured are those people working in the informal labour market 
(without a legal contract of work). It also includes the long term 
unemployed.
In this study the dependents of a person without a direct social security 
entitlement e.g. housewives without a formal paid job, are classified under 
the classification of the person they depend upon for receiving social security 
benefits. The only exception is the not-insured which includes all those 
people without a formal entitlement to social security.
♦ * *
A descriptive analysis was performed on the various levels of use of con­
tracted private hospitals, as presented below:
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1. Demand.
Proportional discharge rates.
By age
By sex (gender)
By payment status
By social security entitlement status
By diagnosis
2. Process of care
Type of admission
Procedures
Surgical and medical causes 
Normal delivery and caesarian section
Provider of care (payment scheme)
Intensive care 
Length of stay
Reimbursement per discharge type
3. Outcome of care
Death rate 
Transfer rate 
Maternal deaths 
Perinatal mortality rates
The descriptive analysis aimed at revealing the main features and the 
role played by contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro. 
It was followed by the analyses directed at testing the existence of associ­
ation between payment status and the use of contracted private hospitals. 
Firstly, this relationship was tested by looking at differences in crude propor­
tional discharge rates across the payment groups. Secondly, the explanatory 
power of the variable payment status was further tested by controlling for 
confounding variables.
Given the structure of the data set and the large number of operational 
questions being tested, it is assumed that this is an exploratory study of 
the above relationship. More in depth and detailed analysis was outside
8 8
the scope of this investigation, which aimed at pointing to general trends in 
variations in the use of contracted private hospitals across the social groups.
Logistic regression was used as an appropriate statistical method for test­
ing variations between proportions, controlling by confounding variables7 
and allowing the assessment of interactions[97]. The method employed was 
Logit Analysis, which is the statistical approach suitable for binary depen­
dent variables[5], as is the case with this analysis.
The basic assumptions of the Logit Model[5] require that data be origi­
nated of a random sample of unreplicated data with a dichotomous depen­
dent variable. The data source for this investigation includes all discharges 
occurring during a one year period. This implies that the sample equals the 
population.
However, the AIH form data set include readmissions, which might vio­
late the assumption of independence between the observations. The extent 
of readmissions in the sample is not known but, for performing the Logit 
Analysis the payment group retired was excluded. It is expected that the 
elimination of this group from the analysis has reduced the number of read­
missions to a minimum. The retired group mainly constituted of elderly 
people and is expected to be the group showing larger probabilities of hav­
ing a readmission.
The procedure CATMOD in SAS version 6.06, used to run the Logit 
Analysis, also calculates predicted probabilities for the occurrence of the 
event being tested in the model, allowing the measurement of variations 
between the ‘populations’8 as well as the calculation of the odds ratios. 
These possibilities make this test a helpful tool for health care planning and 
for monitoring the performance of health care services.
Odds ratio is a measure of risk, and its logarithm is by definition, the logit 
function. Logit analysis may be seen as a regression technique in which the 
dependent variable is the logit function. The odds of a probability is defined 
as the ratio of this probability by the probability of the complementary 
event [9].
Odds(p) =
1 - p
When one has K explanatory variables £1, 2:2, 
the Logit Model may be written as:
7 A  confounding variable is a variable which is both related to the independent variable 
and the dependent variable. Ignoring them leads to a bias in the results[97]
^Populations’ are formed by the CATMOD procedure in SAS[169] on the basis of 
cross- classifications of the independent variables in the model
(3.1)
,x k (e.g. sex, age etc.),
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log odds (p) = a + PiXi + (32X 2 + . . .  + faX k  (3.2)
The estimation of the regression parameter is done by using Maximum 
Likelihood or Weighted Least of Squares. In this analysis the option was to 
use Maximum Likelihood.
The odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of the probability e.g. of being 
discharged by a given diagnosis in one given ‘population’ by the ratio of the 
odds of this probability in another ‘population’.
p i
Odds ratio = 1~^ ?1 (3.3)
l-p2
When there is no difference between two populations the odds ratio 
equals 1. This indicates the absence of variation between ‘populations’ in 
regard to the event being analyzed. On the other hand, values different from 
1 indicate the existence of variation, denoting the existence of an association 
between the independent and the dependent variable.
3 .7 .1  S tr a te g y  A d o p te d  for M o d e l S e le c tio n  in  th e  L o g it  
A n a ly s is
In order to analyze the relationship between payment status and use of 
contracted private hospitals, the first step taken was to choose a strategy of 
model selection. The strategy adopted is presented below:
1. Recoding the dependent variable -  in all models the dependent variable 
was a binary variable recoded as (1) for the positive event and (2) for 
the negative event.
2. Fitting the model with all main effects (independent variables) -  lev­
els of categories were recoded when shown to be non-significant, by 
merging those non-significant values.
3. Looking at individual effects which might be eliminated from the 
model -  the chi square (x2) test for the null hypothesis of the pa­
rameter being zero was used for selecting the effects which could be 
removed from the model. The method adopted for fitting the model 
followed the one suggested by Alufsio Barros[9]. Effects with large 
probability values (greater than 0.05 for a significance test of 5 per 
cent) were selected to be tested to ascertain if they should be elim­
inated from the model. Tentatively, one at a time, the effects were 
removed from the model which had shown large probability values.
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The decision whether or not to leave an effect out of the model was 
taken by subtracting the likelihood ratio from the model with the effect 
from the model without the effect. Those effects were removed which 
had shown a non-significant (x2) for the above result.
4. Analyzing the maximum likelihood statistics[9j in the model, which 
is an appropriate statistic for performing the hypothesis test in logit 
analysis -  when small (close to zero) the model doesn’t fit the data 
well. When large (close to one) the model is good, which means that 
the interactions left out of the model are not significant.
5. Fitting the model with first level interactions9 -  only first level inter­
actions were used in the models.
6. Looking again at the interactions which might be eliminated from the 
model by using the same approach employed for the main effects. This 
last step leads to the final model.
With the final model fitted, the Catmod Procedure was run once more for 
obtaining the predicted probabilities for the occurrence of the event in each 
population, by introducing the option (pred[169]). Odds ratios were then 
calculated as a means to provide a measure of the magnitude of observed 
differences between populations.
9 Consider y  as an dependent variable and two qualitative independent variables a and 
b. An interaction effect exists when the relationship between y  and a differs depending on 
which level of b the individual is classified
Chapter 4
IN  A M PS Paym ent Schem e 
for C ontracted Private  
H ospitals
This chapter will discuss the payment scheme adopted by the Institute of 
Health Care -  (INAMPS) to reimburse inpatient services delivered by con­
tracted private hospitals. This study was not designed to assess the impact 
of this payment scheme. The aim of this chapter is to provide information 
on the financial incentives and control mechanisms within which contracted 
private hospitals operate as a framework for the analysis of inequalities in 
the delivery of care. The chapter starts with a historical description of the 
development of the reimbursement mechanisms adopted by social security, 
followed by a detailed presentation of the characteristics of the new payment 
scheme, thereby raising the most likely impact it might have on the delivery 
of services. Finally, the system adopted by INAMPS is compared with the 
payment system adopted by the Medicare programme of the United States 
which is based on a similar reimbursement mechanism -  the prospective 
payment system.
4.1 H istorical Developm ent
At the beginning of the 1980s, the rising cost of the health care sector was 
already a matter of concern in many countries. The Brazilian economy was 
in depression. The slowing down of the economy had a considerable effect 
on employment rates and lower wages in real terms affected social security’s 
revenue.
Social Security had been in deficit since the late 1970s. This financial cri­
sis put considerable pressure on social security’s health care expenditure. At
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the beginning of 1981, the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MPAS) 
created a Consultative Council (CONASP), which had the function of de­
vising guidelines for a reorganization of social security’s health care policy 
(see chapter II).
CONASP’s guidelines, issued in 1982, were mainly directed at cost con­
trol measures. Amongst them, there was an increase in the regulation of 
contracted private hospitals. A new accounting system for contracted pri­
vate hospitals was created -  the System of Social Security Inpatient Care 
(SAMHPS) -  which replaced the existing retrospective payment mechanism 
with a prospective payment system.
SAMHPS was firstly adopted on an experimental basis in 1981, in the 
state of Parana, a developed state in the southern region of Brazil. This 
pilot programme had the effect of reducing admissions by 30.0 per cent and 
was valued as good by the local population. However, it had not shown the 
proportionate effect of diminishing treatment costs[114]. Nevertheless, in
1983, it started to be implemented in other states and by the beginning of
1984, the new payment system was set up in the country as a whole.
T h e  N ew  Paym ent Scheme
The payment scheme adopted by SAMHPS to reimburse contracted private 
hospitals, which is called in this study the Procedure Based Reimbursement 
Scheme (PBRS) is a prospective payment system based on a fixed payment 
rate where the unit of output are Groups of Procedures.
The new payment mechanism was largely aimed at improving the effi­
ciency of the system by changing the financial incentives facing the hospitals. 
In theory, the new prospective payment system would give hospitals an in­
centive to function efficiently because the same amount is paid for a given 
service regardless of the actual cost incurred in supplying that service. Put 
in a different way, whenever hospitals are paid for a procedure, a flat amount 
set prospectively, which is independent of length of stay and services pro­
vided and creates an incentive to find the less costly regimen to realize an 
outcome.
T h e  fee-for-service paym ent schem e The PBRS replaced the old fee- 
for-service payment mechanism known as Unit of Service (US). This was a 
retrospective payment mechanism with final reimbursable or approved costs 
determined after services were rendered and costs incurred. Retrospective 
payment mechanisms are believed to be inflationary because they tend to 
encourage unnecessary expenditure. It also demands an expensive adminis-
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trative structure to regulate the care provided and to calculate the specific 
reimbursable costs to hospitals. The bill under the US payment scheme 
(fee-for-service) included all resources consumed in each admission. These 
resources were divided into three categories which covered the various inter­
mediary products within the hospital production process. They were:
• Hospital Services e.g. Per Diem and Taxes, Materials and Medicines 
(HS).
• Diagnostic and Therapeutic Services (SADT)
• Professional Services (SP)
INAMPS established a ceiling for payment for each one of the above 
categories. This upper limit was defined for each procedure. However, hos­
pitals could claim payment for additional costs incurred and they succeeded 
in doing so in most claims[27]. So, hospitals could increase spending for 
inpatient services with confidence that INAMPS would absorb them. As 
a result INAMPS found itself operating an expensive, inflationary system 
with very low ability to predict expenditure.
The fee-for-service payment scheme had also been under severe criticism 
for many years for its negative impact both on the finance of the system 
and on the quality of care. It was considered a system that encouraged 
fraud, given the difficulties of regulating the care provided. Besides the 
administrative complexity of managing such a system, the ability to control 
expenditure and quality of care was also undermined, because often doctors 
linked to private hospitals would be simultaneously working as INAMPS’ 
supervisors[63]. It should be highlighted, moreover, that this aspect was 
not changed with the implementation of SAMHPS. Unnecessary admissions, 
unjustified long lengths of stay, ghost patients and sub-standard care were 
among the most frequent criticisms of hospitals under the fee-for-service 
payment scheme[64]
C ontro l M echanism s In order to control fraud and protect the quality 
of services delivered to patients, the new regulatory mechanism (SAMHPS) 
contemplated the establishment of a more effective auditing system. SAMHPS 
uses a computerized billing process, based on data from hospitals’ claims - 
the AIH form, which provides a modern and more neutral tool to control 
hospitals (see chapter III). Hospitals’ claims are processed by a central com­
puter system (about 900,000 AIH forms per month, in the whole country) 
building up the largest inpatient statistics in Brazil. A medical auditing
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system was designed, which, among other activities, could be triggered by 
alarm reports produced by the new billing data base. Nevertheless, the new 
auditing system never worked properly. It was undermined by the strong 
pressure against it, exercised by the hospitals. One doctor, in charge of im­
plementing the new auditing system in Sao Paulo, had to work under threat 
of his life1.
The failure to control care provided by hospitals in a more effective way 
harmed, from the beginning, the ability of the system to improve efficiency 
and quality of care.
4.2 T he Rationale of the Prospective Paym ent 
System
A prospective payment system is characterized by “payment rates (that) 
are established before services are rendered and monies are expended. Hos­
pitals, therefore, know the amount that will be paid before services are 
rendered” [68].
A prospective reimbursement system is likely to alter the production 
processes at the hospital, because services delivered will be reimbursed by 
a fixed value independent of resources consumed by each individual pa­
tient. In theory, the hospital should try to keep down the variability of costs 
between patients within each unit of output, to avoid losses. It is consid­
ered that doctors influence generally around 70 per cent of national health 
expenditure[68], at least in the developed countries. Hence, in theory, hos­
pital operating functioning under prospective reimbursement mechanisms 
would need to have a better and more effective administrative control over 
medical practice to avoid losing money. This means that the hospital might 
make savings by promoting a greater standardization of medical practice.
The above implies that the quantity and the quality of care patients re­
ceive is likely to change under the financial incentives inherent in a prospec­
tive payment system. To make a profit, hospitals are expected to look for 
ways to maximize their operating margins. This might lead hospitals to 
specialize in those cases where the relation between the payment rate and 
costs are more in favour of the hospitals’ own interests[32]. According to 
Grimaldi (1985), “in the long run payment must cover all costs for a ser­
vice to justify itself financially... So, if a certain unit of output generates 
losses, the hospital may terminate the service, subsidize losses with gains 
from other units of output, function more efficiently, trim quality and seek
1 Personal communication.
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more philanthropic contributions”. Nonetheless, the overall magnitude and 
direction of the prospective system on health care costs and benefits are 
not clearly known[47]. Unnecessary admissions are not believed to be com­
pletely discouraged as long as payment rates exceed cost. Hospitals might 
respond by increasing the specialization of services, which means concen­
trating their admissions within a limited group of health problems. Early 
discharge, selection in favour of less severe patients and less intensive care 
might be some of the negative outcomes which should be considered under a 
prospective payment system. Moreover, when prospective payment systems 
are applied to selected areas of care, such as the hospital sector, this might 
induce health services to shift costs to other areas with different payment 
allowances and perhaps greater risks for the patient.
4 .2 .1  T h e  P ro c ed u r e  B a sed  R e im b u rsem en t S ch em e (P B R S )
SAMHPS lays it down that when a patient is admitted to a contracted 
private hospital, an AIH form must be issued by IN AMPS. Moreover, it 
establishes that each admission must be classified into a medical procedure. 
Procedures are listed and published by INAMPS. They have seven digit 
codes plus one control code. A procedure has to be written on the form 
before admission occurs. A procedure is defined[84] as “an action (process) 
executed by a health professional” . Procedures are grouped as:
• Clinical Procedures - e.g. treatment of hepatitis
• Surgical Procedures - e.g. gastrectomy
• Diagnostic Procedures - e.g. chest X rays
• Therapeutical Procedures - e.g. blood transfusion
Each patient has to be classified into a procedure before admission to 
hospital, the only exception being for emergency cases (see chapter III). 
This means that, whenever an AIH form is issued by INAMPS, a procedure 
(Requested Procedure) has to be filled in on the form by an INAMPS’ doc­
tor. The requested procedure can be changed by medical request from the 
hospital2, for those admissions where there is no agreement between the re­
2ActualIy, the initial SAMHPS’s norm related to changes in the requested procedure, 
indicated that only a INAMPS’ supervisor was authorized to do it. This implied that 
IN AMPS would maintain control over the selection and coding of the unit of output 
used for payment. Nevertheless, hospitals managed to change this norm. At present, the 
hospital’s clinical director is authorized to change the requested procedure. Nonetheless, 
whenever a change is made, it has to be entered on the AIH form
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quested procedure and the most important procedure performed (Performed 
Procedure), which is the unit of output used for payment purposes.
The PBRS is based on the principle of rate-setting which means that the 
value to be paid for each admission is previously defined by the financing 
agency (INAMPS) and is not dependent on how much or what has been 
actually delivered to each individual patient. Values, however, are gener­
ally defined on the basis of negotiation with hospitals’ and professionals’ 
representatives.
In PBRS, both the hospital and the doctors are paid prospectively. The 
creation of SAMHPS did not modify the former IN AMPS’ routine of reim­
bursing directly doctors not employed by contracted private hospitals, but 
who provide care for INAMPS’ patients in these hospitals. These are the 
doctors contracted out by INAMPS. So, in SAMHPS, both professional ser­
vices (SP) and diagnostic and therapeutic services (SADT) are reimbursed 
directly to hospitals when the provider of care is employed by the hospital 
or directly to the provider of care when he or she is a contracted professional 
or a contracted out service.
INAMPS has contracts with 75,000 medical professionals, in the coun­
try as a whole. Contracted out medical professionals were responsible for 
about 80 per cent of INAMPS’ expenditure on professional services, at the 
beginning of the 1980s.
4 .2 .2  T h e  D ev e lo p m en t o f  th e  P ro c ed u r e  B a se d  R e im b u rse ­
m en t S ch em e (P B R S )
The development of the PBRS took place in 1980 and was mainly imple­
mented by specialists working in INAMPS. At first, a List of Procedures, 
with the average monetary values attached to them, was created. It con­
tained about 2,300 procedures. The average values were calculated from a 
data set containing about eight millions admissions performed during 1980, 
paid under the fee- for-service scheme. This means that initial values were 
based on amounts paid under very inefficient conditions. Thus, rate setting 
policy was initially based on incurred costs with no adjustments made .
The first List of Procedures was considered too long to be handled as 
a managerial tool. To overcome this limitation, procedures were grouped 
into 260 Groups of Procedures. The grouping process was developed with 
the advice of doctors to guarantee clinical coherence within the groups. The 
groups of procedures originated through the above process can be roughly 
sub-divided into clinical and surgical groups.
The groups of procedures developed became the unit of output for the
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PBRS. For this purpose, values were attached to them. These were strictly 
average values of the procedures listed within each group, calculated on the 
basis of admissions for the first half of 1983.
The total value attached to each Group of Procedures is in practice, 
desegregated into smaller values, each attached to an item of hospital ex­
penditure (see figure below ) -  the same ones used by the old scheme of 
payment, presented earlier in this chapter.
EXAMPLE OF A GROUP OF PROCEDURES (in Cruzeiros 1983)
Group 35.100-03-06 Obstetric Surgery III
35.008.01-6 Surgery of the Ectopic Pregnancy
35.009.01-2 Caesarean Section
35.012.01-3 Laparotomy for Rupture of the Womb
35.015.01-2 Surgical Cure of the Post Delivery
Uterine Inversion
Per Diem/Tax Med&Mat. SADT Prof. Services Total
24.608,00 20.368,00 1.302,00 1,302.00 69.462,00
Index (points) (Surgeon) 126 (Anaesthetist) 84
Average Length of Stay (norm) 5 days
Source: INAMPS, Tabela de Procedimentos, 26/08/83.
The number of procedures has slightly increased throughout the years, 
mainly due to the inclusion of new ones, particularly the so called special 
procedures, which are not paid on a prospective basis. Actually, however 
no significant changes have been introduced in the system since its creation, 
ten years ago: no broad assessment of the system has been carried out since 
the pilot experience developed in the state of Parana, during the year 1981.
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4 .2 .3  R e im b u rsem en t o f  H o sp ita l S erv ices  (H S )
Hospital services are reimbursed directly, on the basis of values previously 
defined by IN AMPS for each group of procedures. Values are generally 
negotiated with representatives of hospitals. For medicines, the value is 
defined from a basket of hospital medicines (about 100 products). Prices 
are based on those on the Pharmaceutical Guide, published by the Brazilian 
Pharmaceutical Association (ABIFARMA).
The PBRS incorporated special allowances for hospitals, to account for 
the existing differences in complexity and running costs. Special allowances 
are set for different classes of hospitals. This allowance is defined by an index 
(IVH) applied upon values for the payment of hospital services . Hospitals 
are classified at the time they establish a contract with INAMPS based 
on an INAMPS classification system for hospitals, known as RECLAIR. 
Since 1987, non-profit making private hospitals, which have opted to sign 
a special contract with INAMPS, started to receive a higher index, as a 
means of stimulating their participation in the system. Indices for teaching 
hospitals can be two and a half times larger than those for contracted private 
hospitals, given their differences in complexity and costs.
The prospective payment system, as mentioned earlier, brings new fi­
nancial incentives into the hospital production processes, which might bring 
some negative results, both for patients and the system itself. A rate-setting 
policy for reimbursing hospital services might induce them to behave in un­
ethical ways such as: slowing down the intensity of care delivered to patients 
to maximize profits/reimbursement or selecting patients which might result 
in the reduction of access of very severe patients or patients demanding 
long stays at hospital. This would lead to inequities of access between age, 
social and illness groups. Provision of sub-standard care, splitting of bills, 
unnecessary admissions and upgrading the code of requested procedure for 
maximizing reimbursement are responses that also might occur. Hospitals 
also might opt to reduce levels of investment, ending up by providing care 
below technically acceptable standards.
There is evidence of negatives responses to the financial incentives in­
troduced by the new payment scheme, shown by the performance of some 
hospitals. A study, performed by a special commission in charge of assess­
ing and defining guidelines for orthopaedic care, showed that a highly unac­
ceptable number of closed fractures (68.6 per cent) was being treated with 
surgical procedures, despite the fact that a great proportion of closed frac­
tures can be safely treated, and should be treated, by conventional means.
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Moreover, this assessment revealed that standards of care were very low. 
The study showed 15.2 per cent of infections amongst these patients. The 
Commission recommended that within diagnostic categories and mainly for 
children, conventional and surgical treatment should have the same payment 
rate as a way of preventing unnecessary surgery[21]. Unethical upgrading 
of performed procedure was the reason for INAMPS terminating contracts 
with two hospitals in the state of Rio de Janeiro in 1986[157]. The reliability 
study, presented in chapter V, also indicates that upgrading of performed 
procedure was occurring in hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro. A sur­
vey carried out by INAMPS on a sample of patients admitted to contracted 
private hospitals between 1985 and 1986 showed the existence of disagree­
ment between the hospital information and the former patients’ answers. 
Disagreements were mainly related to data on the performed procedure and 
the length of stay[157].
4 .2 .4  R e im b u rsem en t o f  P ro fe ss io n a l S erv ices
Professional services (SP) and also diagnostic and therapeutic services (SADT) 
are not directly reimbursed by values attached to groups of procedures. The 
system for defining the amount of money each doctor will be paid for services 
provided in the previous month is complex. For each group of procedures 
there is established an index (points) that is used to allot the payment rate 
between the medical professionals that were in charge of providing the care 
to the patients. Therefore, for surgical procedures, each has an index for the 
principal surgeon and the anaesthetist, displayed in the Table of Procedures 
(see page 97). The standard composition of the surgical team is also iden­
tified in the table. This means that SAMHPS establishes a norm for the 
minimal acceptable composition of the surgical team for each procedure3. 
Whenever there is more than one surgeon in the surgical team an allocation 
is performed, regarding the importance of each professional in the surgery. 
The first auxiliary surgeon receives a share that is 30 per cent of the princi­
pal surgeon index. The second auxiliary surgeon receives 20 per cent and so 
on4. The criteria for reimbursing medical visits are the same as are applied 
to medical procedures, as explained below. For medical procedures the norm
3It must be emphasized that the system defines norms for surgical procedures in regard 
to the minimal acceptable size of surgical teams, as a way of preventing low quality of care. 
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this norm on the quality of care would depend on a strict 
monitoring of the amount of services provided to each patient and on the qualification of 
providers of care. This could be done by computer programme using data on the AIH 
form. Nevertheless, this is not done, at least, not in a comprehensive way.
4 Personal communication
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is that, independently of the procedure and the number of services provided, 
the system assumes one medical visit for each day of stay of the patient in 
the hospital. That is to say, it adds 18 points in the professional services’ 
index for each day of stay in hospital. An exception is made for visits from 
specialists which are counted separately (counted as extra visits). The in­
dex for a medical visit is always 18 regardless of whether it is a routine or a 
specialized medical visit5.
The system also defines the average length of stay for each procedure. 
This standard is also noted in the Table of Procedures.
The monetary value for each unit in the professionals’ services index is 
calculated monthly for each hospital, based on that month’s admissions. 
The formula to calculate the value of each unit of professionals’ services can 
be written as:
value o f  the procedure iX frequency ; / A i \
rn v /
t=l Pl
K i
where : P,- = ^  pj 
j = i
n= Total types of procedures in the Table of Procedures.
m= Total Performed Procedures in a given month by a hospital.
ki=Total PS index in each Performed Procedure.
pj=Total index of each PS item within each Performed Procedure.
Having identified the value for each unit of professional services, the 
actual reimbursement for each professional for those services provided in 
the previous month is calculated by multiplying the value of one unit of 
professional services calculated for the hospital by the the total index each 
professional has achieved in that month. This total index is the sum of the 
number of points he or she has achieved for each procedure they performed.
In short, in the formula for calculating the monetary value of each unit of 
professional services, the numerator is related to the case-mix of patients ad­
mitted in a specific month in each hospital and the denominator symbolizes 
the mix of professional services furnished to those individual patients.
For example, the unitary value for the procedure Cardiac Surgery with 
Bypass under IN AMP S’ norms would require at least one surgeon (index= 
533); three auxiliary surgeons (indexes=160, 106 and 53 respectively) and 
one anaesthetist (index=490). The norm for length of stay in this procedure 
is fifteen days. This means that on average, the patient would receive fifteen
5 Personal Communication.
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medical visits during his or her stay, each counting for eighteen points. The 
total value for professional services was 25,085.00 Cruzeiros on 18/12/87. 
Based on these norms, the theoretical professional unitary cost for perform­
ing this procedure was 16.16 Cruzeiros. On the other hand, for perform­
ing the procedure Appendectomy IN AMPS’ norms would require at least a 
team of one surgeon (index=154), two auxiliary surgeons (index=46 and 
30 respectively), one anaesthetist (index=140) and five days of stay. The 
total value of professional services on the same date was 4,373.00 Cruzeiros. 
Hence, the theoretical professional unitary cost would be 9.50 Cruzeiros.
The unitary costs for professional services are weighted according to the 
procedure’s resource intensity and complexity. Moreover, the real value to 
be reimbursed monthly for professional services is a result of the case-mix 
of all admissions in that month measured by the distribution of requested 
procedures on the AIH forms of all patients admitted and the mix and 
quantity of professional services furnished to each individual patient. This 
reimbursement strategy has the following incentives:
• Less complex procedures performed in hospitals with a more com­
plex case-mix will be reimbursed at a higher value, and the reverse 
is also true. This creates incentives for hospitals and doctors to pro­
vide complex care in hospitals with a more complex case-mix. This 
incentive might impact positively on the quality of care since there is 
evidence of an association between the volume of cases treated and 
better outcome[71].
• As the value of a unit of professional services is associated with the 
hospital’s overall production, the practice mode of each doctor inter­
feres with the monthly value of the unit of payment of professional 
services. This might cause doctors to practise on a more standard ba­
sis. The lower the quantity of professional services a hospital delivers 
for each individual patient, the higher the unit of professional services 
will be valued.
The above might lead hospitals and/or professionals to practice in such 
ways as would negatively impact upon the patients:
• Unacceptable reduction of length of stay. Especially regarding med­
ical procedures, the reduction in the length of stay of the patient in 
the hospital will have a positive impact upon the value of units of 
professional services.
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• Prevention of specialized care to avoid reductions in the value of the 
units of professional services.
• Selection of patients classified into groups of procedures that present a 
more favourable relation between costs (doctor’s time and specializa­
tion) and payment rate. The above, might lead to problems of access 
for patients classified in some unprofitable groups of procedures.
• Unnecessary admissions also might be stimulated, as a means of raising 
total income.
• Unethical changes in the requested procedure, aiming at those with 
better unitary costs, also should be monitored because this could im­
pact positively, both in terms of getting a better index at the end of 
the month, as well as increasing the professional services’ unit value.
Incentives might also impact differently between medical services pro­
vided by the hospitals’ salaried doctors and contracted doctors, since hos­
pitals’ strategies for raising net income (profits) are not always the same as 
doctors’ strategies to raise income. Hospitals might opt to increase the work­
load of salaried surgeons and employ less specialized professionals. On the 
other hand, independent doctors might also concentrate care in more com­
plex hospitals and limit their provision of care to those procedures where the 
payment rate is more valuable for them. As might happen with hospitals, 
contracted out surgeons might want to increase their workload as a means 
of increasing their reimbursement. This would increase the competition be­
tween doctors with a contract with IN AMPS, since the number of doctors 
is much higher than the demand.
The study developed by the commission on orthopaedic care[21], showed 
that beside the high numbers of unnecessary surgeries, most of them were 
performed by non specialized surgeons or under inadequate conditions. The 
survey carried out by INAMPS[157], indicated that patients were being 
charged for professional services, which is strictly forbidden under INAMPS’ 
rules.
4 .2 .5  R e im b u rsem en t o f  D ia g n o stic  an d  T h e r a p e u tic a l S er ­
v ic e s  (S A D T )
Diagnostic and therapeutical services, as in the case of professional services, 
can be provided by the hospital or a contracted out service. The reimburse­
ment mechanism is very similar to the one used to reimburse professional 
services, although detailed information about the allotment system was not
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available. There is an index that defines the weight of SADT for each pro­
cedure, which is used for payment purposes. These indexes are not made 
public.
The AIH form contains the necessary information for INAMPS to cal­
culate the reimbursement of diagnostic and therapeutic services delivered 
by the hospitals. This information should be entered in the subsection of 
professional services (see chapter III) on the AIH form. The quality of this 
information is presented in chapter V. Data related to SADT furnished to 
patients is not criticised by SAMHPS, with very few exceptions. Indeed, 
without reliable and complete data on the diagnostic and therapeutical ser­
vices, the ability of the system to monitor quality of care through computer 
programming is once more undermined.
4 .2 .6  R e im b u rsem en t o f  C o sts  E x c lu d ed  F rom  th e  P B R S
SAMHPS has a range of elements within hospital production for which costs 
are not included in the PBRS. These are admissions with uncommonly long 
lengths of stay or those where intensive care or special procedures were de­
livered to patients. For control purposes, in some of the items above, the 
reimbursement will depend on the authorization of an INAMPS’ auditor, 
which must be entered in the auditing subsection on the AIH form (see 
chapter V).
Long Length o f  Stay
Whenever a patient stays in hospital for longer than double the standardized 
days of stay for the specific procedure, the hospital will receive a special per 
diem reimbursement. This per diem has a previously defined payment rate 
which is procedure-based. SAMHPS also includes a medical visit for each 
extra day of stay for the payment of professional services.
Long lengths of stay are clearly not encouraged by the payment method 
for professional services. Each new day of stay in the hospital adds more 
units to the denominator of the formula that calculates the monetary value 
of a unit of professional services, negatively affecting the final value. The 
financial incentives for the hospital will depend on the relation between the 
per diem payment rate and the actual costs for each procedure.
Intensive Care Services
Intensive care is also reimbursed individually based on two previously estab­
lished rates. The first applies for the first 72 hours of stay in an intensive
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care unit. The second applies for the following days[82].
Special Procedures
SAMHPS considers some complex procedures and some procedures very 
seldom delivered by hospitals, which involve highly variable costs, as special 
procedures. Some examples of special procedures are Parenteral Nutrition, 
Angiography, Neuroradiology with Contrast, Haemodialysis and Rh factor 
Vaccine. These are considered special procedures only when they are not the 
main reason of admission, but procedures performed on patients admitted 
to hospitals for other reasons[128].
The initial SAMHPS’ norms established that special procedures should 
only be delivered by services identified by INAMPS as reference hospitals. 
Nonetheless, the reference system for special procedures did not evolve as 
planned. The reference system that was best developed, was the cardiovas­
cular system, based on the Heart Institute (INCOR), in the State of Sao 
Paulo -  see page 59. INCOR’s specialists came to be in charge of designing 
the guidelines for accrediting reference hospitals, defining standards of care 
and establishing a central register to monitor pacemaker implants. But, 
even this system did not succeed and it was being gradually phased out.
Some special materials such as prostheses (e.g. pacemakers) have their 
costs also excluded from the PBRS and are reimbursed individually. These 
materials are paid by unit of service or material used. The system for billing 
these special materials in 1986 was a separate system from the AIH form. 
This parallel system allowed the employment of these materials without 
control, which resulted in a very high volume of unnecessary implants and 
costs charged to social security.
Moreover, the reimbursement of some items of care by different payment 
mechanisms brings severe limitations to SAMHPS, in terms of its ability 
to control expenditure and improve the quality of services delivered. To 
maximize their revenues, hospitals might respond to constraints imposed by 
the prospective payment mechanism by transferring costs from one type of 
care to another[32].
An example of that, in the Brazilian system, has been the severe misuse 
of protheses and orthoses with serious consequences for patients and the 
finance of INAMPS. Prices charged by hospitals for pacemakers varied more 
than 500 per cent within and between states in the country. The average 
price hospitals were charging INAMPS in 1987 was 2.2 times higher than 
the average price in the United States and 3.6 times the price in Argentina. 
W ith the intention of restraining such abuses, INAMPS started to make pay­
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ment for those materials directly to the manufacturers[170]. An assessment 
performed by DATAPREV also showed strong indications of a high provi­
sion of unnecessary implants of protheses and orthoses. The Orthopaedics 
Commission Study observed evident signs of abuse in the use of orthoses in 
orthopaedic care.
O u tp a tien t care Finally, the payment for outpatient care delivered by 
contracted private hospitals is based on the retrospective payment mech­
anism, manually processed with much more limited ability to control bills 
and care delivered than SAMHPS. The existence of this extremely different 
approach to reimburse services provided by the same hospital leaves an enor­
mous gap for hospitals to transfer costs from one sector of care to another, 
thus subverting the rationale of the prospective payment scheme. During 
the field work, in collecting data for the reliability study (see chapter V), it 
became evident that such transfers of costs were common practice in some 
hospitals.
4.3 Comparing the Procedure Based R eim burse­
m ent Schem e (P B R S) w ith  the D iagnosis R e­
lated Groups (DR G S) Prospective Paym ent 
Schem e
4 .3 .1  D R G -B a se d  P r o sp e c tiv e  P a y m en t S y s te m
In 1984, the Medicare programme6 in the United States implemented a new 
method of reimbursing hospitals for inpatient services based on a prospective 
payment system, as an effort to control the growth in health care costs.
The unit of output in the reimbursement system adopted by Medicare 
is the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), a case-mix classification system 
for patients admitted to acute hospital care. DRGs were developed by re­
searchers from Yale University[54]. It is a system that groups clinically 
similar patients who are also similar in regard to the consumption of re­
sources. For classifying a patient into a DRG, the system considers one or 
more of the following variables:
• Principal Diagnosis
• The most resource-intensive operating room procedure received by the 
patient.
6 Medicare is a programme established by the government of the United States directed 
to finance the health care of the elderly.
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• The presence or absence of Secondary Diagnoses which represents rel­
evant comorbidities and complications.
• Age category.
• Discharge status (just for a few DRGS).
The DRG system started to be developed in the 1960s by researchers 
aiming at providing hospital managers with a system which would allow 
the measurement and evaluation of hospital performance. Since then, the 
system has evolved from a series of revisions to account for updating in the 
coding of diseases and procedures, changes in medical practice and medical 
technology and to increase its specificity in discriminating between patients 
with different levels of resource consumption. The sixth revision released in 
1989 contained 477 DRGs.
One major criticism of DRGs as a case-mix classification system is that 
they do not adequately account for the severity of a patient’s illness. Severity 
of illness is one factor supposed to be associated with the complexity of the 
hospitals’ case-mix. Most existing patient classification schemes considered 
additional diagnosis (other than the Principal Diagnosis) as an extremely 
important factor for modelling resource use. More recently, a refinement of 
DRGs was developed by the group at Yale using comorbidities and compli­
cations so as to further discriminate patients in regard to resource use[57].
In the payment scheme adopted by Medicare, the DRG is used for the 
reimbursement of labour and other direct expenses, but it does not cover all 
reimbursable costs[65]. Contrary to PBRS, it does not cover the payment of 
doctors7 and capital costs are reimbursed on a cost basis. Hospitals may also 
receive extra payment in the case of teaching hospitals and/or if the patient 
discharged was a cost or length of stay outlier. Outliers are those discharges 
which do not appear to belong to the underlying frequency distribution 
postulated to describe most cases in a DRG.
To control for the negative incentives which might be generated by 
prospective payment systems (see page 95), the Health Care Financing Ad­
ministration (HCFA) of the government of the United States established in 
1984 contracts with Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Programs 
known as (PROs). PROs are in charge of examining claims for Medicare 
services furnished to patients in regard to their appropriateness and quality.
7Doctors under the Medicare programme are paid on a fee-for-service basis. However, 
due to the increasing costs of physicians’ services, in November 1989, the Congress of the 
United States introduced changes by implementing volume performance  standards[158] to 
control the quantity and costs of doctors’ services.
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PROs replaced the ineffective Professional Standards and Review Organi­
zation (PSRO) that operated in the country from 1972 to 1982. Consumer 
participation on PRO boards became mandatory in 1986.
PROs are independent organizations, profit-making or non-profit mak­
ing, with a contract with HCFA, which evaluates the performance of the 
PROs and reviews the contracts every three years, renewing them accord­
ing to performance. It is strictly forbidden for PROs’ reviewers to have 
any direct contact or financial interests linked to hospitals which provided 
the services they are analysing. PROs review cases on a retrospective basis 
e.g. transfers, readmissions, day and cost outliers, newborns etc. and on a 
concurrent basis e.g. procedures with high variation such as Hysterectomy, 
which might be reviewed before admission or permanent pacemakers im­
plants and reimplants might be reviewed before surgery. Denial of payment 
for substandard care as well as notification of beneficiaries of such decisions 
are required by law[143].
There are still controversies about the impact of the DRG-based prospec­
tive payment system. Reduction in the costs of the hospital sector appeared 
to have been offset by the increase of costs in the other sectors of care, de­
noting the occurrence of a shift of costs. Sager[166] and Guterman[69] ob­
served an increase in discharges of Medicare patients to nursing homes after 
the implementation of the DRG-based prospective payment system. There 
is also research evidence that patients were being discharged earlier from 
hospital. DesHarnais[40] found that discharges and length of stay declined 
significantly after the introduction of a DRG-based prospective payment 
system. There is also evidence of a decline in the use of intensive care[112]. 
However, Kahn et cols.[92] did not observe any relationship between the 
Medicare new payment system and a worsening of severity-adjusted mortal­
ity rates. In this study, which assessed the early years of the implementation 
of the DRG-based payment scheme, mortality was assessed among deaths 
from a group of selected diseases occurring in the hospital for up to 180 days 
following admission. Therefore, it suggests that early discharge was not as­
sociated with increasing death rates. This outcome might be related to the 
performance of PROs in monitoring services delivered to Medicare patients. 
There is also evidence of hospitals erroneously assigning patients to DRGs 
as a way to increase reimbursement (see chapter V). These errors appear to 
be more frequent among those hospitals with poor financial conditions and 
operating with lower efficiency[175].
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4 .3 .2  T h e  B razilian  S y s te m
Both the PBRS and the Medicare system are based on a prospective ap­
proach. However, PBRS differs largely from the DRG-based prospective 
payment system, particularly regarding the unit of output, control mecha­
nisms and reimbursable costs as presented below.
• The unit of output in the payment system adopted by INAMPS does 
not take into account the patients’ characteristics. Procedures rep­
resent treatment patterns, but are weakly associated with patients’ 
characteristics. Age, patient’s severity of illness and even social class 
are likely to be associated with resource consumption. Because of this 
failure to take into account patients’ characteristics, the system is very 
likely to have heterogeneous groups with patients classified in the same 
group but requiring significantly different levels of resource consump­
tion. Heterogeneity within groups will affect the ability of the system 
to reduce costs and might prevent access and lower the quality of care 
delivered to those patients significantly more costly than the average 
cost of the group of procedures in which they are classified.
• The unit of output in the system adopted by INAMPS lacks the nec­
essary systematic updating to overcome shortcomings as well as to 
respond to changes in medical practice.
• SAMHPS did not succeed in implementing a control scheme directed 
at avoiding and punishing hospitals and doctors for delivering less than 
adequate care. The control system was based on direct and indirect 
supervision performed by doctors employed by INAMPS without any 
public control.
• PBRS involves the payment of doctors’ services, putting both doc­
tors and hospitals under similar financial incentives. This aspect is 
likely to provide a better outcome in terms of cost containment. How­
ever, it creates incentives on medical practice (see page 102), which 
then would require monitoring the specialty and workload of direct 
providers of care to prevent adverse effects on the quality of services 
delivered to patients.
• The PBRS does not have any mechanisms for compensating hospitals 
for cost outlier patients, which might limit the quantity and type of 
services furnished for these more severely ill patients.
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The effectiveness of the payment scheme is strictly associated with the 
homogeneity of the patients within each group of procedures, in terms of 
their resource consumption. On the other hand, as time goes on, medical 
practice and technology change, affecting health care costs. The former 
indicates that regular updating and modifications of relative values of the 
output units should be made mandatory.
Efforts to improve the classification system in PBRS have been limited to 
some areas of care, mainly the ones involving high technology. But, most of 
these efforts have not succeeded for a long time nor have the implementation 
of schemes to monitor the performance of contracted private hospitals.
The impact of negative responses from hospitals under PBRS is also 
likely to increase inequalities in health. The outcome of being discharged 
home in unstable conditions will vary according to the ability of patients 
and families to get access to ambulatory services or nursing care, to purchase 
drugs and to provide the necessary care at home. Moreover, the poor might 
require more resources from hospitals than the non-poor patients, which 
would put the less privileged patient under greater risk of receiving less 
than appropriate care under the prospective payment scheme. Epstein[51] 
observed in the United States that patients with low socioeconomic status 
after adjusting for age, severity of illness and DRG presented longer average 
lengths of stay and were likely to require more resources.
Moreover, the very high levels of inflation in the Brazilian economy dur­
ing the 1980s, rapidly reduced the real values of reimbursement, putting 
payment rates constantly under negotiation. Payment rates rapidly lost any 
relation to their initial values. Andre Medici (1990b) argues that the in­
creases in payment rates in the second half of the 1980s were below rates 
of inflation, with a serious impact on hospitals. Under-financing might lead 
contracted private hospitals to seek for new markets in the independent 
private sector as well as stimulate fraud and low quality of care.
Indeed, the high levels of inflation in the Brazilian economy (400 per 
cent in 1987 and 1000 per cent in 1988) and the monetary policy8 adopted 
by the government during this decade, is thought to have neutralized a great 
deal of the financial incentives inherent in the new payment scheme.
8Data[117] show that, in 1988, Group Medical Plans’ profits were mainly achieved in 
the monetary market and not as the result of an efficient production of services.
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4.4 Final Com m ents
In summary, the development of PBRS was a very straightforward one. It 
was an objective and in some ways a simple and direct strategy for approach­
ing a very complex and critical problem -  to control costs and improve the 
quality of services delivered by contracted out services. It did introduce a 
major and very important change in the relationship between social security 
and the services contracted out by expanding the regulatory power of IN­
AMPS. Nonetheless, for SAMHPS to achieve more effective results, it would 
have needed a great deal more strength and political willingness from the 
Federal Government to deal with old established hospital and professional 
lobbies and to cut the existing links between the social security bureaucracy 
and hospitals’ representatives.
Reducing costs at the same time as improving the quality of services 
is an enormous task which would have required clear political action to 
minimise the effect of inflation on the reimbursement of services delivered by 
contracted private hospitals and the negative effects of the payment scheme 
on the performance of services. It would require the establishment of a 
permanent monitoring system with some sort of public control in order to 
highlight the shortcomings in the unit of output, values paid, unethical 
practices, substandard care, constraints in access for particular groups of 
patients, thus enabling the identification of existing problems and the setting 
up of appropriate measures to deal with them.
Chapter 5
T he R eliability o f D ata  on  
th e A IH  Form
This chapter presents the reliability study. It was conducted to measure lev­
els of agreement between the information on the AIH form abstracted from 
the medical records by the hospitals’ staff with the information abstracted 
by the research team. AIH forms are insurance claims1 primarily linked 
to reimbursement. The collection of AIH forms builds up a large inpatient 
care data set which is a relevant source of data for management, health care 
service research and morbidity surveillance. For reimbursement, as well as 
management and epidemiological purposes it is important that information 
in the AIH form data set is reliable. The concept of reliability is discussed 
below. The sampling technique, the field work and the statistics used for 
measuring reliability are described, followed by the analysis of the results.
5.1 T he Concept o f R eliability
Reliability of an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure can be de­
fined as the capacity not to vary its results when used by different people or 
in different periods of time[6]. However, one must accept that error free mea­
surement is never attainable in almost any area of scientific investigation. 
Indeed, the measurement of nearly any phenomenon will contain a certain 
amount of chance error. For scientific investigation repeated measurement 
of the same phenomenon needs to be consistent. The more consistent the 
results of repeated measurements, the more reliable the measuring proce­
dure. Crombach[34] used two elements to infer reliability -  stability and 
equivalence. Stability means to obtain the same results after different ap­
plications of the instrument. Equivalence refers to the capacity of different
1See chapter III for a more detailed discussion on the AIH form.
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instruments to measure the same characteristic, or of one instrument ap­
plied by many people at the same time, or evaluated by different referees 
to measure the same characteristic. The latter refers to the design known 
as inter-rater reliability[6]. For medical data, reliability was defined[162] as 
the capacity to reproduce the same selected medical information in relation 
to pre-existing criteria.
One must distinguish the concept of reliability from the concept of va­
lidity. Validity is the extent to which an instrument correctly measures a 
characteristic. Reliability, as discussed above, is concerned with stability 
of repeated measurements, it does not say anything about the veracity of 
the information. This means that a reliable instrument does not necessarily 
provide valid information. In the case of medical information abstracted 
from medical records, reliability measures do not give any indication of the 
quality of the information on the medical record itself.
5.2 T he Quality o f M edical D ata
Hospitals’ discharge data, abstracted from medical records, have assumed 
increasing relevance for planning, management and health care service re­
search. This rise in the use of health care service’s statistics has been caused 
by the major developments in the computer industry in the last fifteen years. 
More recently, in some countries such as the United States, discharge data 
have also become available to the public, as a means of increasing consumers’ 
choice.
This new trend in the use of data abstracted from medical records has 
been followed by a greater demand for the assessment of the quality of this 
information. In the 1970s, the Institute of Medicine of the United States 
conducted a reliability study of information abstracted from the medical 
records[39]. This study was unique given its national scope. It also in­
cluded a study of claims generated for reimbursement purposes by hospitals 
admitting Medicare beneficiaries.
This investigation highlighted the large variations in the reliability of the 
different items of discharge data -  non-medical data such as sex, age, data 
of admission being more reliable then clinical data such as -  diagnosis and 
procedures. Clinical data were shown to have lower reliability with levels of 
agreement varying largely between diagnoses. The reliability of diagnostic 
information also appears as varying according to the level of coding refine­
ment, with comparisons for the four digits being less comparable than for 
the three digits.
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The major reliability study of medical data developed in Brazil was con­
ducted M. L. Lebrao[106] in 1974. She studied the quality of medical in­
formation in the Boletins CAH -  1012 -  a form containing data abstracted 
from public and private hospitals’ medical records in Sao Paulo. These Bo­
letins are kept by the Health Department of the state of Sao Paulo. The 
investigation found a 17.6 per cent level of disagreement for diagnoses based 
on the three digits level.
The reliability of diagnoses measured by various studies has shown large 
variations. Levels of disagreement varied between 42.5 per cent in the study 
conducted by Demlo (1978) in the United States to 5.5 per cent in the 
study conducted by O’Gorman from the Republic of Ireland[139]. However, 
variations in the methodology adopted for measuring reliability limit the 
comparability of these studies.
Reliability problems observed for clinical information in the medical 
records reflect problems in the quality of the data, but can also be explained 
by the fact that this information might be extremely subjective. Demlo[38] 
(1981) pointed to the fact that for 6.5 per cent of medical records analyzed 
the research group could not identify a Principal Diagnosis. This happened 
particularly for those records of patients with more than one diagnosis.
The linkage of clinical information to financial reimbursement, as has 
happened in the United States with the reimbursement of Medicare pa­
tients based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) or, in Brazil, with the 
reimbursement of contracted private hospitals based on a fixed payment rate 
by procedure, is likely to influence the quality of diagnosing, selecting the 
adequate procedure and coding[28, 78]. Simborg[172] has drawn attention 
to what he has called DRG creep -  the deliberate and systematic shift in hos­
pitals’ reported case-mix in order to improve reimbursement. Some recent 
studies[78,13] were designed to assess the impact on the coding of diagnoses 
of a prospective payment scheme. Hsia[78] conducted a study to measure 
the amount of incorrect diagnostic coding under the prospective payment 
scheme in the United States. This study showed that the average hospital 
has a 20.8 chance of coding incorrectly the discharge of a patient. Moreover, 
a hospital that had a coding error presented a 61.7 chance of overpaying 
itself.
Besides the occurrence of intentional manipulation of coding aimed at 
maximizing profits, low reliability of diagnosis might result from short­
comings in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) and, more 
notably, due to the difficulties in judging the information on the medical
2These latter became known as -  Boletins C A H  - 1 0 6 .
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records. These difficulties can range from bad handwriting, incompleteness, 
wrong interpretation of medical terms to difficulties in interpreting original 
medical notes. Variations in the judgement about care rendered are observed 
even when medical professionals’ assessments are compared[143] which in­
dicates the difficulties in the abstraction process. Last but not least, the 
level of adherence to the existing coding rules will also have an impact on 
the reliability of the clinical data.
5.3 M ethods
5 .3 .1  S am p le
The objective of this study was to evaluate the reliability of information 
on the data set of AIH forms completed by contracted private hospitals 
after discharging a patient covered by INAMPS. The design did not aim to 
identify the reliability of data at the hospital level, but at the more aggregate 
level -  the overall collection of AIH forms in the city.
A stratified sample by clusters in two steps was selected, representing 
the collection of AIH forms filed by 29 acute contracted private hospitals 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1986 (see Appendix 7.1). The first step of 
the sampling process consisted of the selection of a sample of hospitals and 
the second step consisted of the selection of a random sample of AIH forms 
(sample unit) from the hospitals sampled in the first stage.
Acute contracted private hospitals’ characteristics vary considerably. They 
vary in regard to ownership -  they can be for-profit or charity hospitals. 
However, for-profit and charity contracted private hospitals did not appear 
to be associated with the range of hospital indicators used in this analysis 
such as -  number of beds, specialty, occupancy rate, average length of stay, 
mortality rate, number of AIH forms etc. Therefore, this study did not 
separate hospitals in regard to their ownership.
The geographical distribution of acute contracted private hospitals in 
the city shows a concentration of services in the districts near the inner 
city areas and the north zone -  the lower income districts of the city. The 
more wealthy districts such as Copacabana, Ipanema or Leblon do not have 
a single contracted private hospital. However, no association was observed 
between the hospitals’ characteristics and the average family income of the 
residents of the administrative region where the hospital is located. The lat­
ter indicates that when considering only those administrative regions which 
have, at least, one acute contracted private hospital, there is no important 
variation in the wealth of the resident population and the hospital’s char-
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acteristics. This implied that for the sampling process, the geographical 
location of the hospital need not be taken into account.
For the purpose of defining clusters of hospitals, they were classified in 
relation to a range of characteristics represented by the indicators listed 
in Appendix C. The statistical procedure used to classify hospitals was 
principal components analysis[ 133] -  a method of factor analysis which allows 
the transformation of a group of variables into a new group of principal 
components which are not correlated among each other. This method has 
the capacity to simplify original data, by representing them in a smaller 
range of variables (principal components) than initially considered.
The seven principal components identified explained 83 per cent of the 
variance existing in the data. The analysis showed that contracted private 
hospitals varied in terms of mortality rate, specialty (surgery, chronic, pae­
diatrics, obstetrics) availability of intensive care beds and volume of AIH 
forms filed during the study period. It also showed that the provision of 
intensive care beds was inversely correlated with the volume of AIH forms 
filed by the hospital, suggesting that the better equipped the hospital, the 
fewer INAMPS’ beneficiaries it tends to admit.
Hospitals were primarily classified in four clusters, in relation to their 
position (high or low) in the principal components (factors) -  mortality 
and intensive care. Subsequently, hospitals in each cluster were classified in 
regard to the volume of INAMPS patients discharged. This process ended up 
with eight clusters of hospitals. A sample of hospitals was randomly selected 
from each cluster. In order to maintain the representativeness of the sample, 
as only one third of the 29 acute hospitals were positively indicated by 
the factor -  volume of INAMPS’ patients discharged, the same relationship 
was kept in the sample. A sample of 10 hospitals was obtained, in which 
6 hospitals were negatively signed in the latter factor and four positively 
signed (see Appendix D).
The second part of the sampling process consisted of the selection of a 
random sample of AIH forms from the 10 hospitals selected at the first stage. 
The sample size was fixed at 1,934 AIH forms. AIH forms were randomly 
selected in proportion to the volume of AIH forms filed by each hospital in 
the sample.
This sample size was further regarded as adequate to test the study vari­
ables. The minimum sample size for high frequency diagnosis such as Normal 
Delivery was estimated at 811 -  24.7 per cent of AIH forms in the sample. 
This estimation used Kappa Standard Error Formula (Kappa ( k) statistics 
is presented in the following section) and assumed a confidence interval of
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99 per cent with an accuracy of 0.05. For low frequency diagnosis such as 
Inguinal Hernia (2.3 per cent), the minimum sample size was estimated at 
1,955 assuming a confidence interval of 99 per cent and an accuracy of 0.08.
5 .3 .2  M ea su r in g  R e lia b ility
The study design was based on inter-rater reliability. It was aimed at test­
ing the equivalence of the results of the independent interpretation of the 
information available in the medical records by different raters. The ade­
quate statistics to measure reliability for nominal and categorical variables is 
Kappa[29]. Kappa («) is interpreted as the proportion of agreement between 
two judges rating n subjects after chance agreement has been removed. It 
compares the differences between observed and expected agreement to the 
maximum possible value of this difference. It is equal to 1 when there is 
perfect agreement (raters agree in all cases). It is equal to 0 when the ob­
served agreement equals the expected agreement by chance. It is negative 
when observed agreement is less than expected agreement by chance.
* = (5.1)
1 ~ P c
where:
p0 = the observed proportion of agreement 
pc = the chance proportion of agreement
Kappa standard error is:
se{k)=\IW^S ( 5 - 2 )
Kappa index requires three assumptions to be met:
• Subjects to be assigned are independent of each other.
• Raters operate independently of one another.
• Categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
The independence of subjects would strictly require that readmissions were 
excluded from this study, which was not possible given the structure and 
the information available in the AIH form data set, as presented in Chapter 
III. However, as in the hospitals studied each admission is recorded in an 
individual medical record, the assumption above was not violated.
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Kappa is also a good approach to measure chance-corrected agreement 
since it does not weight disagreement more in the case of homogeneous 
population -  those with rates close to 100 per cent or to 0 per cent[171].
Agreement was measured by using the Kappa index with a confidence 
interval of 99 per cent and a significance test for Hq : « =  0 by using the soft­
ware CONCORD developed for microcomputers by Klein and Coutinho[98].
It is also known[15] in the field of sampling statistics that cluster sam­
pling will yield greater sampling error than random sampling. This means 
larger variances for cluster sampling than for random sampling. Despite the 
limitations discussed above, it is very common in social sciences and medical 
research not to rely on random samples due to reasons of cost, among other 
things. As happened in this study, the option of cluster sampling largely 
limited the number of hospitals in the study, thus restricting the difficulties 
of access and shortening the research time and overall costs.
However, the formula used to correct the variance of Kappa assumed 
simple random sample design. Consequently, one has to interpret with care 
the confidence intervals associated with the Kappa index. That is, the real 
confidence intervals are larger than the ones, evaluated in the study. This 
means that eventually a null hypothesis («)= 0 might be rejected when 
it should not be rejected. However, standard errors in this study are not 
expected to be large given the large sample size. Moreover, to be more strict 
with the hypothesis testing, the confidence interval used was of 99 per cent 
instead of the usual 95 per cent. Therefore, bias introduced by stratified 
sampling should be irrelevant in the study’s conclusions.
Missing data were not included in the analysis of agreement, since it 
prevented the comparison between raters due to lack of information in the 
AIH form or in the questionnaire.
5 .3 .3  R a ters , T ra in ing  and  F ie ld  W ork
As presented already, this study was mainly concerned with the measure­
ment of the consistency of the abstraction process performed by different 
raters (hospital raters and research raters). It also aimed at collecting some 
information which was not available in the AIH form data set, such as the 
area code of the patient’s address.
This study did not aim to test the validity of the information on the 
medical records, but to test if this information was similarly judged by 
different raters when completing the AIH form. This means that it was 
not directed to assess the quality of the information in the medical record 
itself. The research team was mainly abstracting information available in the
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medical record but not judging this information. Despite being an extremely 
relevant question, the veracity of the information on the medical record 
was outside the scope of this investigation. However, one first attempt 
to approach the question of the quality of the information on the medical 
records was made in relation to the Principal Diagnosis and will be presented 
in the results.
* * *
The research team group was constituted of three medical doctors who 
were in charge of abstracting information from the medical records and one 
field-work supervisor. The research raters worked as a team and not as 
individual raters.
A questionnaire containing some of the relevant variables available on 
the AIH form and a Field Work Manual was developed. Variables in the 
questionnaire were the variables in the AIH form which are completed by 
the hospitals’ staff (see chapter IV). The Field Work Manual was based on 
the Modulo do Hospital^4] published by INAMPS to be used as a manual to 
guide contracted private hospitals’ staff in completing the AIH form. The
Field Work Manual was intended to provide the research raters with the
same criteria used by the hospital raters when completing an AIH form. 
However, explicit criteria for agreement were established for the following 
diagnoses, related to childbirth -  Uterine Scar, Fetal Distress and Dystocia.
Raters received 40 hours of training concerning:
• Training in the use of the Field-Work Manual.
• Training in the use of the Table of Procedures[83] for coding.
• Training in abstracting data from medical records.
• Training in completing the questionnaire.
Data was abstracted in the hospitals, after the selection of medical 
records by the field work supervisor. Procedures were coded by the raters 
responsible for completing the questionnaires. Diagnoses were written in the 
questionnaire and coded afterwards by accredited coding professionals.
5 .3 .4  N e g o t ia t in g  A ccess
The first contact with the hospitals aimed at negotiating access to their 
medical records’ files. As the country lacks a tradition in the field of health 
care service research, specially in relation to private hospitals, this became
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a very sensitive and time-consuming task. Hospitals varied largely in their 
response. Some appeared to be quite willing to provide access to their 
files, regarding the research as a relevant activity, while others appeared 
suspicious of our aims with some of them ending up not allowing access to 
their medical records.
The first contact was generally established with the hospital’s general 
manager, when an appointment was sought with the medical record de­
partment or equivalent. This second contact was aimed at discussing the 
organization of the medical documentation in the hospital, the qualifications 
of those in charge of completing the AIH form and coding diagnoses as well 
as planning the participation of the hospital in the research.
Except for two hospitals, the medical records are stored in central files 
and organized in chronological order in relation to the date of discharge. In 
most hospitals, the AIH form was kept attached to the patient’s medical 
record. After the identification of the medical record, the AIH form was 
separated from the medical record by the field work supervisor.
Only one hospital adopts a face sheet containing a summary of the in­
formation on the medical record. This implies that most hospitals’ data for 
completing the AIH form are abstracted directly from the medical record by 
lay medical records staff. In the hospitals visited, the great majority of the 
medical records staff did not have any adequate training in completing the 
AIH form or in coding diagnoses.
The field-work lasted a full year, mainly delayed by difficulties in getting 
access to hospitals’ medical records, which will be discussed in the following 
section.
5 .3 .5  N o n -r esp o n se
The response rate obtained in this study was 69 per cent. Therefore, 31 per 
cent of observations had to be classified as missing records -  a total of 603 
records. One important cause of non-response was the refusal of hospitals 
to participate in the study. However, hospitals tended not to refuse access, 
directly. Generally, they kept on postponing the date for the beginning of 
the work. A time period had to be established for negotiating access after 
which the delay was assumed to be an indirect denial of access.
Two hospitals -  Real e Benemerita Sociedade Portuguesa de Beneficencia 
and Servigo de Assistencia Social Evangelica -  refused access. At a third 
hospital -  Policlfnica de Botafogo -  the non-response rate was very high (83 
per cent) and this was interpreted as an indirect refusal. A fourth hospital 
-  Hospital da Veneravel Ordem Terceira de Sao Francisco da Penitencia -
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was not visited by the research team because it had only three AIH forms in 
the sample. The very small number of AIH forms from this hospital in the 
sample made the negotiating process not worthwhile. These four hospitals 
accounted for 38.5 per cent of the missing records.
A large proportion ( 33.0 per cent) of the remaining missing records were 
medical records from the Santa Casa da Misericordia do Rio de Janeiro, a 
large charity general hospital, which accounted for about one fourth of the 
AIH forms in the sample. The explanation for the large number of missing 
records in this hospital, as in the remaining hospitals, ranged from failure 
to find the medical record (some were said by the hospital to have been lost 
or thrown away) to refusal from some wards to give access to the medical 
records of their patients.
Non-response rates were lower at maternity units and larger at general 
hospitals. Non-response was also proportionally larger for those hospitals 
with a negative sign in the factor -  volume of INAM PS’ patients discharged. 
This implies that hospitals which admit a large number of INAMPS’ ben­
eficiaries accounted for a smaller proportion of missing records (see Ap­
pendix D).
The characteristics of response and non-response were compared by us­
ing the information available in the AIH forms. There were evident dif­
ferences in these two sub-populations as shown in table 5.1 on page 121. 
The non-response population appeared to be more concentrated on patients 
classified as receiving clinical procedures, had shown a slightly larger death 
rate and lower concentration of childbirth discharges. The non-responses 
also appeared to over-represent the AIH forms from patients diagnosed as 
Varicose Veins of Lower Extremities ICD-9 \5f .9  . As will be discussed in 
the following chapters, very unusual frequencies were associated with this 
diagnosis
The large rate of non-responses due to hospitals’ refusal and the fact 
that the population of responses was not equal to the population of non­
responses raised the hypothesis that the reliability of the non-responses was 
lower than that observed for the responses. This would imply that measures 
of reliability observed in this study are somehow higher than the ‘true’ ones.
5.4 R esults
5 .4 .1  P la ce  o f  R esid en ce .
Indicators of use of health care service can only be referred to a popula­
tion when the origin of patients is known. Patients’ place of residence is
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Table 5.1: Frequency distributions of variables in the AIH form for responses 
and non-responses.
Response Non-response
Age
Mean 40 45
Median 34 44
Sex
Men (per cent) 33.8 38.1
Women (per cent) 66.2 61.9
Total 1331 603
Type of Admission
Elective (per cent) 11.3 16.4
Non-elective (per cent) 88.7 83.6
Total 1331 603
Discharge Type
Discharge (per cent) 93.2 93.2
Permanence (per cent) 0.7 0.2
Transfer (per cent) 1.9 1.0
Death (per cent) 4.3 5.6
Total 1331 603
Type of procedure
Surgical (per cent) 61.4 48.9
Clinical (per cent) 38.6 51.1
Total 1331 603
Procedures
Normal Delivery (per cent) 24.7 11.6
Caesarean Section (per cent) 6.9 3.0
Congestive Heart Failure -  Adult (per cent) 5.8 6.5
Acute Cerebrovascular Accident (per cent) 4.8 3.5
Curettage Post Abortion (per cent) 2.9 3.0
Hypertensive Crisis (per cent) 2.6 1.7
Unilateral Inguinal Herniorrhaphy (per cent) 2.0 1.5
Pneumonia not otherwise Specified (per cent) 2.0 2.2
Surgical Treatment of Fracture of Neck of Femur (per cent) 1.4 0.5
Diabetes (per cent) 1.3 1.8
Varicose Veins -  one leg (per cent) 0.1 5.1
Varicose Veins -  two legs (per cent) 0.2 3.3
Total 1331 603
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essential information for the calculation of population rates. Furthermore, 
the origin of patients discharged from hospitals is a necessary element for 
the assessment of patient’s flow for planning the provision of services. This 
study has shown that the great majority of patients discharged from acute 
contracted private hospitals live in the city -  81.5 per cent of patients dis­
charged were residents. The great majority of the remaining patients (7.6 
per cent) came from the municipalities within the Metropolitan Region of 
Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, for 10.6 per cent of medical records there was no 
written information about the patient’s address.
The reliability of this data -  area code of patient’s address -  could not 
be measured since it was not available in the magnetic tape. This means 
that either this information had not been written on the AIH form or it was 
not being put on the magnetic tape by DATAPREV.
5 .4 .2  R e lia b ility  o f  th e  V ariab les A g e  and  S ex
Reliability for the variables age and sex was high (see table 5.2, page 123). 
Reliability for age was measured for age group categories3. These results 
are in agreement with those observed by Lebrao[106]. However, for 259 
medical records information on the date of birth was missing, which did 
not allow the calculation of the age of the patient. It denotes a high level 
of incompleteness for an extremely important variable both for clinical and 
epidemiological purposes.
5 .4 .3  R e lia b ility  o f  th e  P r o c e ss  o f  C are D a ta
Reliability of the variable Type of Admission was interpreted as unsatisfac­
tory (see table 5.2, page 123), limiting its use for research and planning 
purposes. However, the variable Length of Stay calculated from the infor­
mation on date of admission and date of discharge showed a good reliability, 
as presented in table 5.2 on page 123. The reliability of the variable length 
of stay appears to be better than the measure of reliability observed in 1974 
for the city of Sao Paulo’s hospitals[106]. This better result might be re­
flecting the fact that, since the introduction of the new payment scheme in 
1983, length of stay was not linked to financial reimbursement.
3Age group categories: less than five years old; five to fourteen years old; fifteen to 
twenty four years old; twenty five to thirty four years old; thirty five to forty four years 
old; forty five to fifty four years old; fifty five to sixty four years old and older than sixty 
five.
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P rofessional services
For payment purposes, whenever a surgery is performed in a contracted pri­
vate hospital, the identification of the surgical team (first surgeon, auxiliary 
surgeons and anaesthetist) has to be written on the AIH form. Moreover, as 
presented in chapter III, there are norms attached to each surgical procedure 
which define the minimal acceptable surgical team. Reliability measurement 
of the variables which identify the presence of each professional in a surgical 
team tended to be unsatisfactory (see table 5.2 on page 123). This is very 
objective information and reliability should be high.
Table 5.2: Indices of agreement ( k ) for non-clinical variables on the AIH 
form
Kappa (k) 99% Confidence interval
Age Group 0.973 0.93 -  1.00
Sex 0.993 0.92 -  1.00
Type of Admission 0.410 0.34 -  0.48
Length of Stay 0.904 0.87 -  0.93
First Surgeon 0.889 0.82 -  0.95
First Auxiliary Surgeon 0.524 0.46 -  0.59
Second Auxiliary Surgeon 0.195 0.13 -  0.25
Anaesthetist 0.694 0.62 -  0.76
Medical Encounters 0.284 0.26 -  0.31
Reliability of the variable presence of the main surgeon was higher than 
for the variable presence of auxiliary surgeons. The prevalence of auxiliary 
surgeons was larger in the hospitals’ AIH form than in the research question­
naire. The above indicates that there was information written on the AIH 
forms which was not written in the medical records. Unreliable information 
might be indicating reimbursement for care not delivered to patients and 
lower than expected quality of care. Nonetheless, the opposite was observed 
for the anaesthetist, which showed a larger prevalence in the medical records
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than in the AIH form. The explanation for the latter is unclear since the ab­
sence of information on the AIH form should imply no reimbursement, with 
hospitals or professionals incurring losses. It might be indicating, however, 
that this specialized care was not been provided to patients and not been 
checked by IN AMP S.
Reliability for the variable number of medical encounters (consultations) 
during the patient’s stay at the hospital was low as shown by table 5.2 on 
page 123. This is mainly explained by the incompleteness of this informa­
tion on the AIH form, due to the fact that this is a variable not related 
to reimbursement. Actually, hospitals are reimbursed on the basis of one 
consultation per day regardless of what is written on the AIH form4.
Reliability for Diagnostic and Therapeutical Services appeared to be low. 
Again this is very objective information and reliability should be high. The 
exceptions were Clinical Pathology, Radiography and Electrocardiogram and 
Electroencephalogram which tended to present better reliability. The results 
shown in table 5.3 (page 125) only consider that this information was writ­
ten, at least once, it does not consider the volume of services. However, 
the variability between patients in the volume of exams performed tended 
to follow the pattern observed in the reliability -  large for those services 
with low reliability and small for those with high reliability. This suggests 
that the overall information is better for those services with high reliability. 
Agreement for Cardioversion and Nuclear Medicine could not be assessed 
given the absence of these procedures in the sample.
5 .4 .4  R e lia b ility  o f  C lin ica l D a ta  
D iagnosis
Following the trend already verified in other studies, reliability of the most 
frequent diagnosis tended to be lower at the four digit level than at more 
aggregate levels (three digits categories) as shown in table 5.4 and table 5.5 
(pages 126 and 127). Diagnosis at the four digit level presented an average 
k = 0.72 and for three digits level an average k = 0.82.
The level of agreement for diagnosis observed in Lebrao’s[106] for Sao 
Paulo’s hospitals was 82.5 per cent at the three digit level which is a sim­
ilar result to the one observed in this study. However, one must take into 
account that these studies are not strictly comparable due to differences in 
the methodology.
4See chapter IV for more detailed information on the payment system.
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Table 5.3: Indices of agreement ( k ) for Diagnostic and Therapeutical Ser­
vices in the AIH form
Kappa (k) 99% Confidence interval
Pathological Anatomy 0.516 0.45 -  0.58
Ventilator 0.437 0.38 -  0.51
Physiotherapy 0.216 0.15 -  0.27
Haemotherapy 0.671 0.60 -  0.74
Nebulizer 0.151 0.14 -  0.18
Clinical Pathology 0.914 0.84 -  0.98
Radiotherapy 0.814 0.74 -  0.88
Electrocardiogram
and Electroencephalogram 0.777 0.71 -  0.85
Reliability measures varied largely between diagnoses. Among those di­
agnoses more prevalent in the sample of AIH forms, reliability was high for 
Normal Delivery ICD-9 650.9 and Inguinal Hernia ICD-9 550.9; moderate 
for Congestive Heart Failure ICD-9 428.0 and Acute but ill-defined Cere­
brovascular Diseases ICD-9 436.9 but, for Obstructed Labour by Bony Pelvis 
ICD-9 660.1 and for Bacterial Pneumonia ICD-9 482.9 observed agreement 
could not be considered higher than agreement obtained by chance (see ta­
ble 5.5 on page 127).
Disagreement for Bacterial Pneumonia mainly reflected discrepancy at 
the level of the aetiology of the disease. For most medical records with a 
Principal Diagnosis Pneumonia the researchers’ raters identified the diagno­
sis Pneumonia, organism unspecified ICD-9 486.9.
For the diagnosis Diabetes Mellitus ICD-9 250.9 reliability was higher 
for the three digits category indicating that disagreement was mainly at the 
level of specification of the disease .
It was observed that, on the AIH forms, the four digit diagnostic cate­
gories were largely placed on the fourth digit 8 or 9, which are considered as 
ill defined classifications for the diagnosis category, denoting low accuracy
126
Table 5.4: Indices of agreement ( k ) for clinical variables in the AIH form.
Kappa (k) 99% Confidence interval
Principal Diagnosis 
Four Digits 0.720 0.679 -  0.761
Principal Diagnosis 
Three Digits 0.811 0.772 -  0.849
Clinical Procedures 0.741 0.687 -  0.795
Surgical Procedures 0.943 0.894 -  0.992
in the coding process.
*  * *
To approach the question of quality of diagnosis written in the medical 
record, the research team (all of them qualified doctors) were asked if they 
agreed with this information. For 98.5 per cent of the medical records ana­
lyzed a Principal Diagnosis was written. The research team tended to agree 
with 85.4 per cent of the medical records. Among disagreements, the main 
reason referred to was lack of concordance between the clinical information 
on the medical record and the principal diagnosis written on it.
The research team was also asked to abstract data on multiple diagnoses. 
The questionnaire allowed more options for Secondary Diagnosis than the 
AIH form. For 42.4 per cent of the medical records analyzed, at least one 
Secondary Diagnosis was identified -  a much higher percentage than the 
one observed on the AIH forms in the sample (1.9 per cent). Moreover, 11.7 
per cent of the medical records had shown at least four Secondary Diagno­
sis. This result highlights the high level of incompleteness for the variable 
Secondary Diagnosis in the AIH form . Multiple diagnoses are important 
information for the measurement of the severity of illness, a confounding 
variable for comparisons between patients. .
P rocedures
The clinical data linked to financial incentives in the AIH form is the Pro­
cedure Performed. It is the unit of payment for the reimbursement system 
adopted by INAMPS, as presented in chapter IV. Alterations in this data
127
Table 5.5: Indices of agreement ( k ) for some selected diagnosis.
Kappa (k) 99% Confidence interval
Normal Delivery 
ICD-9 650.9
Three Digit Category 0.892
Four digits 0.892
Congestive Heart Failure 
ICD-9 428.0
Three Digit Category 0.905
Four digits 0.793
Acute Cerebrovascular Disease 
ICD-9 436.9
Three Digit Category 0.787
Four digits 0.787
Obstructed Labour 
ICD-9 660.1
Three Digit Category 0.000
Four digits 0.000
Fracture of Neck of Femur 
ICD-9 820.8
Three Digit Category 0.8798
Four digits 0.000
Essential Hypertension 
ICD-9 820.8
Three Digit Category 0.725
Four digits 0.736
Inguinal Hernia 
ICD-9 550.9
Three Digit Category 0.970
Four digits 0.919
Bacterial Pneumonia 
ICD-9 482.9
Three Digit Category 0.000
Four digits 0.000
Diabetes Mellitus 
ICD-9 250.9
Three Digit Category 0.775
Four digits 0.000
0.822 -  0.962 
0.822 -  0.962
0.835 -  0.974 
0.723 -  0.863
0.717 -  0.857 
0.717 -  0.857
0.810 -  0.949
0.655 -  0.821 
0.666 -  0.806
0.899 -  1.000 
0.849 -  0.989
0.705 -  0.844 
0.000 -  0.000
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might maximize hospitals’ profits. Therefore, besides measuring the reli­
ability of this variable, an attempt was made to ascertain the extent to 
which disagreement was financially favouring the hospitals. The reliability 
for the variable Procedure Performed (the most frequent ones) was high ( 
k=0.907 ) -  higher than the reliability observed for diagnosis at the four 
digit level. Reliability appeared to be higher for surgical procedures than 
for clinical procedures -  reflecting the lower degree of subjectivity of surgical 
information (see table 5.4 on page 126).
*  *  *
The impact on the hospital’s reimbursement was assessed for the 341 
observations classified as disagreement (see figure 5.1). For 19.6 per cent 
of disagreements, this could not be assessed due to a variety of reasons 
such as missing data. For 29.0 per cent of disagreements both the hospi­
tal and the research raters coded the discharge in different procedures but 
which had an equal reimbursement rate. The latter are minor disagree­
ments because raters identified procedures pertaining to the same group of 
procedures. However, for 19.9 per cent of observations the hospitals’ code 
was related to procedures with a lower reimbursement rate compared with 
procedures coded by the research raters. For 31.4 per cent of no-agreements 
the hospitals’ assignment was in procedures with a higher reimbursement 
rate than the research assignment. In short, whenever disagreement affect­
ing the reimbursement rate occurred, the observed trend was that hospitals 
were maximizing their reimbursement.
Figure 5.1: Level of agreement for the variable Procedure Performed and 
impact of disagreements on the reimbursement rate.
U n k n o w n  
2 0 %
Equal  
29%
j r e e m e n t  74% N o n - a g r e e m e n t  20%
9 9 0  341  Sma l l e r
2 0 %
Bi gger  
31%
6  
C o m p a r i s o n  b e t w e e n  raters Ef f e c t  on r e i m b u r s e me n t  o f  n o n - a g r e e m e n t
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5 .4 .5  R e lia b ility  o f  O u tco m e D a ta
Death is the variable in inpatient statistics most commonly used for mea­
suring outcome of care. The variables death and transfer in the AIH form 
appeared with high reliability (see table 5.6 on page 129). Nonetheless, it 
should be stressed that for 55 medical records it was not possible to ascertain 
how the admission terminated, due to missing data.
Table 5.6: Indices of agreement ( k ) for outcome variables in the AIH form.
Kappa (k) 99% Confidence interval
Death 0.973 0.903 -  1.000
Transfer 0.833 0.763 -  0.903
Stillbirth 0.932 0.862 -  01.000
Death (newborn) 0.639 0.572 -  0.706
Nonetheless, the information used for calculating perinatal mortality rate 
(stillbirth and death of the newborn), more specifically death of the newborn, 
showed low reliability. The research raters identified more newborn deaths 
and stillbirths than the hospital raters. The above implies that large vari­
ations will occur in perinatal mortality rates, depending on whether it is 
based on AIH form data or on the research data. The AIH form’s rate will 
be lower than the research’s rate. Reliability for the variable Born Alive, 
the other variable needed for the calculation of perinatal mortality rate, was 
high (k =0.99).
5.5 Conclusions
The quality of data in the AIH forms varied largely between variables. 
Among non-clinical variables reliability was high for age, sex and length 
of stay. Existing errors most probably originated when transposing the 
code number or erroneously abstracting the date of birth, admission or dis­
charge. However, reliability for type of admission was low, limiting the use 
of this variable for management and research purposes. In chapter VIII this 
variable was used only in the descriptive analysis.
Reliability was also considered low for those variables associated with 
the identification of the surgical team. This information is used for payment
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of professional services. The payment scheme adopted by INAMPS implies 
that the greater the number of professionals involved with each admission, 
the less each individual professional is likely to earn (for more details see 
chapter IV). To prevent unacceptable reductions in the surgical team, with 
a negative result on the quality of care, INAMPS has established norms 
defining the minimally acceptable surgical team for each group of proce­
dures. However, it was suggested that the regular checking of this norm was 
not being carried out. This study has shown a higher frequency of surgeons 
on the AIH form than in the medical records, suggesting that some hospi­
tals might be writing information on the AIH form just for reimbursement 
purpose without providing the service to the patient. On the other hand, 
an opposite trend was observed for the presence of the anaesthetist -  lower 
frequency on the AIH forms than in the medical records. This might imply 
that an anaesthetist is not present regularly present in the surgical teams.
The above result limited the analysis of the division of labour between 
salaried and contracted doctors presented in chapter VIII. The variables 
related to auxiliary surgeons and medical encounters which had shown very 
low reliability should be excluded.
In regard to diagnostic and therapeutical services, reliability was consid­
ered low for most items on the AIH form, limiting their use for monitoring 
the quality and intensity of care delivered to patients. However, the quality 
of this information can be improved by bringing all items to the reliability 
levels observed for some frequent diagnostic services such as Clinical Pathol­
ogy and Radiography. Moreover, it was observed that the AIH form tended 
to show a higher volume of diagnostic services than the questionnaire, sug­
gesting incompleteness of this information in the medical records. It raises 
the questions of whether these services were truly delivered to patients.
Reliability of diagnosis was similar that one obtained by the other Brazil­
ian study[106] carried out in the seventies, demonstrating that a great scope 
for improvements in the quality of information on diagnoses still remains. 
The results obtained indicate that the use of diagnoses information from the 
AIH forms for utilization statistics or epidemiological studies should concen­
trate on more inclusive diagnostic categories: three digit comparisons were 
more reliable than four digit ones. These results apply mainly for those most 
frequent Principal Diagnoses, which were the ones tested in this analysis.
Reliability varied largely between diagnoses. Some diagnoses appeared 
more troublesome than others. For instance, there were no agreements for 
Obstructed Labour ICD-9 660, a diagnosis for which explicit criteria were 
developed. This means that the research raters could only assign a patient
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to the above diagnosis if the criteria were met.5 As this is a diagnosis 
strongly associated with caesarian section, the absence of agreement between 
hospital’s and research raters also questions the adequacy of a caesarian 
section in patients with the above diagnosis.
The major problems related to the quality of diagnoses on the AIH form 
is the quality of the abstracting and coding process. The division of re­
sponsibility for abstracting and coding influences the quality of diagnoses. 
Most contracted private hospitals in the sample do not adopt a ‘summary 
sheet’ containing basic information assigned under the responsibility of the 
attendant doctor. Medical records from which data were abstracted by a lay 
staff tended to contain imprecise and incomplete information . The same 
staff, most of them without any specific qualification in coding, would also 
be in charge of coding the diagnoses. Furthermore, the coding source pub­
lished by INAMPS to be used by contracted private hospitals is a resume of 
the 9th Classification of Diseases - ICD-9 published by WHO, which omit­
ted the terms of inclusions and exclusions, therefore raising the chance of 
misclassification and ill-defined categories.
It was also observed that errors in diagnoses can be the result of mis- 
specification[78], with the attendant doctor selecting and writing in the med­
ical record an incorrect diagnosis. The research raters tended to disagree 
with about 14 per cent of the diagnoses written on the medical records.
This study also highlighted that information on multiple diagnoses is 
highly incomplete on the AIH forms, limiting the use of this data set for 
the measurement of diagnostic case-mix, because of the existence of a large 
number of false negatives.
Reliability of procedure performed measured by this study was good, de­
spite the fact that this is the variable used by IN AMPS for payment. This 
result is influenced by the mechanisms of control adopted by INAMPS. As 
presented in chapter III, the patient is classified in a procedure by an IN­
AMPS’ doctor before admission to a contracted private hospital . The only 
exceptions are emergency patients. However, procedures might be changed 
by the hospital, but the Clinical Director has to sign the AIH forms assum­
ing the responsibility for the adequacy of the new procedure. Nonetheless, 
it was observed that, whenever there was a disagreement which revised the 
reimbursement, there was a higher chance for this disagreement to maximize 
the hospital gains, emphasizing the need for further control.
5The criteria defined would require that in order to establish the diagnosis of O bstructed  
Labour the result of an exam should be written in the medical record (manual, X Ray or 
ultrasonography) indicating a disproportion of maternal or fetal origin.
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Finally, data on death and transfer showed a high reliability. However, 
perinatal deaths showed low reliability, leading to the under-estimation of 
perinatal mortality rates calculated from data on AIH form, seriously mis­
leading any evaluation of perinatal care.
In general, this study has shown that the quality of data on the AIH 
form is somehow better than the quality that is generally attributed to this 
source. However, important problems exist, preventing the use of some 
variables and restricting the use of others. These urgently call for improve­
ments in the organization of the medical record, division of responsibility 
on the abstracting and coding process, increased training and also for fur­
ther implementation of mechanisms of control of the medical care data in 
contracted private hospitals and on the AIH form. These are needed both 
to avoid losses by INAMPS as well as to provide managers, researchers and 
consumers with a reliable source of information about inpatient care in the 
country, therefore improving the quality of care.
Chapter 6
A nalysis o f C ontracted  
Private H ospitals in the  
C ity o f R io de Janeiro
One question raised in this study was the role played by contracted private 
hospitals in the division of labour between health care organizations in the 
Brazilian Health Care System. To show this in a more schematic way, it 
will be necessary to analyze the main characteristics of contracted private 
hospitals, by answering the following questions: Whom did they treat? (age, 
sex, payment status, social security entitlement status), Where the patient 
was admitted? (Acute, Psychiatric or Chronic Hospital), Why (diagnosis), 
How (process of care, type of provider of care, expenditure) and the Results 
(type of discharge).
The hypothesis considered in this chapter is that private hospitals paid 
by Social Security, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, treat a selective population 
within the working population and their dependents. It is expected that 
the inequalities within the labour market, and the existence of a large infor­
mal labour market in the Brazilian economy, will be seen to create major 
constraints on the social impact of social security care policy.
This chapter begins by presenting the contracted private hospitals’ share 
of the health care market in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The city’s social 
structure is also discussed here, followed by a detailed analysis of the so­
cial and demographic characteristics of patients discharged from contracted 
private hospitals.
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6.1 The State, the M etropolitan A rea and th e  
City o f Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro is one of the oldest cities in Brazil. Its settlement goes back 
to the XVI century. Most of its characteristics are related to the fact that it 
was the capital of the country until 1962, when the Federal Administration 
moved to Brasilia, Brazil’s new capital. Another important aspect is that 
in 1974 it lost its status as a Federal State to become a city of the State of 
Rio de Janeiro.
The State of Rio de Janeiro is located in the Southeast of Brazil. Its 
territory is 44,268 square kilometres which corresponds to 0.52 per cent 
of the national territory. In 1986, the State’s population was estimated 
as 12,669,481 inhabitants. The population density is estimated to be 286 
inhabitants per square kilometre.
The city of Rio de Janeiro is the most important city in the state. Its 
population in 1986 was estimated as 5,711,971 inhabitants, which corre­
sponded to 40 per cent of the state’s population. While the city covers only 
3 per cent of the state’s territory, it nevertheless presents the highest popu­
lation density in the country -  4,340 inhabitants per square kilometre. The 
Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro is made up of the city of Rio de Janeiro 
and the neighbourhood municipalities.
The State of Rio de Janeiro presents a high rate of urbanization. In 
1980, 91 per cent of its population was living in urban areas. The inter­
nal migration is high, with the population moving to the city of Rio de 
Janeiro and its metropolitan area. The migration from the North and the 
Northeastern regions is also important. Nevertheless, the rate of population 
growth has been declining since the last decade, in the city as well as in 
the State of Rio de Janeiro. This decline rate is associated with a decrease 
in birth rate. However, the influence on immigrational flow should also be 
considered. The surrounding area of the city of Rio de Janeiro is a very de­
prived one. The rate of migration and population growth is higher than in 
the city. Living conditions are normally below standard. A large part of the 
work force commutes to Rio de Janeiro in order to work. Transportation is 
precarious, causing severe difficulties in the everyday life of this population.
There is an estimate that 1 million people live in ‘slums” in Rio de 
Janeiro. Social conditions have been deteriorating in the last few years. 
Hence, criminality rates, which are already very high, present an increasing 
pattern. However, Rio is the second most developed city in the country, 
with some areas evidencing a very high standard of living.
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6 .1 .1  T h e  S tru ctu re  o f  th e  H e a lth  C are S y s te m
Generally speaking, the structure of the health care system in Rio is very 
similar to the one that exists all over the country (see Chapter II). Regard­
ing the quantity, complexity and quality of such care, the system in Rio 
generally follows the pattern of the southeast region, in which the great­
est number of inpatient services in the country is concentrated, considering 
mainly services from the private sector. The availability of specialized ser­
vices is also high when compared to other regions. Profit-making hospitals 
are mostly concentrated in the region of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Rio 
de Janeiro has a great concentration of public hospitals, due to the fact that 
it was the capital for so many years. The majority of self-owned hospitals of 
the Compulsory Social Security Scheme (INAMPS) axe located in the city, 
and most of them are large general hospitals.
Contracted private hospitals are the major providers of inpatient caxe in 
Brazil. In 1986, they were responsible for 75.4 per cent of all admissions, 
financed by INAMPS, in the country as a whole[125]. But in Rio, contracted 
private hospitals were known to have a smaller participation in the provision 
of inpatient caxe, due to the high availability of public beds. In accordance 
with the data provided by DATAPREV for this study, contracted private 
hospitals were responsible for 110,723 admissions in Rio, during 1986.
The National Household Survey (PNAD) 1981 provides information on 
the utilization rates for residents in the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro. 
The utilization rate for the Metropolitan Area in 1981 was 6.4 admissions 
per 100 inhabitants. A mean of 1.3 admissions per patient per year (1.308 to 
1.409, with 95 per cent confidence interval) was observed. Actually 19 per 
cent of the population which was admitted to hospital reported more than 
one admission. Utilization rates appeared evenly distributed (3.2 admis­
sions per 100 inhabitants), between the public and private sector. Unfortu­
nately PNAD’s data do not allow analysis between sub-sectors of care, e.g. 
contracted private hospitals (dependent private sector) versus private hospi­
tals without direct public finance (independent private hospitals). Inpatient 
statistics1 have to be used in order to compare the utilization pattern across 
sub-sectors of care. However, in general, inpatient statistics do not make 
it possible to separate readmissions. This means that each admission is 
counted individually. Therefore estimated rates, based on inpatient statis-
1The Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography (IBGE), annually performs a 
Health Service Census based on the collection of inpatient statistics, which provides data 
on manpower, equipment, discharges and death. Aggregate data are published and services 
are classified as public or private
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tics, are normally overstated, due to hidden readmissions. Furthermore, 
available inpatient data do not provide data at the Metropolitan Area level. 
So the discussion presented in this section and the data presented in table 6.1 
page 136) are only related to the State of Rio de Janeiro and the City of 
Rio de Janeiro. This means that the figures presented do not directly apply 
to the Metropolitan Area and the opposite is also true.
Utilization rates2 were estimated for the State and city of Rio de Janeiro. 
The State showed an overall rate of 12.4 admissions per 100 inhabitants but 
this is over-estimated, due to hidden readmissions (see table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Hospital utilization rates per 100 inhabitants -  1986.
Population Utilization rates
Private Public
Number Total Dependent Independent
Brazil 138,000,000 12.6 5.5 4.7 2.4
State of RJ 12,669,481 12.4 4.5 4.6 3.2
City of RJ 5,711,971 15.0 2.2 6.4 6.5
Note — Population figures calculated from the 1980 Census using IBGE’s annual factor 
for population growth (1.019376). Source for discharge figures: AMS-IBGE, INAMPS 
em Dados, 1986 and DATAPREV.
Estimated rates for the State of Rio de Janeiro, show that the participa­
tion of contracted private hospitals in the provision of inpatient care (4.5 per 
100 inhabitants) was higher than the participation of the public sector (3.2 
per 100 inhabitants) and almost similar to the participation of the private 
services from the Independent Private Sector (4.6 per 100 inhabitants). Sur­
prisingly, the participation of contracted private hospitals was much smaller 
than expected and the participation of independent private hospitals much 
more important. Actually, the major provider of inpatient care, both in the 
state and the city, appeared to be the Independent Private Sector.
The contracted private hospitals emerged as playing a less important role 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro, than in the country as a whole. Estimated
2One must be cautious in analyzing the rates in table 6.1, page 136. Firstly, rates for the 
city are over-estimated because the population living outside Rio was not included in the 
calculations. There is a flow of patients from outside Rio to the city’s hospitals, although 
the magnitude of this is not known. Moreover, the volume of non-residents probably 
varies between heath care organizations. Nevertheless, for contracted p riva te  hospitals, 
data from the reliability study (see chapter V) indicate that, in 1986, approximately 85 
per cent of patients discharged were residents. Estimated rates for the S ta te  of R io de 
Janeiro  are more reliable than the ones for the city,. because they tend to have a more 
accurate denominator.
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utilization rates for the State of Rio de Janeiro (4.5/100) were lower than 
the national rates (5.5/100), being even smaller for the city of Rio de Janeiro 
(2.2/ 100).
To summarize, inpatient care in the city of Rio de Janeiro was provided 
both by public and private services. Private services appeared to be the 
major providers of care. But, amongst private hospitals’ discharges those 
without direct public finance were the most prevalent. Contracted private 
hospitals had a less important role in the city of Rio de Janeiro than in the 
State and in the country as a whole. Nevertheless, about two-thirds of all 
admissions, both in the state and in the city, were publicly financed.
6 .1 .2  T h e  S ocia l S tru ctu re
The social structure and the pattern of inpatient services’ utilization across 
social groups will be discussed in this section. This analysis is based on 
data published by IBGE and data from the National Sample Household 
Survey (PNAD), for the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro. The limited 
availability of data for the city of Rio de Janeiro implied that most of the 
following analysis was based on figures for the urban population of the state 
of Rio de Janeiro or the metropolitan area. These figures do not directly 
apply to the population of the city of Rio, which is the most developed 
municipality within the state and the metropolitan area. However, it is 
assumed that the existing differences do not bias the overall pattern.
In 1986, 62.0 per cent of the economically active urban population (43.0 
per cent of the total population) living in the state of Rio was male. Data 
for the same year show that among the working population, only 62.0 per 
cent were entitled under a governmental social security scheme. This means 
that approximately one third of the working population was not-insured. 
They were part of the so called informal labour market.
Among those not-insured, men were also more prevalent, but the rate 
of ‘non-entitlement’ was larger for women (47.6 per 100 working women) 
than for men (33.7 per 100). The very young and the elderly also presented 
higher ‘non-entitlement’ rates, when compared with the working population 
between 25 to 49 years old. These figures highlight the fact that both age 
and gender have different values within the labour market.
The rates of social security entitlement also varied between employment 
status categories. The proportion of entitlement to social security among 
employees was 72 per cent[61], well above the average rate. Data from 
social security[59] show that the entitlement rate for the self-employed was 
the lowest among the employment status categories (21.4 per 100). This
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low rate might be explained by the high number of self-employed, working 
in very low institutionalized types of work such as car washing, watching 
over parked cars in the streets, street vending, among others.
The population which is not-insured is also much poorer on average 
than the insured population, with 50.0 per cent of the not insured earning 
less than one legal minimum wage compared with 16.0 per cent among the 
insured.
In 1986, unemployment3, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, was at the level 
of 3.3 per cent of the economically active population. The above figure is 
very close to the one for the city in the same year -  3.5 per cent. Again, men 
were more prevalent among the unemployed, but the rate of unemployment 
was larger for women -  4.0 per 100 of the economically active population. 
Unemployment was higher among the young and tended to decrease as age 
increased.
For those people at work, the great majority were employees (75.0 per 
cent). The self-employed correspond to 20.0 per cent of the working popu­
lation and the employers to 4.0 per cent4. Besides this, one per cent of the 
working population in Rio were non-paid workers.
Income is very unevenly distributed across the working population (see 
figure 6.1). The employees and the self-employed show a high income vari­
ability. On the contrary, employers presented a much more concentrated in­
come distribution, skewed towards the top income levels. The self-employed 
appeared to be the group with the highest concentration of people in the 
lowest income groups, followed by employees in a middle income position.
Data from DATAPREV, published by IBGE[59] indicate that in the 
State of Rio de Janeiro in 1986 17.0 per cent of the urban population of 
10 years old or more was retired on a pension or receiving some sort of 
social security benefit. Assuming5 that about 45.0 per cent of those were on 
sickness benefit, the estimated proportion of pensioners and retired people 
in the above population was 9.0 per cent. This figure is not far from the one 
observed in 1981 from PNAD’s data for the Metropolitan Area: 7.0 per cent 
of the population of 10 years old or more were retired or on the pension.
In summary, approximately, one third of the working population in the 
Metropolitan Area of Rio was found not to be insured. Social security en-
3Unemployment, as it is measured by PNAD, refers to those people who at a point in 
time, were not working, but looking for work[59]. ,
4Figures from 1981 PNAD indicate that in the Metropolitan Area, there was a slightly 
bigger concentration of employers and relatively less employees and self-employed.
5These figures were estimated from data published by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Security [126].
139
Figure 6.1: Income distribution for employment status 
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titlement rates varied between employment status, age groups and sexes. 
The self-employed, the women, the youngest and the elderly appeared to be 
the groups with higher non-entitlement rates, signalling their relative lower 
value within the labour market. Employees were the most prevalent group 
among the working population. Income distribution varied greatly between 
and within employment status groups, showing up the large inequalities 
existing in this society.
6.1.3 H ea lth  S ta tu s  and  U tiliza tion  of H ea lth  C are  Services
The Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro presents the highest percentage of 
elderly people (65 years old or more) in the country. The Ageing Ratio6, 
for the area was 16 elderly per 100 inhabitants less than 15 years old. This 
age structure was close to the one observed in the Metropolitan Area of Sao 
Paulo (14.9 per 100).
The structure of mortality shows that Disorders and Diseases of the Cir-
6 Ageing Ratio =  number of inhabitants 65 or more /  number of inhabitants less than 
15 years old
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Table 6.2: Utilization rates for income groups PNAD -  1981.
Legal minimum wage Rate per 100
Less than 0.5 11.0
0.5 to 1 10.0
More than 1 and less than 2 9.0
More than 2 and less than 3 8.0
More than 3 and less than 5 7.0
More than 5 and less than 10 6.0
More than 10 and less than 20 5.0
More than 20 6.0
Note — Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro -  PNAD -  1981.
culatory System are the first group among causes of deaths followed by 
Neoplasms. These two groups are responsible for about 50.0 per cent of all 
deaths -  a larger rate than the one observed in the Metropolitan Area of 
Sao Paulo which is the richest and most developed area in the country.
In 1986, the city of Rio de Janeiro also showed one of the highest mortal­
ity rates from violence and accident in the country (99.6 per 100.000 inhab­
itants). It reflects the level of violence in everyday life in the city. Contrary 
to what happens in First World countries, the main causes of death in the 
group of injuries are traffic accidents and murder.
Disorders and Diseases of the Respiratory System are the fourth cause of 
death, but the risk of death for problems in the respiratory system is smaller 
in Rio than in Sao Paulo. The particular feature of causes of death in the 
Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro is suggested to be, to some extent, a 
reflection of the high number of elderly people in this region.
Data from PNAD (1981) see table 6.2 (page 140), show that the less 
privileged people living in the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro were 
experiencing more hospitalization than the more privileged or the higher 
income groups, suggesting that health care need was greater among the 
poor population.
Presumably, these higher rates are signalling the disproportionate share 
of morbidity which the less privileged groups in the city experience. Nonethe­
less, despite their higher utilization rates, it is most likely that the poor and 
less privileged population are being admitted to hospitals through emergen­
cies in more severe conditions and receiving less than adequate care.
The relationship between social class and health was emphasized by
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PNAD data for the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro (1981), when ad­
mission rates were analyzed across employment status. There was a clear 
positive gradient for the social groups in relation to the utilization of inpa­
tient services. Those poorer and less prestigious social groups had shown 
larger utilization rates. These large rates experienced by those at the lower 
levels of the social stratification reflect the existing differences in morbidity 
and severity between the social groups, as well as the existing variations in 
access to services at the primary level.
The employees had a utilization rate (5.76 per 100 employees), slightly 
below the utilization rate observed for the area (6.4 per 100 inhabitants). 
The self-employed had shown a rate (6.55 per 100 self-employed), slightly 
above that of the area as a whole, most probably influenced by its more 
deprived social conditions. On the other hand, the utilization rates for the 
employers (2.77 per 100 employers) was much smaller than the observed 
rates for the other social groups. The employer were utilizing hospital ser­
vices at a rate less than half the area’s level. The highest utilization rate, 
among the working population, was for the most deprived group, those non­
paid workers (0.8 per cent of the working population), located at the bottom 
of the social stratification. They presented a utilization rate (7.4 per 100), 
much above the rate for the area.
There are no available data published on health status and utilization 
patterns for the not-insured and the unemployed in Rio. Nevertheless, given 
that these groups have a concentration of the less privileged and the poorer 
people within the economically active population, it is reasonable to assume 
that they have worse health status and a different utilization pattern to 
their counterparts in the labour market. Tallon[177] showed that, in the 
United States, the population not covered by health insurance is more likely 
to report poorer health status than those insured. There is also evidence 
for the developed world that the unemployed experience worse health than 
the population at work[156]. Furthermore, Arber[7] showed that health 
conditions, among the unemployed, varied across social class, being worse for 
those unemployed originally attached to unskilled and manual occupations.
In conclusion, Rio is a city with a high prevalence of elderly people, 
when compared to the whole country. The mortality pattern reflects the 
level of development of the city, the age structure and the high levels of 
violence. Utilization rates varied sharply between social groups, reflecting 
the large inequalities in health ‘need’. Employers appeared to be much less in 
need of health care services, when compared to the other employment status 
categories. The self-employed and the non-paid workers presented utilization
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rates above the regional level. Differences in the utilization pattern across 
social groups also appeared to be further explained by existing discrepancies 
in income, which varied markedly between and within social groups. It was 
also assumed that the unemployed and the not-insured were experiencing 
worse health status than the employed and the insured.
6.2 T he R ole o f C ontracted  P rivate H osp ita ls
6.2.1 P a tie n ts ’ C h arac te ris tic s
In this sub-section, the social and demographic characteristics of patients 
admitted to contracted private hospitals are discussed, and the existence of 
social selection in the demand for these hospitals will be initially investi­
gated.
Age and Sex
In the majority of admissions (74.1 per cent) to contracted private hospitals 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the patient’s age fell between 15 to 64 years old, 
indicating that a great proportion of patients admitted to those hospitals 
come from the working and childbirth age population. And, approximately 
sixty per cent of admissions of patients were women ( see figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2: Frequency distribution for age and sex
  male 38%
1 5-64  7 4 % 1-4  4 %
>1 3 %
female 62%
Discharges by Age Groups. Discharges by Sex.
Note —  Contracted Private Hospitals -R J-1986.
Nevertheless, age and sex specific discharge rates7 showed significant 
variations across the age groups and the sexes (see table 6.3, page 145). 
Estimated rates tended to increase with age with two exceptions:
7 Rates were calculated by using population figures based on data for the city of Rio 
de Janeiro, estimated from the 1980 Census[58].
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• The age group of less than 4 years old, in which rates were higher than 
for the age group 5-14 years old, for both sexes.
• The age group of 46 to 64 for women, which presented a lower rate 
than the preceding age group.
The observed higher rates for younger children followed the universal pat­
tern, reflecting the age distribution of health problems in the population. 
Age and sex specific morbidity rates have a ‘U’ shape curve indicating that 
morbidity is more frequent in the extreme age groups for both sexes. It is 
suggested that this rate has been influenced by high utilization rates amongst 
children less than a year old.
The literature on health care service utilization is almost unanimous in 
indicating that women present higher rates of hospitalization than men[73, 
79, 90, 130]. Data for acute hospitals in the United States[181], show that 
utilization rates for women, after excluding childbirth, were still 18.0 per 
cent higher than for men. Nevertheless, Verbrugge[184] points out that for 
the US population and for serious problems which are not sex specific, men 
have slightly higher or equal rates of hospitalization. In Brazil, there is 
evidence of a similar pattern in health care service utilization. Women’s 
admission rates in 1981 were higher than for men[151]. For the State o f Rio 
de Janeiro[61], women’s rates (4.99 per cent) were higher than men’s (4.35 
per cent) , even after the exclusion of child birth admissions.
The above rates also vary across age groups. In the United States, hos­
pital utilization for midlife women and men are virtually identical, although, 
after the age of 65, men are more likely to be hospitalized than women[140]. 
For the State of Rio de Janeiro[61], the women’s rate between 50 to 59 years 
old (8.3 per cent) was higher than for men in the same age group (6.7 per 
cent).
In contracted private hospitals, discharge rates for women were also 
higher than for men, but the latter presented higher utilization rates for 
all age groups, except the group from 15 to 45 years old. When childbirth 
related admissions were excluded from total discharges, discharge rates for 
women dropped to slightly under the men’s rate: the above difference did 
not hold, however, when rates were controlled for acute care hospitals. Ac­
tually, after the exclusion of childbirth-related admissions, rates for women 
continued to be slightly higher than for men (see table 6.3 on page 145).
The slightly higher rate observed for men, after the exclusion of child­
birth related discharges, was mainly a function of:
• Men’s much higher discharge rate for psychiatric contracted private
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hospitals, as will be discussed later in chapter VII.
• Men’s higher discharge rate in the age group of 45 to 64 years old for 
all discharges.
The latter represents an inverse pattern to the one observed in PNAD’s 
data for the State of Rio de Janeiro[ 61]. These suggest that middle-aged men 
and male psychiatric patients are more likely to be admitted to a contracted 
private hospital than middle aged women and female psychiatric patients.
The relatively high discharge rates observed for the age group of 65 years 
and over (7.7 per cent for men and 5.4 per cent for women) again suggest 
the existence of a selection in favour of the elderly in contracted private 
hospitals. Data for United States’ acute hospitals in 1977[181], shows that 
people aged 65 years and over were being admitted five times more than 
those under 15 years of age, for both sexes. Data from PNAD-1981[61] had 
shown that the above difference was smaller for the population living in the 
state of Rio de Janeiro -  3.9 times more for elderly women and 3.7 times 
more for elderly men. These differences are mainly explained by the fact that 
the Brazilian population is younger than the North American population. 
Nonetheless, for contracted private hospitals, both for all hospitals and for 
acute hospitals, discharge rates appeared to be much more concentrated 
in the older age group (12 times more in all hospitals and 10 times more 
in acute hospitals) reinforcing the hypothesis of selection in favour of the 
elderly. ;
Despite the fact that the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro presents 
the highest ageing ratio among the Metropolitan Areas in the country, it still 
has a low concentration of elderly people when compared with developed 
countries in the world. The United States in 1980 presented an ageing ratio 
of 69.9, much higher than the one observed in the Metropolitan Area of Rio 
de Janeiro[180].
In summary, contracted private hospitals’ discharges were mainly con­
centrated in the working age population and among female patients. Never­
theless, discharge rates showed that despite the fact that women presented 
higher utilization rates than men, the latter presented higher rates for all 
age groups, with one single exception -  the childbirth age group. Moreover, 
after excluding deliveries, women’s total rate dropped to under men’s rate, 
but continued a little higher rate for acute hospitals than midlife women. 
Furthermore, it was also suggested that there was a selection in favour of 
the elderly in the admission to these hospitals.
145
Table 6.3: Age and sex specific discharge rates. Rates per 100
All Admissions Acute Hospitals
Age Groups Men Women Men Women
less than 4 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9
5 - 1 4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
1 5 -4 4 1.0 2.9 0.5 2.6
4 5 -6 4 3.0 2.1 2.1 1.6
more than 65 7.7 5.4 6.2 4.3
TOTAL 1.5 2.3 1.0 2.0
Total (*) 1.5 1.4 1.048 1.150
Note — Population figures calculated from 1980 Census. Missing 674 records. Unknown 
age in the population =  4,130 people. Contracted Private Hospitals - Rio/1986.
Excluded discharges for child birth.
P aym ent Status
The social distribution of patients was also analyzed by looking at the distri­
bution of patients by payment status8. In more than half of the admissions 
(56.5 per cent) either the patient was an employee or one of his dependents 
was. In one third (32.5 per cent) of admissions, either the patient was a re­
tired person or one of his or her dependents was, suggesting that contracted 
private hospitals were covering selected groups within the social security 
population. Moreover, only in 3.2 per cent of admissions was the patient 
not a social security contributor (not-insured), despite the fact that, as pre­
viously discussed, about one third of the working population in the same 
year was not-insured (see table 6.4 on page 146).
By comparing the social class distribution of patients discharged from 
contracted private hospitals with their relative distribution in the population 
(see table 6.4 on page 146), further understanding of the social characteris­
tics of the selected market for contracted private hospitals can be gained.
The retired appeared to be highly over-represented among discharges 
(32.5 per cent) when compared with their relative distribution in the popu­
lation (7.0 per cent). The explanation for the above should be approached 
in two complementary ways:
• Age is a characteristic intrinsically associated with becoming retired.
8The categories of the variable P aym ent Status on the AIH form, are mainly related 
to the various contribution modes within the social security scheme. It is necessary to 
emphasize that in this variable, patients will be classified on the basis of the insured person. 
That is to say that the insured person’s dependents receive his or her classification.
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Table 6.4: The relative distribution of discharges and the population for 
payment status.
Discharges Population
Employee(%) 56.5 37.8
Retired (%) 32.5 7.0
Self-Employed (%) 6.1 8.0
Unemployed (%) 1.3 3.5
Employer(%) 0.4 1.8
Not-Insured(%) 3.2 34.4 <**)
Note — Population 10 years old and more - Metropolitan Area of Rio de 
Janeiro/1981. Percentage of the working population. Contracted Private Hospitals 
Rio de Janeiro -  1981 All discharges.
For most , retired people, retirement was associated with ageing (or 
with illness). Ageing is highly related to a higher risk of illness and 
the use of health care services.
• As previously indicated, elderly people are suggestively more likely 
to get an admission in a contracted private hospital than those very 
young.
So the over-representation of the retired in contracted private hospitals’ 
discharges is suggested to be not only a function of age, but also a result 
of selection mechanisms favouring this social group. Nonetheless, this se­
lection might be partially explained by the fact that, within the contracted 
private hospitals’ target population (the population covered by social se­
curity), the high proportion of retired people is over-representing the el­
derly, when compared with the population as a whole. Employees were also 
over-represented in contracted private hospitals’ discharges, when compared 
with their distribution in the population. The same though was not true 
for the self-employed, the unemployed and the employers9, who appeared 
to be under-represented in discharges, when compared with their relative 
distribution in the population.
The self-employed utilization pattern seems to be different from the one 
observed for their social security counterparts - the employees. Nonetheless, 
it must be noted that their apparent lower utilization might be due to a
9Comparable data for the not-insured population was not available. But, as already 
pointed out, the not-insured were scarcely represented in contracted private hospitals 
discharges.
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certain extent to their lower social security entitlement rate. This could 
mean that for those self-employed people entitled to social security, the 
utilization pattern would not significantly differ from the one observed for 
the employees. They might even have higher utilization rates, given their 
general trend to consume more inpatient services. However, it should also 
be considered that the self-employed is a heterogeneous group in regard to 
occupation and income. Those high-income self-employed might be using 
services at the independent private sector, the same being true for some 
groups among the employees. In short, the over-utilization by the employee 
when compared with the self-employed, is suggested to be associated with 
the much lower rate of social security entitlement among the self employed. 
This means that those self-employed entitled to social security would have 
a similar utilization rate to the one observed for the employees, everything 
else being equal.
Regarding the unemployed, it must be emphasized that those who were 
insured when at work, keep the right of access to social security health ser­
vices for as long as two years after becoming unemployed[124]. So a similar 
pattern to the one discussed for the self-employed might also be occurring 
with the unemployed. The above would mean that for those unemployed 
people who were covered by social security benefits when at work, contracted 
private hospitals would remain an available option for inpatient services. 
However, for those not covered by social security the main option would be 
the local public services, mainly the network of emergency services.
On the other hand, the employers’ under-representation in contracted 
private hospitals’ discharges is presumably associated with their better health 
status indicated by their much lower utilization rates but also, an indication 
of their preferences for inpatient services outside the social security network 
e.g. mainly the independent private sector (private services without direct 
public finance).
Age and  sex d is trib u tio n  Important variations were also observed in 
contracted private hospitals’ discharges between the sexes and age groups, 
across payment status. The relationship between sex and age differentials 
in mortality and morbidity with social class is a complex one. There is re­
search indicating that the relationship between health ‘need’ and sex and 
age varies across social groups[7, 77, 200]. For contracted private hospitals’ 
discharges, the prevalent pattern observed for all discharges, where women 
are more prevalent than men, did hold across payment status, with two 
exceptions -  the unemployed and the retired (see table 6.5 on page 148).
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The above pattern indicates that unemployed men are more at risk of be­
ing admitted to a contracted private hospital than the men from the other 
social groups. This favours the hypothesis that unemployed men were ex­
periencing worse health conditions than their counterparts at work. On the 
contrary, the higher prevalence of men among patients classified as retired 
might be influenced by a large number of patients in this payment category 
who retired due to accident at work or due to illness. The disabled and the 
chronic ill are potentially great users of health care services.
Table 6.5: Proportional discharge rates for sex across payment status.
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Men 29.8% 35.2% 31.2% 50.4% 52.8% 41.6%
Women 70.2 64.8 68.8 49.6 47.2 58.4
Total 61915 412 6666 1476 35532 3360
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986 -  Missing records: 1352.
Age varied across payment status with the employee and the unemployed 
being, on average, much younger than the employer, the self-employed and 
the not-insured. The average age of the employee is mainly a function of the 
high prevalence of women of childbirth age among discharges in this social 
group. The same, though, does not explain the age pattern of discharges 
among the unemployed. Actually, for the unemployed among whom men 
were more prevalent in discharges than women, their age distribution sug­
gests that they were experiencing serious health problems at a younger age 
than the employed population. The average age for the retired was 58.3 
years old (see table 6.6 on page 149).
In conclusion, the probability of discharge from a contracted private hos­
pital varied across payment status, with the retired and the employees being 
the groups more likely to be admitted to one of these hospitals. The age 
and sex distribution of discharges did not hold constant across payment sta­
tus, indicating that the relationship between payment status and the use 
of health care services was mediated by these attributes. Men were more 
prevalent in discharges among the unemployed and the retired, most prob­
ably reflecting particular health and demographic characteristics of these 
social groups in the population.
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Table 6.6: Mean age by payment status.
Mean age
Employee 39.5
Employer 44.1
Self-Employed 41.6
Unemployed 39.5
Retired 58.3
Not-insured 44.3
Note — All discharges. Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
Social Security Entitlem ent Status
Social security entitlement status was analyzed to separate the insured pa­
tient from his or her dependents. The analysis was directed to answer the 
question of the existence of selection in favour of those at work - the insured 
person him- or herself.
Figure 6.3: Frequency distribution for social security entitlement status
Insured 39%
nsured 52% 
4 4 9 9 9 _
2803
Dependent 61%
Dependent 48% 35967
40762 Retired patients excluded.
All discharges.
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals-RJ-1986
Acute private hospitals discharges10 appeared to be equally distributed 
between the insured and their dependents. However, this distribution was 
mainly reflecting the highly concentrated distribution of insured patients (82 
per cent) among the retired. Indeed, when the retired were excluded from 
discharges, the proportion of insured patients fell below the proportion of 
dependent patients, better reproducing the distribution of the economically
10This data does not include discharges from psychiatric and chronic hospitals.
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active people within the population (see figure 6.3). The high frequency 
of insured people among retired patients is most probably associated with 
characteristics of their age pattern: the older you axe the less dependents 
you have. But, it also reflects the fact that women were less prevalent in 
discharges among this payment group.
The above distribution does not show any compelling indication of the 
existence of selection mechanisms in favour of the insured to the detriment 
of their dependents. The lack of comparative data inhibits further analy­
sis at this level. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the following chapter, 
the greater predicted probability of discharge observed for men for non-sex 
specific health problems points in favour of a selection in favour of the eco­
nomically active population. Moreover, the proportion of insured patients 
varied markedly across payment status. Besides the retired, the unemployed 
also appeared to be over-concentrated among the insured patients, presum­
ably indicating the worse health condition of men patients classified in these 
two payment categories (see table 6.7 on page 150).
Table 6.7: Distribution of the social security entitlement status of patients 
by payment status.
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired
Insured 36.4% 45.5% 55.6% 62.3% 82.0%
Dependent 63.3 54.5 44.4 37.7 18.0
Total 51699 334 5684 1053 26991
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
Reproducing the distribution of gender within the labour market, where 
men are more prevalent than women, social security entitlement status ap­
peared clearly associated with gender. Insured patients were 82.0 per cent 
among men and only 38.0 per cent among women. Despite the fact that this 
trend did hold across payment status, the difference between the sexes ap­
peared to be lower among the unemployed, apparently indicating the higher 
prevalence of women among this group in the population. The higher preva­
lence of women in discharges among the unemployed was associated with an 
over-representation of unemployed insured women in childbirth discharges. 
This raise the hypothesis that women might being dismissed from work due 
to pregnancy.
Summarizing, the social security entitlement status of patients varied
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remarkably across payment status and sexes. It was suggested that these 
distinctions were reproducing the social characteristics of the labour market, 
but further investigation of this hypothesis could not be undertaken. It was 
highlighted that among the unemployed, the proportion of insured patients 
was the highest across payment status groups and that it was even higher 
for women. Unemployed dependents are less likely to be admitted to a 
contracted private hospital than the dependents of the employed population. 
The above points further in favour of a relationship between health and 
unemployment, e.g. employers are dismissing sick people from work but 
also unemployment per se is suggested to be increasing the risk of ill health. 
Moreover, it is indicated that unemployed women are at even higher risk of 
being admitted to a contracted private hospital than their counterparts at 
work.
6.3 Conclusions
Taking into account the overall low discharge rates for contracted private 
hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro, which means under-coverage for all 
social groups, there is evidence indicating that the employees and the retired 
are the social groups most likely to be admitted to a contracted private 
hospital. Nonetheless, it seems that for those in the labour market, one 
relevant factor in explaining observed differences in the utilization pattern 
for contracted private hospitals is prevalence of social security entitlement. 
This implies a distinct pattern of access, availability and adequacy of care, 
at least in regard to inpatient care for people pertaining to the formal or to 
the informal labour market.
As the likelihood of social security entitlement also varies across age 
groups and sexes in favour of those most privileged in society, it means that 
discrepancies in the ability to consume health care services when needed, 
are also observed at these levels of the social stratification.
These conclusions are consistent with the hypothesis of the limited social 
efficiency of a health care policy based on the principles of insurance, in a 
country where about one third of the working population is excluded from 
the formal labour market. Those excluded are most probably the ones at a 
higher risk of needing health care services.
Chapter 7
T he C ase-M ix in C ontracted  
Private H ospitals
In this chapter the role of contracted private hospitals in the supply of 
inpatient care in the city of Rio de Janeiro will be discussed, on the basis of 
the range of health problems these hospitals treat. Variations in case-mix 
across payment status will be analyzed, further testing the hypothesis of 
social selection in the use of these hospitals.
7.1 T ype o f H ospital
In the city of Rio de Janeiro, the great majority of contracted private hospi­
tals’ discharges (80 per cent) were in acute hospitals1, followed by psychiatric 
hospitals (14 per cent) and chronic hospitals (7 per cent) see figure 7.1.
Despite their preference for acute care, contracted private hospitals are 
known for treating less complex health care problems and providing services 
with low technological input. This is exemplified by the small proportion 
of surgical patients admitted to contracted private hospitals, less than half 
of that observed for social security self-owned hospitals[82]. This trend has 
been increasing, at least during the first half of the 1980’s[161]. It denotes 
the recent trend in the Brazilian Health Care System, where contracted 
private hospitals have been under threat to hold their position as relevant 
providers of inpatient care.
When compared with contracted private hospitals’ discharges in the 
country as a whole[127], the distribution of discharges in contracted private 
hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro presented a more extreme feature, 
shown by their slightly lower concentration of surgical patients and an over-
1The operational definition of Acute Hospital adopted in this study is presented in 
detail, in chapter III (Methodology.)
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Figure 7.1: Discharges by type of hospital.
Acute 80% 
87801 ,
Chronic 7% 
7223
Psychiatric 14% 
15007
Note — Contacted Private Hospitals-City of Rio de Janeiro-1986.
concentration of discharges in the areas of obstetrics, psychiatric and chronic 
care (see table 7.1, page 153). It is suggested that this specific feature is 
shaped by the greater competition which contracted private hospitals have 
to face in the city from other sectors of care and by the payment scheme 
adopted by INAMPS to reimburse these hospitals. This competition might 
be leading contracted private hospitals to shift from acute care to chronic 
care and to the independent private sector. Moreover, it also intensifies 
the existing trend which leads contracted private hospitals to select health 
problems which might require a low technological input for treatment.
Table 7.1: Proportional discharge rates by specialty.
Brazil City of Rio de Janeiro
Internal Medicine 62.2 50.5
Surgery 15.0 13.6
Obstetrics 22.8 35.9
Sub-Total (Acute Care) 100.0 100.0
Psychiatry 3.5 14.0
Chronic 0.2 7.0
Acute 96.3 79.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Note —  Contracted Private Hospitals Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
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7 .1 .1  V aria tion s across A g e  G roup  and  S ex
Age and sex adjusted discharge rates presented a consistent pattern between 
the sexes across hospitals - larger rates for men in all ages groups, with two 
exceptions:
• Larger rates for women of childbirth age in acute hospitals.
• Slightly larger rates for elderly women (more than 65 years old) in 
chronic hospitals (see table 7.2, page 154).
Table 7.2: Age and sex specific discharge rates for type of hospital. Rates 
per 100 inhabitants.
Acute Psychiatric Chronic
Hospitals Hospitals Hospitals
Age Groups Men Women Men Women Men Women
less than 4 11.2 9.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
5-14 2.3 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
14-44 5.0 26.1 4.7 2.3 0.4 0.3
45-64 21.1 15.6 5.3 3.0 3.5 2.4
More than 65 62.0 43.0 2.6 2.1 12.8 14.2
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -1986.
The first aspect above has already been discussed in the previous chapter. 
The second one might be reflecting the fact, already observed in the United 
States, that women have more chronic conditions than men, specially after 
the age of 45 and 50 years old[184, 140].
Nonetheless, the most noticeable aspect of this analysis is the observed 
discrepancy in discharge rates between the sexes for psychiatric hospitals - 
men’s rates being much larger than women’s.
A similar pattern to the one observed in Rio de Janeiro has been de­
scribed for psychiatric contracted private hospitals in Salvador - Bahia[176]. 
In this study, Abnoel compared psychiatric discharges across sectors of care. 
He observed that for psychiatric contracted private hospitals, men patients 
were more prevalent than women patients, but this distribution between the 
sexes did not hold across sectors of care: in the psychiatric public hospital, 
the prevalence of women exceeded that of men. He argued that the sex dis­
tribution of admissions to psychiatric contracted private hospitals was not 
reflecting the distribution of mental diseases in the population, but was the
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result of selection mechanisms in favour of the economically active popu­
lation. Another indicator of selection in favour of the economically active 
population, pointed out by Abnoel, was that psychiatric contracted private 
hospitals (and the public hospital) concentrated on treating patients that 
were on average older than patients admitted to the teaching hospital and to 
the independent private hospital (private hospital without public finance).
In the city of Rio de Janeiro, patients discharged from psychiatric con­
tracted private hospitals were heavily concentrated in the age group between 
15 to 65 years old, representing those in the productive age groups. This age 
distribution also highlights the occurrence of an under-representation of the 
elderly in psychiatric contracted private hospitals’ discharges, despite the 
fact that the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in the elderly population, 
in a large urban city in Brazil, was seen to be 25 per cent[154].
Thus, women and the elderly were undoubtedly under-represented in 
contracted private hospitals’ psychiatric discharges. This may be explained 
by the fact that psychiatric contracted private hospitals are admitting mainly 
people in the economically active population. Abnoel (1988) raised the hy­
pothesis that psychiatric contracted private hospitals play a particular role 
for those middle-aged workers who present signs and symptoms assumed by 
society to be related to mental illness. Abnoel shows that, in 80.0 per cent 
of discharges in psychiatric contracted private hospitals, the patient was the 
insured person. Moreover, a much larger proportion of patients in these hos­
pitals decided themselves to be admitted to hospital, when compared with 
patients admitted to hospitals from other sectors of care.
Psychiatric contracted private hospitals would be an alternative way 
of life for those at risk of losing their place in the labour market, due to 
problems associated with mental illness: a transient way of life, which might 
guarantee a minimal level of comfort as well as pave the way for obtaining 
sickness benefit from social security.
7 .1 .2  V aria tio n s across P a y m en t S ta tu s  
P sych iatric H ospitals
The proportional rate of discharge between hospitals of different specialties 
varied across payment status (see table 7.3, page 156). The unemployed and 
the not-insured appeared to be over-represented in psychiatric and chronic 
hospitals’ discharges.
A study in England[156], showed that the unemployed presented a rate 
of mental illness, two times the estimated rate for the employed population.
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Table 7.3: Proportional rate of discharge by payment status across type of 
hospital.
Employee Employer Self . 
Employee
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Acute
Psychiatric
Chronic
83.1%
14.1
2.8
79.7%
16.3
4.0
84.6%
10.7
4.7
71.1%
21.8
7.1
75.5%
11.4
13.1
58.4%
30.7
10.9
Total 62190 419 6719 1481 35730 3492
ICD-9 291 
and 303^
17.0% 12.0% 13.0% 28.0% 18.0% 24.0%
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
Proportional rates related to discharges in psychiatric hospitals only. ICD-9 (291) 
‘Alcoholic Psychosis’ and (303) ‘Alcohol Dependency Syndrome’ .
The unemployed also appeared to live a less healthy life than the employed, 
presenting large rates of smoking, heavy alcohol drinking and poor sleeping.
Data for contracted private hospitals showed that the unemployed were 
the social group more likely to be discharged from hospital due to Alcoholic 
Psychosis (ICD-9 291) and Alcohol Dependency Syndrome (ICD-9 303), 
presumably as a result of their poor life conditions, deprived of resources 
and satisfaction (see table 7.3, page 156).
Therefore, the proportional discharge rate for unemployed patients in 
psychiatric contracted private hospitals is suggested to be mainly a factor 
related to the high prevalence of health problems associated with mental ill­
ness in this social group which in turn would lead to a greater demand. Ad­
missions of the unemployed to psychiatric hospitals might also be explained 
as an alternative which temporarily guarantees better life conditions, for 
those without a job.
Like the unemployed, the not-insured are excluded from the benefits 
of being a member of the formal labour market. They have low income 
on average, limited purchasing power and access to social security bene­
fits. However, the not-insured are on average older than the unemployed. 
Actually, the long term unemployed are very likely to become workers in 
the informal labour market. Given their deprived life and limited access to 
goods and services, it is expected that both the unemployed and the not- 
insured have poorer health than their counterparts in the formal labour mar­
ket. Nevertheless, the not-insured presented a very unusual pattern of use of
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contracted private hospitals. The main characteristics of this unique pattern 
will be discussed throughout this study. It is suggested that the observed 
over-representation of not-insured patients in dependent psychiatric private 
hospitals could be explained in two complementary ways:
• A lower threshold2 in psychiatric contracted private hospitals than 
in acute contracted private hospitals to admit not-insured patients. 
As will be discussed later, this might be the result of supply-induced 
demand.
• A high prevalence of mental illness in this social group.
C hronic H ospitals
In almost ninety per cent of discharges in chronic contracted private hospitals 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the patient was classified as a terminally ill 
patient. Therefore, chronic contracted private hospitals in the city should 
be taken mainly as a place to die and not as a place for treatment and/or 
recovery.
The unemployed also appeared to be over-represented in chronic private 
hospitals’ discharges. Moreover, they presented a specific distribution of 
principal diagnosis, indicating that the reasons for admission among the un­
employed did not match the overall pattern observed for these hospitals. The 
ten most frequent diagnoses in chronic hospitals accounted for about fifty 
per cent of all discharges, but only thirty per cent of unemployed patients’ 
discharges. Their wider spread of case-mix indicates that the unemployed 
are being treated in chronic hospitals for problems for which the employed 
and the retired get treatment at acute hospitals.
The proportional discharge rate, for malignant neoplasms, in chronic 
hospitals for the unemployed was larger than their rate in acute hospitals, 
suggesting that the unemployed are less likely to be treated for cancer in 
acute hospitals.
The above gives rise to various possible explanations. One would be 
that unemployed patients would have less access to acute contracted private 
hospitals than their counterparts in the labour market. The other could be 
that those with cancer might be at higher risk of becoming unemployed, 
thus raising the prevalence of patients with advanced stages of the disease 
among this social group. Moreover, the relatively large proportional dis­
charge rates from cancer for those classified as unemployed observed for
2Threshold is defined as the equilibrium between the supply and the demand[85].
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chronic hospitals could also be related to the overall supply of the health 
care services: unemployed patients would have less access to early diagnosis 
and treatment, being admitted to hospitals mainly at advanced stages of the 
disease. Either one of these explanations denotes that those individuals are 
being excluded from their basic rights as citizens and should be considered 
as relevant questions for future investigation.
However, the over-representation of not-insured patients in chronic hos­
pitals’ discharges appears to be of a different nature. When their distribution 
of principal diagnoses for chronic hospitals is observed, they appear to have 
very large proportional discharge rates for one specific diagnosis -  Cerebral 
Thrombosis ICD-9 4$4-0 (15.7 per 100 of not-insured patients’ discharges). 
This proportional discharge rate is much larger than the total proportional 
discharge rate for this diagnosis (9.9 per 100 discharges) or, the propor­
tional discharge rate observed for retired patients (10.9 per 100), who would 
be expected to be at greater risk of Cerebral Thrombosis, given their older 
age.
It is suggested that this very atypical distribution of principal diagnoses 
cannot be explained by the prevalence of the disease among the not-insured 
population but is the result of practices induced by the hospitals. These are 
discussed later in this chapter.
Summarizing, contracted private hospitals’ discharges were heavily con­
centrated in acute hospitals. Discharge rates varied between age groups and 
sexes by type of hospital. Men’s rates were larger than women’s rates for 
psychiatric hospitals in all age groups, indicating that selective mechanisms 
were operating against admission of women and the elderly to these hos­
pitals. It was suggested that these hospitals were playing a wider social 
role than that of treating patients. One of these roles would be associated 
with providing an alternative way of life for those in the labour market who 
presented problems associated with mental illness. More than a place of 
treatment, they would be a place where workers, being excluded or already 
excluded from the labour market, looked for a guarantee of a minimal stan­
dard of living. Proportional discharge rates between payment groups varied 
across type of hospital. Attention was drawn to the over-representation of 
the unemployed and the not-insured, both in psychiatric and chronic hospi­
tals. However, it was proposed that the explanation for the relative excess 
demand, in psychiatric and chronic contracted private hospitals, of the un­
employed and the not-insured has a completely different character.
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7.2 T he Case-M ix
The distribution of principal diagnoses3 in contracted private hospitals’ dis­
charges will be analyzed, aiming at the identification of the range of health 
care problems cared for by these hospitals. Examining variations in case- 
mix4 by payment status was a way of further looking at the hypothesis of in­
equity, in the use of contracted private hospitals. Variations in proportional 
rates of discharge for specific diagnoses might have various explanations. 
These rates indicate the chance of a discharge occurring in each particular 
diagnosis. Differences in the morbidity of the population is one important 
possible explanation for variations in this probability. On the other hand, 
the distribution and frequency of disease varies with the social, age and sex 
structure of the population. Variations in the case-mix might also result 
from the structure of the supply of services and the organization of medical 
practice. Besides, problems related with the codification of disease might 
also account for some variations.
7 .2 .1  T h e  C a se -M ix  in C o n tra cted  P r iv a te  H o sp ita ls  in  th e  
C ity  o f  R io  d e Jan eiro .
The country as a whole was used as a yardstick for the discussion of the 
distribution of diagnoses in contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro. Variations in the distribution of principal diagnoses for contracted 
private hospitals’ discharges, between the country and the city, should be 
mainly attributable to factors on the demand iside of the health care market, 
since those are services under the same finance and payment mechanisms. 
However, the structure of the supply of services, in terms of type and quan­
tity of available beds in other sectors of care, might also explain some of 
these variations.
Data for the city were also compared with discharge data for the state of 
Sao Paulo and for one municipality within this state - Ribeirao Preto. The 
state of Sao Paulo has a unique data set, based on the collection, on a routine 
basis, of information on all discharges occurring in the state, regardless of the 
sector of care. This means that information on all discharges is collected, 
both from the public and private hospitals located within the state. For 
each discharge the hospital has to fill a discharge form (Boletim CAH -
3Principal Diagnosis is defined as: the disease that, best explains that admission[84].
4 Case mix will be ascertained on the basis of the principal diagnosis. The rate of 
missing data for the variable secondary diagnosis was very large, limiting its use in this 
study. More detail about the quality of this information, in the AIH form, is presented in 
the reliability study (see chapter V).
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106). These forms are gathered in the State’s Health Department. The 
main constraint related to this data set is the limited capacity of the Health 
Department to process this large volume of data, so that little information 
from this data set is available for use. However, some researchers have been 
able to use the information (Boletim CAH - 106). The published data from 
some of these studies[160, 56, 200] were used in this analysis.
The distribution of diagnoses in the State of Sao Paulo is suggested to 
be a better mirror of morbidity in the population given i t ’s universal refer­
ence. Variations when compared with rates observed in contracted private 
hospitals in the city of Rio should, to a greater extent, be due to variations 
in the organization of medical care.
* * *
One third of the discharges from acute contracted private hospitals in the 
city of Rio de Janeiro had the principal diagnoses classified in the major 
group Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Puerperium ICD- 
9 630 to 676. Moreover, about 20 per cent of the discharges from these 
hospitals had the principal diagnoses classified in the major group Diseases 
of the Circulatory System ICD-9 390 to 439. These two major groups of 
diseases accounted for more than half of the discharges in acute contracted 
private hospitals in the city, showing a very concentrated distribution of 
reasons for admission.
The major group Neoplasms ICD-9 140 to 239 also appeared over-repre­
sented in discharges from acute contracted private hospitals in the city. It 
is suggested that this is mainly explained by the fact that, in 1986, the city 
of Rio de Janeiro presented the second largest proportional mortality rate 
for neoplasm among the states’ capitals in the whole country[152].
It was observed that the case-mix in the city’s hospitals did not match 
the case-mix observed in contracted private hospitals in the country as a 
whole. For the country as a whole, Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, 
and the Puerperium and Diseases of the Circulatory System accounted for 
only one third of discharges. A very similar pattern could also be observed 
for all discharges, in the state of Sao Paulo (see table 7.4, page 161).
On the contrary, patients discharged from contracted private hospitals, 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro, classified under the major group of Diseases 
and Disorders of the Respiratory System ICDT9 460 to 519 appeared under­
represented, when compared with patients discharged from contracted pri­
vate hospitals, in the country as a whole and with all discharges from the
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Table 7.4: Proportional discharge rates for the eight most frequent ma­
jor groups of diseases in contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro.
Rio de Janeiro^ Brazil^*) Sao
Paulo<**>
Ribeirao
PretoC")
Complications of Pregnancy 
ICD-9 (630-676)
35.2(1) 23.2(1) 23.9(1) (1)
Circulatory System 
ICD-(390-459)
20.9(2) 13.1(3) 11.0(3) (2)
Respiratory System 
ICD-9 (460-519)
10.8(3) 17.6(2) 14.1(2) (3)
Digestive System 
ICD-9 (520-579)
6.6(4) 7.9(6) 6.7(5) (4)
Genitourinary System 
ICD-9 (580-629)
6.5(5) 8.5(5) 7.3(4) (5)
Neoplasms 
ICD-9 (140-239)
4.8(6) 3.0(9) — —
Endocrine 
ICD-9 (240-279)
4.6(7) 3.1(8) 3.7(7) (7)
Injuries and Poisoning 
ICD-9 (800-999)
2.5(8) 4.4(7) 5.8(6) (6)
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals - 1986. Data for the city are related only to 
Acute Hospitals. Data for Brazil[127] include all discharges, but those classified under 
Mental Illness (ICD-9 2 9 0 - 3 1 9 ) . All admissions. Sources: [160, 56].
state of Sao Paulo. The same was true for those patients grouped in the 
major group of diseases Injuries and Poisonings ICD-9 800 to 999.
It is suggested that the case-mix observed for contracted private hospitals 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro reflects the morbidity in the population. How­
ever, as will be discussed below, supply-induced demand is also suggested 
as explaining some of the observed variations.
*  *  *
The very large proportional discharge rate for the major diagnostic group 
Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Puerperium cannot not be 
explained by variations in need. Rio de Janeiro, as one of the most developed 
cities in Brazil, has a relatively small crude birth rate, which does not justify 
the observed larger rates of admission in the area of maternal care.
When the distribution of diagnoses within this major group of diseases 
is analyzed, it appears that in more than half (59 per cent) of discharges, 
the principal diagnosis was normal delivery -  a larger proportional discharge
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rate than observed for the country as a whole (51 per cent). Nonetheless, 
since these are services under the same financial incentives, it is assumed 
that the most reasonable explanation for observed variations is related to 
particular characteristics of the health care market for inpatient care in Rio.
It is suggested that the competition contracted private hospitals face 
in the city, both from public and private services, makes them intensify 
some general characteristics of the organization of services in this sector 
of care -  to concentrate on the provision of services with low technological 
input. Moreover, the city has a deficit in obstetric beds[67]. Therefore, Rio’s 
contracted private hospitals face less competition in the area of maternity 
care, allowing them to have a larger share of the health care market in 
obstetrics.
When discharges classified under the major group Diseases of the Circu­
latory System were analyzed, further understanding of the contracted private 
hospitals’ market in the city of Rio de Janeiro, could be obtained. The pro­
portional discharge rate for Ischaemic Heart Diseases ICD-9 410-414 in the 
city (13.0 per cent) was much smaller than the one observed for contracted 
private hospitals in the country as a whole (21.0 per cent). Again, these 
variations in rates are not likely to be explained by variations in morbidity, 
since the population of the State of Rio de Janeiro has larger proportional 
rates of Ischaemic Heart Diseases (12.7 per cent of all causes of death), when 
compared with rates for the country as a whole. The City of Rio de Janeiro 
presents the largest proportional mortality rate for Diseases of the Circula­
tory System, when compared with the other major capitals in the country 
as a whole[153].
When rates for the city were compared with rates for all discharges in 
the city of Ribeirao Preto, a well developed town in the state of Sao Paulo, a 
more striking variation was observed. The proportional rate of discharges for 
Angina Pectoris ICD-9 413, Ischaemic Heart Disease ICD-9 410 and Other 
Acute and Sub-acute Forms of Ischaemic Heart Disease ICD-9 411 was three 
times larger in Ribeirao Preto than in contracted private hospitals in Rio. 
This variation seems to be indicating the limited role played by contracted 
private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro in the area of emergency 
care. Moreover, it also suggests that contracted private hospitals are not 
considered referral services for Ischaemic Heart Diseases, because they do 
not compete with other sectors and sub-sectors of care, since they provide, 
in general, poorly equipped beds[45].
On the other hand, the proportional rate of discharge for patients classi­
fied under the group of Cerebrovascular Diseases ICD-9 430-438 was much
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larger in the city (25.0 per cent) than for all contracted private hospitals’ 
discharges in the country as a whole (18.0 per 100). Among those, the most 
prevalent diagnosis in the city was III Defined Acute Cerebrovascular Disease 
ICD-9 436. Moreover, the proportional rate for this diagnosis in contracted 
private hospitals’ discharges, in the city, was ten times larger than the rate 
observed in Ribeirao Preto.
Firstly, such a large proportion of patients classified as III Defined is per 
se an indication that patients with Cerebrovascular Diseases were not being 
properly diagnosed in contracted private hospitals in Rio. But secondly, it 
also points to the hypothesis that these hospitals are selecting for treatment 
those health care problems which might be cared with a low technological 
input.
It is suggested that for Cerebrovascular Diseases the opposite of what 
was observed for Ischaemic Heart Diseases occurs, with contracted private 
hospitals in Rio managing to assume a larger share of the market and acting 
as referral hospitals. This would be possible because these patients require 
a relatively long length of stay, shortening the turnover in the emergency 
public hospitals in the city, where beds are under constant pressure. The 
incidence of Cerebral Vascular Diseases is high given the relatively large 
concentration of elderly people living in the city and the lack of preventive 
services and control policies.
A great proportion of patients classified in the major group of Diseases 
of the Respiratory System are those with Acute Respiratory Diseases. Pneu­
monia was responsible for 13.7 per cent of deaths in children less than a year 
old, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, in 1986[153]. Indeed, Acute Respiratory 
Diseases are known to be very frequent in young children living in Third 
World countries. For those deprived children Acute Respiratory Diseases 
are in general more severe, requiring inpatient treatment more frequently. 
Bacterial Pneumonia is a very important cause of death among this age 
group in developing countries.
The observed small proportional discharge rate for the major group Dis­
eases and Disorders of the Respiratory System possibly reflects, to a certain 
extent, the morbidity pattern in the population. The City of Rio presented 
a smaller proportional mortality rate for diseases of the respiratory system 
(9.9 per cent), when compared with other developed cities in the country 
such as Sao Paulo (12.3 per cent) - [153]. This relatively small rate is sug­
gested to be attributable to the high Ageing Ratio observed for the city of 
Rio de Janeiro. However, the small proportional discharge rate for Diseases 
of the Respiratory System also reflects the negative selection of the very
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young patient to the advantage of elderly patients as previously discussed 
in chapter VI.
Finally, the small proportional discharge rate for Injuries and Poisoning 
in contracted private hospitals in the city, should also be highlighted: it 
further indicates the limited role of these services in the area of emergency 
care.
In summary, about half of acute contracted private hospitals’ discharges, 
in Rio, were of patients with health problems related to Complications of 
Pregnancy, Childbirth and Puerperium or Diseases of the Circulatory Sys­
tem. Discharges appeared to be heavily concentrated in Childbirth and 
Cerebrovascular Disease. Emergency and technology-intensive care were 
under-represented in discharges from these hospitals. Contracted private 
hospitals in the city appeared to be treating a selective share of the health 
care market, which did not even match the share showed by contracted pri­
vate hospitals in the country as a whole. It was suggested that the particular 
case-mix presented by the city’s acute contracted private hospitals is partly 
the result of the morbidity pattern in the city, but also of the particular 
structure of the contracted private sector in the city -  under-equipped beds 
and preference for potentially profitable patients.
7 .2 .2  V aria tion  in  C a se -M ix  across P a y m en t S ta tu s
Proportional discharge rates for the major diagnostic groups varied largely 
across payment status (see table 7.5, page 165). The major cause of dis­
charge, as seen before, was Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth and 
Puerperium. Indeed, it was the major reason of discharge for all payment 
status categories, except the retired. It accounted for more than half of em­
ployees’ admissions. Within this major diagnostic group, the main diagnosis 
observed among those patients classified as employees was Delivery, which 
accounted for about 80.0 per cent of employees discharges.
Diseases of the Circulatory System were the second major reason for 
discharge for all the payment groups except the retired. Actually, this was 
the most prevalent group of diseases among retired patients. It was respon­
sible for about 40.0 per cent of all retired patients’ discharges. The most 
frequent principal diagnoses among retired patients, within this diagnos­
tic group were Congestive Heart Failure ICD-9 488.0 and III Defined Acute 
Cerebrovascular Disease ICD-9 486.9. Rates of discharge for Diseases of the 
Circulatory System presented variations across payment status, with not- 
insured patients presenting the second largest proportional rate. This was 
mainly attributable to the exceptionally large proportional discharge rate
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Table 7.5: Proportional discharge rates for major groups of causes of disease 
(ICD-9) across payment status per 10,0000 discharges.
Total Employee Employer Self
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Complications 
of Pregnancy 3556.1 (1) 5168.3 (1) 3922.2 (1) 3752.9 (1) 3608.7 (1) 412.0 (7) 3877.1 (1)
Circulatory
System 2094.4 (2) 1029.4 (2) 1497.1 (2) 1637.0 (2) 1329.5 (2) 4284.0 (1) 1931.2 (2)
Respiratory
System 1083.8 (3) 1001.7 (3) 1047.9 (3) 1308.4 (3) 1320.0 (3) 1315.4 (3) 722.4 (4)
Digestive
System 657.6 (4) 608.3 (5) 898.2 (4) 771.0 (5) 902.2 (4) 741.0 (4) 1110.6 (3)
Genitourinary
System 646.3 (5) 686.0 (4) 748.5 (5) 800.9 (4) 655.3 (5) 546.5 (6) 540.5 (6)
Neoplasms 483.8 (6) 339.6 (6) 449.1 (6) 756.9 (6) 178.4 (9) 700.3 (5) 702.7 (5)
Endocrine
Diseases 459.2 (7) 259.4 (8) 329.0 (8) 403.1 (7) 503.3 (7) 3508.5 (7) 211.3 (8)
Injury
and poisoning 252.7 (8) 194.7 (9) 389.2 (7) 353.8 (8) 579.3 (6) 330.1 (8) 235.9 (7)
Infectious
Diseases 252.0 (9) 284.2 (7) 149.7 (9) 186.6 (9) 455.8 (8) 204.9 (9) 167.1 (9)
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
for not-insured patients with Varicose Veins of Lower Extremities Without 
Mention of Ulcer or Inflammation ICD-9 454-9- This rate for not-insured 
patients (857.8 per 10,000 discharges) was 7.7 times larger than the aver­
age rate (112.1 per 10,000 discharges). The major group of Disease of the 
Respiratory System was the third most frequent principal diagnosis for all 
payment status groups, except the not-insured. Actually, the likelihood of 
a discharge of a not-insured patient due to Diseases of the Respiratory Sys­
tem was small, the probability being about half of that experienced by the 
unemployed.
The fourth most frequent reason for admission was Diseases o f the Di­
gestive System. For this diagnostic group, not-insured patients, again, pre­
sented the largest proportional discharge rate. This large rate was mainly 
attributable to Inguinal Hernia without Mention of Obstruction or Gangrene 
ICD-9 550.9, another elective diagnosis, with not-insured patients showing 
an unexpectedly large rate. Their discharge rate for Inguinal Hernia (573.5 
per 10,000 not-insured discharges) was 5.3 times larger than the average 
rate.
The surprisingly high rates observed for not-insured patients, for some
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particular diagnoses, such as Varicose Veins, Inguinal Hernia and Cerebral 
Thrombosis (chronic hospitals) are very unlikely to be explained on epi­
demiological grounds, strongly suggesting that supply-induced practices are 
operating. The over-concentration of the demand for selective diagnoses on 
a single payment group raises two hypothesis:
• Illegal practices: Hospitals would be charging IN AMPS for ‘ghost’ 
patients. These patients classified as not-insured would not be identi­
fiable within IN AMPS’ files, thus limiting the ability of the financing 
institution to identify the fraud.
• A lower threshold for not-insured patients at those hospitals, which 
concentrate on care for patients with Varicose Veins and Inguinal Her­
nia.
Focusing on the analysis at the hospital level, it becomes apparent that 
one third of not-insured discharges were concentrated on two hospitals. Both 
hospitals are non-profit making contracted private hospitals. Just one of 
these two hospitals accounted for 46.2 per cent of all discharges of patients 
with Varicose Veins of the Lower Extremities. Within hospital variations in 
the proportional rate of discharge for Varicose Veins of the Lower Extremities 
were smaller than those observed for all discharges. However, important 
variations in rates still remained, with the not-insured presenting one of 
the largest rates (see table 7.6, page 166). Further Ad Hoc investigation 
is clearly required to explain the large variations observed for not-insured 
patients, for some principal diagnoses.
Table 7.6: Proportional discharge rate for varicose veins of lower extremities 
by payment status.
Payment status Number Proportional discharge rate
Employee 451 33.4%
Employer 2 100.0%
Self-Employed 63 48.5%
Unemployed 5 50.0%
Retired 108 54.0%
Not Insured 130 74.3%
Note — Policli'nica de Botafogo, non-profit making contracted private hospital. Rio de 
Janeiro -  1986.
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* * *
As expected, those patients classified as retired presented a very par­
ticular case-mix, when compared with the other payment groups. They 
tended to be admitted most frequently for Diseases of the Circulatory System 
and Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Disease and Immunity Disorders: 
Congestive Heart Failure (1543 per 10,000), 111 Defined Acute Cerebrovas­
cular Disease (955.9 per 10,000), Diabetes (393.9 per 10,000) and Essential 
Hypertension (320.1 per 10,000) . Actually, in more than half of discharges 
classified as Congestive Heart Failure and in more than one third of dis­
charges classified as 111 Defined Acute Cerebrovascular Disease the patient 
was retired. Retired patients also presented the largest proportional dis­
charge rate for Nutritional Deficiencies (262.7 per 10,000) indicating that 
many of them are experiencing deprived life conditions and lack of proper 
care.
On the other hand, employers appeared to be at less risk of being dis­
charged from a contracted private hospital due to: Endocrine, Nutritional 
and Metabolic Disease and Immunity Disorders or Infectious and Parasitic 
Diseases. This may well reflect the distribution of health problems in this 
wealthier group. Employers were also at less risk of being discharged due 
to health problems amenable to prevention and control at the primary care 
level, such as: Essential Hypertension (89.8 per 10,000) or Diabetes (59.8 
per 10,000), suggesting their better access to health services and healthy life 
styles. However, employers presented double the probability of being ad­
mitted to a contracted private hospital due to Chronic Renal Failure when 
compared with their counterparts. Their proportional discharge rate for 
Chronic Renal Failure (259.7 per 10,0000) was more than three times larger 
than the unemployed patients’ rate (77.6 per 10,000)5. This most probably 
is the result of the greater facility such patients experience in getting access 
to these areas of high cost treatment.
Contrasting with the case-mix presented by the employers, those pa­
tients classified as unemployed appeared as the group most likely to be 
admitted to a contracted private hospital due to Infectious and Parasitic 
Diseases. They also presented large rates of discharges for Nutritional De­
ficiency. Also, among discharges classified as Diseases o f the Respiratory 
System , unemployed patients presented the largest rates for Bacterial Pneu­
monia Unspecified ICD-9 482.9, Pneumonia Organism Unspecified ICD-9 
486.9 and Pneumococcal Pneumonia ICD-9 481-9, suggesting their higher
5These rates did not include discharges due to normal delivery and caesarian section.
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risk of having more severe acute respiratory diseases and their lack of proper 
care.
Furthermore, the unemployed was the payment group with the least 
chance of being admitted to a contracted private hospital for treatment of 
Neoplasms. Actually, not a single unemployed person was discharged from 
a contracted private hospital in Rio, in 1986, for Malignant Neoplasm of 
Female Breast, despite the fact that this was the most prevalent Neoplasm 
among discharges. In fact, Malignant Neoplasm of the Breast is the major 
killer of women, among deaths due to cancer, in the country as a whole[152]. 
The unemployed had also shown the smallest proportional discharge rates for 
Malignant Neoplasm of Cervix Uteri ICD-9 180 and Malignant Neoplasms 
of Stomach ICD-9 151, the two cancers which apparently present higher 
death rates in the poor in Brazil[197]. The very low presence of unemployed 
patients in these diagnostic categories among contracted private hospitals’ 
discharges in Rio, strongly suggests a low availability of services for the 
unemployed, resulting in a lower chance of being diagnosed at early stages 
of the disease. It might also be explained by a perverse selection within 
the labour market -  the dismissal from work of patients at advanced stages 
of the disease, thus increasing the prevalence among the unemployed, as 
already suggested earlier in this chapter.
In the case of employees, the most typical patients were women of child­
birth age discharged due to Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the 
Puerperium or Diseases of the Genitourinary System. Their relatively large 
rate for Infectious and Parasitic Diseases is suggested to be a factor of the 
greater demand for contracted private hospitals of children in this payment 
group.
Self-employed patients closely followed the average diagnostic distribu­
tion. Their case-mix seems to reflect, to a certain extent, their middle-age 
distribution.
In summary, the case-mix in acute contracted private hospitals in Rio 
presented large variations across payment status. The most prevalent em­
ployee patient was a woman of childbirth age, discharged due to Delivery or 
Genitourinary Problems. The self-employed presented a standard case-mix. 
Employer patients showed a case-mix with less discharges for those diag­
noses associated with poverty and/or diseases amenable to control outside 
the hospital setting. On the other hand, this payment group presented the 
largest rate for Chronic Renal Failure -  a costly, life-saving intervention. The 
unemployed, placed at the other extreme of the social stratification, showed 
a case-mix which reflected their more deprived life and limited availability
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of services indicated by large rates of Infectious Diseases, Acute Respiratory 
Diseases and Nutritional Deficiency and low rates of health problems which 
require more technology-intensive care, such as Neoplasms. The retired case- 
mix also revealed poor living conditions and availability of services. Their 
discharges were concentrated in some Diseases of the Circulatory System 
and Endocrinous and Nutritional Problems. Finally, not-insured patients 
presented the most peculiar case-mix, showing variations in rates for some 
elective diagnoses of such a magnitude as to raise the hypothesis that they 
were the result of supply-induced demand, if not actual fraud.
7.3 Testing th e H ypothesis o f Variation in th e  
Case-M ix across Paym ent Status
This section was orientated to test the main hypothesis in this thesis -  that 
patterns of use of contracted private hospitals vary across the social groups. 
In this section the hypothesis of variations in the case-mix across payment 
status will be tested more specifically.
The null hypothesis being tested is that the explanatory variable payment 
status has no effect on the probability of being discharged from contracted 
private hospitals for specific diagnostic groups. The alternative hypothesis 
is then that payment status explains variations in the probability of being 
discharged from specific diagnostic groups.
This hypothesis was tested by controlling for the two main confounding 
variables in relation to illness -  age and sex. To control by age and sex 
was a way to isolate their effect in the analysis of the relationship between 
payment status (independent variable) and being discharged for a given 
diagnosis (dependent variable). The other relevant confounding variable 
that should be considered in the explanation of variations in the probability 
of being discharged from hospital for a given diagnostic category is severity. 
Unfortunately, the available data did not allow any further measurement of 
severity, besides age itself.
It must be highlighted that the statistical approach used in this analysis 
tests each individual variable in the model as main effects. That is to say 
that the effect of payment status, age and sex on the dependent variable are 
tested in such a way that each variable is controlled by every other variable 
existing in the model. The model itself does not distinguish the independent 
variable from the confounding variables. The definition of the explanatory 
variable and the confounding variables is based on the existing knowledge 
about the variables which might bias the relationship being tested. In this
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analysis, age and sex were taken as confounding variable for the analysis 
of variation between the payment groups. However, in a second levels of 
analysis, they were also analyzed as main explanatory variables.
Retired patients were not included in this analysis, due to their very 
particular characteristics. Retirement is associated with old age, which per 
se is associated with higher risk of illness and utilization of health services. 
Thus, it was assumed that retired patients should not be compared with the 
other payment groups.
7 .3 .1  D ise a se s  o f  th e  C ircu la to ry  S y ste m  IC D -9  390  to  579
The probability of discharge for Disease of the Circulatory System varied 
across payment status, even when controlled by age and sex, this variation 
being statistically significant (p < 0.01). However, the observed variations 
were only statistically significant for not-insured patients. This means that 
variations in the probability of being discharged for Diseases of the Circu­
latory System, after controlling for age and sex, have not been shown to be 
statistically significant, except for not-insured patients. Since Diseases of 
the Cardiovascular System, as happens with the bulk of other diseases[146], 
have a positive social gradient, the absence of a statistically significant vari­
ation suggests that contracted private hospitals are not responding to the 
different health care needs of the various social groups. Moreover, the varia­
tions observed for the not-insured are most probably reflecting, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the very large and atypical proportional discharge 
rates shown by not-insured patients in the diagnoses of Varicose Veins, a 
diagnosis within the group of Diseases of the .Circulatory System.
A new variable was created to replace the variable payment status by 
combining the categories which have not been shown to be statistically sig­
nificant. This new variable called Pystatus assumed the following values: 
l=Not-Insured and 4=Others.
The relationship between the dependent variable (Diseases of the Circu­
latory System)6 and the independent variables in the model (see table 7.7, 
page 171), appeared to be a complex one. Age presented a high chi-square, 
as should be expected, meaning that the probability of Diseases of the Cir­
culatory System is not the same across the age groups. Age also appeared 
as interacting with sex. This interaction manifests that the probability of
6Note that, in logit analysis, the dependent variable is always given by the logarithm of 
the odds e.g. the logit function. This means, for instance, that for the variable Diseases of 
the Circulatory System the dependent variable is the odds of the occurrence of a discharge 
due to a disease within this diagnostic group by the negative event.
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Table 7.7: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of discharges due to “Diseases of the 
Circulatory System”.
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 251.63 0.0000
Pystatus 1 0.38 0.5351
Age group 5 124.22 0.0000
Pystatus*age group 5 71.94 0.0000
Sex 1 1.35 0.2454
Sex*pystatus 1 15.55 0.0001
Sex* age group 5 138.20 0.0000
Likelihood ratio 5 8.47 0.1320
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group 
categories: 0-14; 15-24; 25—34;35—44; 45-64; 65 and more.
Diseases of the Circulatory System varies in both sexes across the age groups 
or, inversely, that the differences in the probabilities across the age groups 
are not the same, between the sexes.
On the other hand, payment status (pystatus) appeared as interacting 
with sex and with age. That is to say that the probabilities across the 
insured and the not-insured axe not the same either for men and women or 
the age groups.
For Diseases of the Circulatory System, the largest predicted probability 
was observed for the ‘population’ of not-insured women, aged between 35 
to 44 years old (see appendix E). Actually, for those classified as not- 
insured, only the older than 65 had shown lower predicted probabilities 
than the insured7. On the contrary, the least likely to be discharged from a 
contracted private hospital due to Diseases of the Circulatory System was 
the ‘population’ of insured men, under fifteen years of old.
Among those more likely to be discharged due to Diseases of the Circu­
latory System (women aged 35 to 44 years old), the odds ratio between the 
not-insured and the insured was 3.37. This can be interpreted as the not- 
insured woman having more than three times the chance of being discharged 
due to Diseases of the Circulatory System than the insured, everything else 
being equal. Among men in the same age group, the odds ratio between the 
not-insured and the insured was smaller -  2.00. These large odds ratios for
7Insured patients are those classified as P ysta tu s=  4 in the fitted model. This category 
includes the employer, the employee, the self-employed and the unemployed
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not-insured patients in the age group of 35 to 44 years old are the result of 
their large proportional discharges rates for Varicose Veins. Despite being a 
diagnosis with higher prevalence for women, not-insured men also presented 
larger proportional discharge rates for Varicose Veins than the insured men.
The above ratios indicate that not-insured patients are much more at 
risk of a discharge from Diseases of the Circulatory System than insured 
patients. It renders evidence for the hypothesis of supply-induced demand 
as the main explanation for not-insured patients’ discharges being atypi- 
cally concentrated in some particular diagnostic categories and age groups, 
thus, further pointing towards the operation of illegal practices within these 
hospitals.
For those patients older than 65, women had shown a larger predicted 
probability of discharge from Diseases of the Circulatory System than men. 
For insured patients, the odds ratio between the elderly women and the 
elderly men was 1.20. On the other hand, men (insured) in the age group 
between 45 to 64 had shown a larger chance of discharge from Diseases 
of the Circulatory System than women, suggesting that men have serious 
Circulatory Diseases at younger ages than woman.
7 .3 .2  D ise a se s  o f  th e  R esp ira to ry  S y s te m  IC D -9  460  to  466
The probability of discharge for Diseases of the Respiratory System also 
varied across payment status, even after being controlled by age and sex 
(p < 0.01), although this variation was statistically significant only for two 
payment status categories -  the unemployed (p < 0.07) and the not-insured 
patients.
The variable Pystatus was created assuming the following values: 1=Un­
employed 2=Not-Insured and 4=Others. In the new variable, the probability 
of discharge varied across the payment groups (p < 0.01), further indicating 
the existence of a relationship between the social group of the patient and 
probability of being discharged due to Diseases of the Respiratory System.
The relationship between the dependent variable (Diseases of the Respi­
ratory System) and the independent variables in the model (see table 7.8, 
page 173) also appeared to be a complex one. More specifically, age and sex 
presented high chi-squares, denoting their important role in explaining vari­
ations in discharges due to diseases within this diagnostic group. Moreover, 
age and sex appeared to interact with each other.
The ‘population’ with the largest predicted probability of being dis­
charged from Diseases of the Respiratory System consisted of women clas­
sified as unemployed and under 15 years of age (see appendix F). Actually,
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Table 7.8: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of discharges due to “Diseases of the 
Respiratory System”.
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 571.74 0.0000
Pystatus 2 12.94 0.0016
Age group 5 481.67 0.0000
Sex*age group 5 231.55 0.0000
Sex 1 171.60 0.0000
Likelihood ratio 22 28.24 0.1678
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group 
categories: 0-14; 15-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-64; 65 and more.
this age group presented the largest predicted probabilities for all payment 
categories and for both sexes, most probably revealing that the young pop­
ulation is being more seriously affected by Respiratory Diseases than the 
adult and the elderly populations. This follows the expected distribution of 
the disease in poor populations. Due to the high prevalence of malnutrition 
among children, they appear to be at a greater risk[120]. So everything else 
being equal, young women presented slightly larger predicted probabilities 
of discharge due to Diseases of the Respiratory System than young men. 
Nonetheless, for the other age groups, men tended to be more at risk than 
women, with the differences being much larger for the young adult. For the 
unemployed, the odds ratios for men and women were 3.13 for the age group 
between 15 to 24 years old; 2.85 for the age group between 25 to 34; 1.59 
for the age group of 34 to 44 years old; 1.20 for the age group of 45 to 64 
years old and 1.22 for those 65 years and older.
These larger probabilities for men, specially for the young adult men, 
suggest that men might be more at risk of Respiratory Diseases than the 
young adult women. As men are more prevalent in the labour market than 
women, it might indicate a greater exposure to risk factors for those in the 
economically active population. On the other hand, it might also indicate 
differences in access to contracted private hospitals between those in the 
labour market and their dependents.
The not-insured woman, aged 15 to 24 years old, presented the smallest 
predicted probability of discharge from Diseases of the Respiratory System. 
In general, the not-insured appeared to be the least likely to be discharged 
from Diseases of the Respiratory System, this being true for all age groups
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and both sexes . This result contradicts the pattern shown by not-insured 
patients in other diagnostic categories, thus stressing the very selective and 
uncommon pattern presented by not-insured patients in contracted private 
hospitals’ discharges in Rio.
The unemployed had the largest predicted probabilities of being dis­
charged from Diseases of the Respiratory System in all the age groups and 
for both sexes. It is an indicator of their more deprived living conditions, 
which increase their risk of having serious Respiratory Diseases.
7 .3 .3  D ise a se s  o f  th e  D ig e s t iv e  S y s te m  IC D -9  520  to  611
The probability of discharge from Diseases of the Digestive System varied 
across payment status (p < 0.01), even when controlled by age and sex. This 
variation was statistically significant only for some of the payment status 
categories, most noticeably the employee (p < 0.01) and the self-employed 
(p < 0.05) and the not-insured.
The variable Pystatus was created assuming the following values: 1=Em­
ployee, 2=Self-employed, 3=Not-insured and 4= Others. It was created by 
combining those categories which were not shown to be statistically signif­
icant. In the new variable, the probability of discharge varied across the 
payment groups (p < 0.01), allowing the rejection of the null hypothesis -  
no effect (pystatus) in the probability of being discharged due to Diseases 
of the Digestive System.
The relationship between the dependent variable (Diseases of the Di­
gestive System) and the independent variables in the model (see table 7.9, 
page 175), showed a distinct pattern. The variable sex presented a high 
chi-square which indicates its relevance as an explanatory variable in this 
model. First level interactions were all statistically significant (p < 0.01) 
demonstrating that variations across each variable in the model, on the 
probabilities of being discharged from Diseases of the Digestive System, did 
not hold the same when these variables interact. That is to say, for in­
stance, that the probabilities of discharge from Diseases of the Digestive 
System across the payment categories, vary between the age groups and the 
sexes.
The most likely people to be discharged from Diseases of the Digestive 
System are the not-insured men, 25 to 34 years old (see appendix G). On 
the other hand, the least likely people to be discharged from this major 
group of diseases are again the not-insured women under 25 years of age.
The differences between the sexes among not-insured patients should be 
highlighted. The not-insured men presented the largest predicted probabil-
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Table 7.9: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of discharges due to “Diseases of the 
Digestive System”.
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 116.94 0.0000
Pystatus 3 89.96 0.0000
Age group 4 142.34 0.0000
Pystatus*age group 12 27.87 0.0058
Sex 1 252.02 0.0000
Sex*pystatus 3 47.83 0.0000
Sex*age group 4 71.62 0.0000
Likelihood ratio 12 8.86 0.7147
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group 
categories: 0-24; 25-34; 35- -44; 45-64; 65 and more.
ity of discharge from Diseases of the Digestive System for all age groups, 
except the one of under 25 years of age. Again, for Diseases of the Digestive 
System the not-insured showed a pattern far from the one shown by their 
insured counterparts. This atypical pattern is mainly attributable to their 
very large proportional discharge rate for Inguinal Hernia, a disease with 
higher prevalence in men.
Actually, men presented larger predicted probabilities for discharges in 
the above diagnostic category than women, for all payment groups. The 
odds ratios between the sexes varied across payment groups with the not- 
insured showing particularly large variations for the age group between 25 
to 34 years old. While the odds ratio for men and women, 25 to 34 years 
old were 5.0 for the employee, 4.0 for the self-employed, it was 12.20 for the 
not-insured.
Given the magnitude of the variations in the predicted probabilities be­
tween the sexes, particularly among those in the productive age groups, it is 
suggested that within this diagnostic group, men are seeking and/or getting 
more access to contracted private hospitals than women.
For the remaining payment groups, in general, the category which in­
cludes the employer and the unemployed showed larger predicted probabili­
ties than the employee and the self-employed, the latter groups showing the 
smallest predicted probabilities for Diseases of the Digestive System. Larger 
predicted probabilities for the unemployed and employer group are mainly 
attributable to the diagnostic group of Hepatic Chronic Disease and Cir-
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Table 7.10: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of discharges due to “Neoplasms”.
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 854 0.0000
Pystatus 3 76.64 0.0000
Age group 1 20.17 0.0000
Pystatus *age group 3 7.19 0.0660
Sex 1 57.36 0.0000
Sex*age group 1 17.74 0.0000
Likelihood ratio 6 8.20 0.16240
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group 
categories: 0-34; 35 and more.
rhosis ICD-9 571 for which these payment groups have shown the largest 
proportional discharge rates.
7 .3 .4  N e o p la sm s  IC D -9  140 to  239
The probability of discharge for Neoplasms also varied across payment status 
(p < 0.01), even when controlled by age and sex. But, this variation was sta­
tistically significant (p < 0.01) only for the self-employed, the unemployed 
and the not-insured. Again, a new variable Pystatus was created assuming 
the following values: l=Self-Employed, 2=Unemployed, 3=Not-insured and 
4=Others representing the payment groups. In the new variable, the prob­
ability of discharge varied across the payment groups (p < 0.01), allowing 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect of the explanatory variable 
(pystatus) in the probability of being discharged due to Neoplasms.
The relationship between the dependent variable (Neoplasms) and the 
independent variables in the model (see table 7.10, page 176) showed that for 
Neoplasms, payment group appeared to play an important role in explaining 
variations in the probability of discharges within this diagnostic category. 
It presented the highest chi-square value. Payment group also appeared to 
be interacting with age, and age to be interacting with sex.
Surprisingly, again the not-insured women older than 35 years were the 
‘population’ which presented the largest predicted probability of discharge 
from Neoplasm (see appendix H).
Indeed, for those aged 35 years and more in all the social groups, women 
presented larger predicted probabilities of discharge from Neoplasm than 
men. However, unemployed women older than 35 had lower predicted prob­
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abilities than employed men. This means that women classified as unem­
ployed had lower chance of being treated from Neoplasm in contracted pri­
vate hospitals in Rio than employed men.
The odds ratio for the not-insured and the unemployed woman, 35 years 
and older was 3.50, indicating an impressive difference between these two 
social groups in their probabilities of being discharged due to Neoplasms. 
Actually, this probability is mainly attributable to the not-insured’s large 
proportional discharge rate for the procedure Malignant Breast Tumour (1.6 
times bigger than the average rate), the most prevalent procedure among 
Neoplasms’ discharges.
The unemployed showed the smallest predicted probabilities of being 
discharged from Neoplasms for all the age groups and for both sexes, fur­
ther suggesting their greater difficulty in gaining access to acute contracted 
private hospitals for more costly care, such as cancer treatment.
The odds ratio for self-employed and employee/employer women aged 
35 years and more was 1.43. This indicates that for this age group the 
self-employed presents a large predicted probability of discharge, suggesting 
that they are at a, greater risk of diseases within the group of Neoplasms.
7 .3 .5  In fec tio u s  D isea ses  IC D -9  001 to  139
Following the trend observed for the other diagnostic categories, the prob­
ability of discharge from Infectious Diseases varied across payment status 
(p < 0.01), even when controlled by age and sex. This variation was statisti­
cally significant for the unemployed (p < 0.01) and the not-insured patients.
The variable Pystatus was created and assumed the following values: 
l=Unemployed, 2=Not-insured and 4=Others. In this new variable, the 
probability of discharge varied across the payment groups (p < 0.01), al­
lowing the rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect of the explanatory 
variable (pystatus) in the probability of being discharged from Infectious 
Diseases. Age appeared in the model (see table 7.11, page 178), as the most 
important variable for explaining the variations in the probability of being 
discharged from a contracted private hospital in Rio from Infectious Dis­
eases. The only statistically significant first level interaction in the model 
was age interacting with sex, showing that the probabilities of Infectious 
Diseases by the age groups vary across the sexes.
The unemployed showed the largest predicted probabilities of discharge 
for Infectious Diseases for both the sexes and for all the age groups (see 
appendix I), reflecting their more deprived social conditions. The major 
differences in the predicted probabilities across payment status were for the
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Table 7.11: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of discharges due to “Infectious Dis­
eases” .
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 750.69 0.0000
Pystatus 2 14.58 0.0007
Age group 2 246.47 0.0000
Sex 1 88.64 0.0000
Sex*age group 2 55.26 0.0000
Likelihood ratio 10 13.03 0.2222
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group 
categories: 0 -  24 ; 25 -  44 ; 45 and more.
unemployed and the not-insured. Surprisingly enough, for this group of dis­
eases, mainly non-surgical and low technology-intensive care, the predicted 
probabilities for the not-insured were rather small. The odds ratio for the 
unemployed and the not insured were 2.39 for men younger than 25 years, 
2.56 for men 25 to 44 years old and 3.44 for women 45 years and older.
There were great variations in the predicted probabilities between the 
sexes across the age groups, with a greater predominance of men, except for 
those older than 45 whose predicted probabilities were quite similar. The 
odds ratio for the unemployed men and women were 2.02 for the age group 
less than 25 years old, 3.80 for those 25 to 44 years old and 0.87 for those 45 
years and older. This trend was also present for the payment group which 
included those employed and insured patients. However, the odds ratios 
were slightly smaller: 1.95 for the age group 24 years old and less; 1.44 for 
the age group 25 to 44 years old and very similar for the age group 45 years 
and older (0.89).
The above indicates a higher prevalence of men in discharges due to In­
fectious Diseases8. However, the explanation for the above is not clear and 
a selection favouring men cannot be discarded. There is no evidence in the 
literature, particularly in regard to Gastro-intestinal Infections[62, 134] in­
dicating that these are illnesses associated with sex. Moreover, the frequent 
use in contracted private hospitals’ codification of diseases of unspecific and 
ill defined codes, does not allow a clear understanding of the true distri­
8The most common diagnoses for Infectious Diseases in contracted private hospitals’ 
discharges were: 1) Ill-defined intestinal infections IC D -9 009. 2) Intestinal infections due 
to other organisms IC D -9 008. 3) Erysipelas IC D -9  035. 4) Septicaemia IC D -9  038. 5) 
Bacterial infection in conditions classified elsewhere and of unspecified site IC D -9  041.
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bution of diagnosis among patients discharged. It also indicates the poor 
quality of the coding of diseases at these hospitals, if not in the provision of 
care.
7.4 Conclusions
Contracted Private hospitals in Rio showed a very particular case-mix, even 
when compared with contracted private hospitals in the country as a whole. 
Discharges were highly concentrated in some areas of care -  one third of 
all contracted private hospitals’ discharges in the city were in the area of 
maternal care. This was an area of care for which the city was experiencing 
a shortage of beds. Discharges also appeared to be highly concentrated in 
Cerebrovascular Diseases. These might be potentially profitable patients 
for contracted private hospitals -  Cerebrovascular Diseases are a range of 
health care problems affecting mainly old people, who would be receiving 
very basic medical care. By providing sub-standard care, reimbursement 
would be maximized. This would be one aspect of the lack of concern and 
prestige which the elderly (specially the poor elderly) have been experiencing 
in Brazil[183]. Hospitals would profit by providing less than adequate care 
for a population who might be seen as a burden by their families and by 
society.
The split pattern of care observed for contracted private hospitals in the 
city -  maternity and cerebrovascular diseases (geriatrics) and the limited 
role shown in the area of emergency and high-technology define the main 
characteristics of this sector of care in the city. The limited importance 
observed for the area of paediatrics should also be highlighted. The lat­
ter appears as a general trend within the social security contracted private 
hospitals in the country as a whole [36].
Contracted private hospitals in the city also showed relatively large con­
centration of discharges in the area of psychiatric and chronic care. Con­
tracted private hospitals had been traditionally the main providers of psy­
chiatric care for social security. However, the relatively larger participation 
of psychiatric discharges in the city is suggested to be also the result of 
reductions in the number of acute contracted private beds, following the 
political changes in social security from the beginning of the eighties (see 
chapter II). There is no evidence of an increase in the number of psychiatric 
private beds in the city in the last few years.
However, the relatively large share observed for chronic hospitals might 
be the result of an increasing link between acute and chronic hospitals.
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This would be explained by the fact that a shift of costs between acute 
and chronic care would increase the profitability of treating some particular 
patients. This could be the case for patients with cerebrovascular diseases, 
which had also shown a large proportional discharge rate (28 per cent) to 
chronic hospitals . Patients might be discharged earlier from acute hospitals 
to be readmitted in a chronic hospital. This link would also justify the 
preference by contracted private hospitals for patients with cerebrovascular 
diseases.
Hence the case-mix in contracted private hospitals in the city is shaped 
by the payment mechanisms adopted by social security as well as by the 
characteristics of the health care market in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In 
this market the contracted private hospitals did not appear as a particu­
larly competitive provider of care, occupying those areas where they faced 
less competition. Moreover, hospitals appeared as limiting the range of 
health care problems they would treat, within those most potentially prof­
itable problems which axe treated with low technology and an apparently 
low intensity of care. This would be an adverse response to the prospective 
payment scheme adopted by social security to reimburse private hospitals.
The unemployed and the not-insured showed the most different patterns 
of use. These payment groups displayed contrasting probabilities of dis­
charge for a range of principal diagnoses.
Everything else being equal, the unemployed tended to show larger prob­
abilities for those health care problems associated with deprived living con­
ditions such as -  Infectious and Acute Respiratory Diseases and, small prob­
abilities for those groups of diseases requiring more costly and continuous 
care such as cancer. ;
On the other hand, the not-insured had shown an atypical pattern of 
admission, with extremely large frequencies for selected principal diagnoses 
strongly suggesting fraud.
It is also suggested that the general trend observed for employers, who 
did not show significant differences in their case-mix when compared with 
the employees and the self-employed (after controlling by age and sex), was 
a function of the very small numbers of discharges observed for this payment 
group.
The social characteristics of patients appeared as a significant element 
in the determination of the use of contracted private hospitals in the city of 
Rio. More specifically, payment status was shown to be a significant variable 
in explaining variations between patients in their main reason for admission 
(principal diagnosis). The study has also pointed towards an association
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between age, sex and the use of inpatient services. It suggested that the 
relationship between these variables and use has two different aspects. One 
was related to biological characteristics determining the production of illness. 
The other was related to social characteristics, which reflects differences 
in life experiences between the age groups and sexes as a result of social 
discrimination.
Everything else being equal, men tended to be more at risk of being 
admitted to a contracted private hospital in the city of Rio de Janeiro than 
women. This was particularly true for Diseases of the Respiratory System, 
Digestive System and Infectious Diseases. The prevalence of men was also 
evident among psychiatric discharges. Additionally to variations in health 
‘need’ between the men and women, this larger prevalence of men is sug­
gested to be also related with one characteristic of social security health 
services, that is to select in favour of the economically active population, 
the real main target population of such a system.
Chapter 8
T he P rocess o f Care
In this section, the role of Contracted Private Hospitals in the City of Rio 
de Janeiro will be examined on the basis of the process of care delivered 
to patients e.g. the content of care provided. The content of care was an­
alyzed by some of i t’s elements -  type of admission, procedure performed, 
type of provider of care, length of stay, use of intensive care unit and reim­
bursement per discharge type. The process of care will also be analyzed to 
investigate the existence of variations across payment status in the process 
of care delivered to patients.
This analysis is limited to Acute Hospitals, since the data available for 
this study did not include information on the process of care for psychiatric 
and chronic hospitals. Indeed, in each one of these settings the process 
of care has a particular feature, given the particular characteristics of the 
health care problem they aim to care for and are not directly comparable.
8.1 T ype o f Adm ission
Type of admission is not strictly a variable related to process of care. It may 
reflect the incidence and prevalence of diseases in the population. But, it 
also may reflect characteristics on the supply side of the health care market, 
in terms of provision of services, payment mechanisms and clinical practice. 
Therefore, in this study, type of admission was regarded as an indicator, 
which may reflect need, as well as the existing structure of services.
The rate of elective surgery varies largely between and within countries[187, 
163]. There is research evidence indicating that some of these variations 
are explained by factors other than variations in morbidity[116]. These 
are supply-induced demands as a result of variations in clinical judgement, 
medical practice, payment scheme, the supply and availability of services 
differentials in consumer demand and/or doctors decision-making.
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The increasing option to perform some surgery on a day basis is behind 
some of the observed variations between regions. Nonetheless, it appears 
that day surgery in contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro 
was restricted mainly to a few surgical procedures such as Tonsillectomy.
8.1.1 E lective A dm issions
For nine out of ten discharges from contracted private hospitals in Rio, 
the patient had a non-planned admission: it was an emergency admission. 
Focusing only on admissions of surgical patients, the proportional discharge 
rate for emergency admissions was just slightly smaller -  86.6 per cent of 
surgical patients’ discharge (see figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1: Proportional discharge rates for type of admission.
E m e r g e n c y
5 6 5 8 0
Surgical Discharges
All Discharges
Note -  Acute contracted private hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
However, when the analysis focused on those more frequent elective rea­
sons for admission, the probability of an emergency admission dropped to 
three out of ten admissions. Put in a different way, for those most likely to 
have an elective or planned admission, seven out of ten patients really had 
an elective admission. The rate of elective admission was, however, smaller 
for some particular diagnoses such as the Neoplasms.
The rate of elective and emergency admissions varied largely by type of 
surgeon (see table 8.1, page 184). Salaried surgeons were less likely to per­
form an elective surgery than contracted surgeons. This points out to the 
underlying division of labour between salaried and contracted surgeons in 
contracted private hospitals in Rio. Those who were salaried performed the 
majority of operations, mainly those emergencies and non-planned surgeries. 
To a great extent, this is attributable to the division of labour between the 
salaried and the contracted surgeon by areas of care (specialty) observed 
in these hospitals. As is presented later in this chapter, salaried surgeons
l e c t iv e  10% 
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Table 8.1: Proportional discharge rates for type of admission by payment 
scheme of the provider of care.
Surgeon’s Payment Scheme Elective Emergency
Salaried (%) 18.4 81.8
Contracted (%) 81.6 18.2
Total (%) 100.0 100.0
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
are responsible for performing the majority of obstetric surgeries. The most 
common obstetric surgical procedures were: normal delivery, caesarian sec­
tion, curettage post abortion and premature labour -  all representing health 
care problems classified as emergency, except for caesarian section which 
might be a planned intervention. Moreover, the salaried surgeon is the pro­
fessional present at hospitals all the time and therefore is more likely to 
perform the emergency operations which arrive at the hospital.
8 .1 .2  V aria tio n s across P a y m en t S ta tu s
Rates for elective admission varied greatly across payment status (see ta­
ble 8.2, page 185). The unemployed, the retired and the employer appeared 
to be less likely to have a planned admission than their counterparts (child­
birth admissions not included). The small rate of surgical treatment for re­
tired patients explains, in part, the small rate of elective admissions among 
such retired patients. Constraints on the availability of services for retired 
and unemployed patients are also suggested to account for their smaller 
probability of having a planned admission.
However, this does not seem to be the case for employer patients. Their 
lower risk of having an elective admission in a contracted private hospital 
is suggested to be a function of their case-mix and pattern of use. There 
is some evidence to suggest that employer patients admitted to contracted 
private hospitals in Rio tend to have a more complex case-mix than their 
counterparts -  they have high rates of use of intensive care units and high 
average payment rates, as will be shown latter in this chapter. This might 
be related to the fact that the few employees who use contracted private 
hospitals do so for selected conditions -  the most expensive ones being con­
ditions such as Chronic Renal Failure and/or arising from the severity of 
their condition.
The most striking variations, however, were again for not-insured pa-
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Table 8.2: Proportional discharge rates for type of admission by payment
status.
Type of 
Admission
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Elective (%) 12.4 6.9 13.9 6.6 5.4 36.9
Emergency (%) 87.6 93.1 86.1 93.4 94.6 63.1
Total (N) 30394 231 3948 770 26109 1451
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986. (Excluded 
Childbirth Discharge). Missing 11 observations.
tients. Their discharge rate for elective admission was three and half times 
larger than the average rate. This rate was largely due to the very large 
prevalence among not-insured patients of elective Principal Diagnoses such 
as Inguinal Hernia and Varicose Veins. As previously discussed, the mech­
anisms behind these very large rates are unclear, but the evidence strongly 
suggests supply-induced demand, if not fraud.
In summary, patients in contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro were mainly admitted as emergencies. The rate of elective or planned 
admissions increased slightly when controlled for surgical patients and it was 
larger when the provider of care was a contracted surgeon. Proportional 
rates for elective admissions varied greatly across payment status, with not- 
insured patients presenting extremely large rates. The unemployed, the 
retired and the employers were the social groups less likely to get an elective 
admission.
8.2 Procedure Performed
8 .2 .1  T h e  R a te  for Surgical and M ed ica l C au ses .
C ontracted Private H ospitals in the C ity
l
For patients discharged from contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio 
de Janeiro, 44.5 per cent were classified as surgical patients. Although, when 
normal delivery and cesarian section which accounted for 28.2 per cent of 
all discharges were excluded, the proportion of surgical patients dropped to 
22.7 per cent of discharges (see figure 8.2, page 186).
This rate corresponded to little less than the share of surgical discharges 
in contracted private hospitals in the country as a whole. Traditionally, con-
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Figure 8.2: Proportional discharge rates by medical and surgical procedure.
S ur g ica l  
3 9 1 0 5  4 5 *
S u r g ic a l  
1 4 3 0 8  2 3 *
N o n - s u r g ic a l  
4 8 6 9 6  7 7 *
N o n - s u r g ic a l  E x c lu d ed  c h i l d b ir t h  d i s c h a r g e s .
4 8 6 9 6  5 5 *
All d i s c h a r g e s .
Note -  Acute contracted private hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
tracted private hospitals played a limited role in the area of surgery. When 
compared with other sectors and sub-sectors of care such as INAMPS’ self­
owned hospitals and teaching hospitals, contracted private hospitals’ rate 
for surgical discharges was about half the figures shown for these other 
hospitals. As pointed out before, contracted private hospitals’ structure 
appeared to be mainly directed to non-intensive care in the areas of obstet­
rics and non-surgical acute care. The most prevalent surgical procedures in 
the city’s hospitals were: Normal Delivery (21.2 per cent of all discharges), 
Cesarian Section (7.0 per cent) and Inguinal Hernia Repair (0.9 per cent). 
The average payment rate for the fifteen most prevalent surgical procedures, 
in contracted private hospitals in Rio, was one third less than the average 
payment rate for contracted private hospitals in the country as a whole. 
The above gives further support to the conclusion that contracted private 
hospitals in the city were treating more simple surgical conditions, when 
compared with contracted private hospitals elsewhere.
Among medical procedures, Congestive Heart Failure (6.7 per cent of all 
discharges), Acute Cerebrovascular Accident (4.8 per cent) and Pneumonia 
not otherwise specified (2.6 per cent) were the most prevalent in hospitals in 
the city. However, in contrast to what was observed for surgical procedures, 
the average payment rate for the most prevalent medical procedures in Rio’s 
hospitals was slightly larger than that observed for all contracted private 
hospitals in the country.
The distribution of medical procedures varied greatly between the city 
and the country. Rio’s hospitals presented a case-mix of medical procedures 
concentrated on those health problems most characteristic of both middle
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Table 8.3: Comparison of the most prevalent medical procedures in con­
tracted private hospitals - Brazil and City of Rio de Janeiro.
City of Rio de J a n e i r o ^ * ) B r a z i l ^ * * )
1) Congestive Heart Failure (adult) Congestive Heart Failure (Adult)
2) Acute Cerebrovascular Disease Bronchopneumonia (child)
3) Pneumonia Otherwise Specified (adult) Gastroenteritis (child)
4) Diabetes Gastroenteritis (adult)
5) Hypertension Gastroenteritis ( less than one year old)
Note -  Acute Contracted Private Hospitals -  1 9 8 6 . Excluded Psychiatric 
Discharges -  January until June -  1985.
and old age groups, while the country’s contracted private hospitals pre­
sented a high prevalence of procedures in the area of paediatrics as shown 
by table 8.3. The distribution of medical procedures in the city is reflecting 
both the age structure of the population of the city and the selection in 
favour of the elderly, as previously discussed in chapter VI.
*  *  *
The likelihood of being discharged after surgical treatment was much larger 
for women than for men, even after the exclusion of childbirth admissions 
(see table 8.4, page 188). The occurrence of a surgical discharge also varied 
across the age groups, being higher for the age group 15 to 44 years old, even 
after the exclusion of childbirth discharges. This mainly reflects the large 
prevalence of female-specific surgical procedures among contracted private 
hospitals’ discharges (obstetric and gynaecological care). However, when 
childbirth discharges were excluded, men showed larger prevalence for non- 
surgical discharges.
In summary, one third of contracted private hospitals’ discharges in the 
city of Rio de Janeiro were classified as normal delivery or caesarian sec­
tion. When childbirth discharges were excluded, the proportion of surgical 
procedures dropped to about one fifth of all discharges. The occurrence of 
surgical procedures in Rio’s hospitals appeared to be, on average, of a less 
complex nature than in contracted private hospitals in the country as a 
whole. The most common surgical patient at these hospitals was a young 
adult woman. Medical procedures appeared to be more concentrated on 
those health problems related to middle and old age, showing larger preva­
lence for men, when childbirth is excluded. Contracted private hospitals
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Table 8.4: Proportional discharge rates for surgical and medical procedures 
by sex.
All Admissions Childbirth Excluded
Procedures Men Women Women
Surgical Procedures (%) 19.0 57.0 25.6
Medical Procedures (%) 81.0 43.0 74.4
TOTAL(N) 28601 59200 34313
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
were mainly concentrated on obstetrics and geriatric care - two polar spe­
cialties within medical practice. They have shown a structure of services 
split into two extremes of medical practice -  low cost obstetric care and low 
technology-intensive geriatric care.
8 .2 .2  V a r ia tio n s  in  Surg ica l R a tes  across P a y m e n t S ta tu s .
Some studies have demonstrated the existence of a relationship between 
the socio-economic characteristics of the population and rates of surgery. 
There is also evidence showing that this relationship varies across health 
care systems. An American study[18] showed that income was positively 
associated with surgery. However, everything else being equal, the more 
highly educated tended to have fewer surgeries. Coulter and McPherson[33] 
demonstrated that in England, before the creation of the National Health 
Service, the most privileged social groups tended to have more operations. 
However, this trend did not seem to be maintained after the creation of the 
National Health System. Roos[164], studying variations in surgical rates for 
the elderly population living in 56 small rural areas in Canada, found that 
large rate areas were associated with better education and with national ori­
gins from wealthier countries (Canada, England and United States). Income 
appeared a less relevant variable in the Canadian study, given their National 
Health Insurance Scheme, which makes care available to all regardless of in­
come.
The rate of surgical procedures (excluding childbirth) showed an enor­
mous variation across the payment groups in contracted private hospitals in 
the city of Rio de Janeiro. Not-insured and employer patients presented the 
largest rates and unemployed and retired patients presented the smallest.
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Again, rates for not-insured patients appeared extremely large - about four 
times the rate for unemployed patients and two times the rates for retired 
patients (see table 8.5, page 189).
Table 8.5: Proportional discharge rates of surgical procedure by payment 
status.
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Surgical (%) 28.6 33.3 32.4 24.8 12.4 48.9
Medical (%) 71.4 66.7 67.6 75.2 87.5 51.1
TOTAL (N) 30399 231 3949 770 26113 1452
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals (Excluded Childbirth Discharges). Rio de Janeiro 
-  1986.
Explanations for observed variations are distinct for each social group. 
For the retired, small surgical procedure rates might be the result of their 
older age which leads to increased risk of attempting surgery. Nonethe­
less, the very low volume of discharges among the retired in the group of 
procedures related to Prostectomy (0.25 per cent of all retired patient dis­
charges), for instance, is indicative of a high threshold for retired patients 
for some surgical treatments. Cancer of prostate is among the three major 
cancers in mortality due to malignant neoplasms in the elderly population 
in Brazil[152].
It is also suggested that unemployed patients were experiencing limited 
access to surgical treatment in contracted private hospitals. This can be 
explained either by limited availability of services, constraining the demand 
of surgical patients in these social groups, or by social selection in the clinical 
decision process. This would imply that the less privileged would be less 
likely to have surgical treatment, despite the fact that some[20] physicians 
place higher value on surgical treatment.
To answer further the question about the existence of selection in the 
clinical decision process, the rate of surgery was analyzed among patients 
in the diagnostic group of Neoplasms, a group where for some diagnoses 
treatment might be either surgical or clinical. The observed variations for 
unemployed patients were even larger as shown by table 8.6 on page 190. 
Although these variations might be attributable to the type of disease and 
the severity, its magnitude suggests that selection mechanisms in doctors 
decision- making were operating as to limit access of unemployed patients
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to surgical treatment.
Table 8.6: Proportional discharge rates of surgery for patients with neo­
plasms by payment status.
Treatment Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Surgical (%) 40.2 53.3 38.1 29.4 24.6 32.2
Non-
Surgical (%) 59.8 46.7 61.9 70.6 72.4 67.8
Total (N) 1754 15 430 17 1890 143
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
The large rate of surgical patients among the not-insured is related to 
their large rate in some specific elective surgical procedures, mainly: Vari­
cose Veins (10.4 per cent of all surgical discharges for not-insured patients) 
and Unilateral Inguinal Hernia Repair (7.4 per cent). Not-insured patients 
rates were larger than rates observed for their counterparts, even though 
Inguinal Hernia Repair, for instance, is considered an elective surgery of low 
variation[190, 116]. This means that Inguinal Hernia Repair is a condition 
of low clinical uncertainty which means it raises few differences in clinical 
opinion. The average expected variation in rates of Inguinal Hernia Repair 
is in the 1.5 fold range. However, not-insured patients presented variations 
ranging from 2.8 times (Employers) to 12.5 times (Retired) (see table 8.7, 
page 191). It further suggests that other factors, besides differences in clin­
ical opinion and morbidity, were operating at these hospitals, to push the 
not-insured rate to such levels.
Employers’ large rates are suggested to be explained by a trend already 
seen for some diagnoses and procedures -  a lower threshold for this most 
wealthy and prestigious social group, for the more expensive and technology­
intensive care. This trend is further stressed by their larger probability 
of getting surgical treatment for cancer. The employers were among the 
payment groups with the highest average payment rate in contracted private 
hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro, as will be shown latter in this chapter.
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Table 8.7: Proportional discharge rates for Varicose Veins and Inguinal
Hernia Repair by payment status.
Procedure Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Varicose (%) 
Veins
1.5 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.4 10.5
Inguinal Hernia 
Repair (%)
1.5 2.6 1.3 1.9 0.6 7.4
Total (N) 30399 231 3949 770 26113 1452
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals (Excluded Childbirth Discharges). Rio de 
Janeiro -  1986.
T esting th e H ypothesis o f  Variation in th e R ate o f  Surgery across 
P aym ent Status
This section was oriented towards testing the hypothesis of variations in the 
rate of surgery across payment status. The method employed for testing 
this relationship is presented in chapter III (Methodology) and chapter VII.
The null hypothesis being tested is that the explanatory variable payment 
status has no effect on the probability of undergoing surgery in a contracted 
private hospital in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The alternative hypothesis 
is that payment status affects the probability of undergoing surgery in a 
contracted private hospital. Discharges classified as retired were excluded 
from this analysis as well as childbirth discharges. The hypothesis was tested 
controlling for two main confounding variables : age and sex.
Variations across payment status in the probability of being treated sur­
gically have been shown to be statistically significant (p < 0.01), even when 
controlled for the confounding variables in the model. This allowed the re­
jection of the null hypothesis. Variation in the probability of surgery were 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) for employees, the unemployed (p < 0.01) 
and the not-insured.
A new variable was created to substitute in the model for the variable 
payment status, by merging those groups which have not been shown to be 
statistically significant. The new variable Pystatus assumed the following 
values: 1= Employee, 2=Unemployed, 3=Not-insured and 4=Others.
The relationship between the dependent variable (Surgery) and the inde­
pendent variables in the model (see table 8.8, page 192) shows that, besides 
payment status, age and sex also play an important role in explaining vari-
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Table 8.8: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of surgery.
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 59.11 0.0000
Pystatus 3 155.86 0.0000
Age group 5 426.65 0.0000
Pystatus*age group 15 71.44 0.0000
Sex 1 17.95 0.0000
Sex*pystatus 3 45.67 0.0000
Sex*age group 5 468.77 0.0000
Likelihood ratio 15 21.48 0.1223
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group 
categories: 0 -  14 ; 15 -  24; 25 -  34 ; 35 -  44; 45 -  64; 65 and more.
ations in the probability of surgery. The relationship between the variables 
in the model appeared to be a complex one. All first level interactions ap­
peared statistically significant (p < 0.01). This indicates that variations in 
the probabilities of surgery across the payment groups were not the same 
between the sexes and the age groups. It means, for instance, that pre­
dicted probability of undergoing surgery for men classified as unemployed 
is different than the probability of undergoing surgery for men classified as 
employee.
Not-insured men, 15 to 24 years old presented the largest predicted prob­
ability of surgery in contacted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro 
(see appendix K). On the other hand, unemployed women aged more than 
65 years old showed the smallest predicted probability. In fact, the not- 
insured presented the largest predicted probabilities of surgery for all the 
age groups and the sexes, except for young women (less than 15 years old) 
and, the unemployed tended to present the smallest predicted probabilities 
of surgery across the age groups and the sexes.
The odds ratio for not-insured men and male employees aged 15 to 24 
years old was 3.07, indicating a much larger chance of surgery for the for­
mer. This ratio further manifests the immense over-representation observed 
for discharges classified as not-insured in some particular diagnoses, mainly 
those involving surgical procedures (see chapter VII). The explanation for 
the not-insureds’ large predicted probabilities is suggested to be the perfor­
mance of ‘unnecessary surgery’1 , if not fraud (ghost patients).
1 There is no consensus among the medical profession for the term unnecessary
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On the other hand, the small predicted probabilities observed for the un­
employed appear to be the result of a high threshold, preventing this social 
group from having predicted probabilities of surgery similar to their coun­
terparts, everything else being equal. This follows the hypothesis already 
raised that this less prestigious group, excluded from the labour market, has 
a selective access to contracted private hospitals with a higher threshold in 
areas of more specialized care.
In summary, the existence of variations in the rate of surgery across pay­
ment status was observed. The unemployed and the retired appeared less 
likely to be admitted to a contracted private hospital for surgical treatment 
than their counterparts, especially the employers. Not-insured patients pre­
sented an anomalous large rate for some specific surgical conditions, putting 
further emphasis on the hypothesis of fraud. Observed variations in rates 
of surgery have been shown to be statistically significant after controlling 
for age and sex, confirming the hypothesis that social group is a relevant 
variable for explaining variations in surgical rates across patients discharged 
from contracted private hospitals.
Two main aspects of this relationship were raised in this analysis. Firstly, 
everything else being equal, the unemployed have lower surgical rates sug­
gesting the existence of social practices operating in and/or outside the 
hospital setting that prevent this social group from having a similar pattern 
of treatment to the one observed for the employed and insured populations. 
Secondly, the large rates shown by not-insured patients cannot be explained 
by the age and sex distribution of not-insured patients in contracted pri­
vate hospital discharges, further suggesting that they result from practices 
induced by the hospitals, which apply selectively to this payment group.
8 .2 .3  T h e  P a y m en t S ch em e o f  S u rgeon s
There is reasonable evidence in the literature that doctors adjust their prac­
tice style in response to economic incentives[3, 49, 74]. Doctors under dif­
ferent payment schemes tend to have different practice patterns: they tend 
to vary in the intensity of care they provide, alter the mix of health care 
problems they treat and services they provide. Moreover, there is also litera­
ture pointing to the fact that doctors treat differently patients with different 
characteristics, despite the latter having identical medical problems[48].
In this section observed variations in the care delivered by salaried and 
contracted doctors were presented. The payment mechanism adopted by
sur<7ert/[165]. This term is used here to express procedures performed without proper 
justification
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IN AMPS to reimburse care delivered by contracted private hospitals implies 
that contracted physicians’ reimbursement is influenced by the volume and 
type of care provided (see chapter IV), the same not being true for salaried 
physicians. When professional services are provided by salaried doctors, 
the payment for this item of service is directed to the hospital. When it is 
provided by a contracted-out doctor, INAMPS reimburses the provider of 
care directly. Therefore, financial incentives upon contracted and salaried 
doctors are not the same. Moreover, hospitals’ net income is likely to vary 
in relation to the payment scheme of the doctor.
This analysis is limited to surgical admissions. As shown in chapter V, 
reliability for medical encounters was very low. The latter is the variable 
which could provide information on the payment scheme of the provider of 
care for non-surgical admissions.
*  *  *
When the payment scheme of the provider of care was analyzed across 
the specialties, a marked division of labour between contracted and salaried 
surgeons was observed: 84.0 per cent of obstetric operations were performed 
by a salaried surgeon, while only 31.0 per cent of non-obstetric operations 
were performed by these professionals.
Considering that obstetric patients are by far the most frequent patient 
treated by contracted private hospitals, salaried surgeons are the most com­
mon provider of surgical care. They were responsible for performing 68.0 
per cent of contracted private hospitals’ surgery in 1986. This suggests 
that, when compared with the country as a whole, INAMPS was spending 
more with the payment of salaried professional services in contracted private 
hospitals in the city than with the payment of contracted-out professional 
services (see page 96).
Possibly, the pattern above was influenced by the payment scheme in­
troduced by INAMPS in 1983 (see chapter IV), particularly, in regard to 
obstetrics. Within the environment of the Procedure Based Reimbursement 
Scheme (PBRS), contracted private hospitals might opt for having more 
services delivered by salaried doctors. By having more control upon the 
practice pattern of surgeons and, particularly, by increasing their workload, 
hospitals might maximize their reimbursement. The shift of some contracted 
doctors to the independent private sector might also happen as a response 
to the PBRS. However, this shift is not likely to explain the higher concen­
tration of salaried doctors in the city’s hospitals given the surplus of doctors 
in the city.
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Variations were also observed among anaesthetists. In contrast to what 
was observed for surgeons, only 28.0 per cent of surgical patients, among 
those with information written on the AIH form about the anaesthetists, 
were treated by a salaried anaesthetist. It appears that contracted private 
hospitals tend to rely on contracted anaesthetists and not include them on 
their permanent staff. However, the incompleteness of this information on 
the AIH form (see chapter V) might be biasing this result.
V aria tions across paym ent s ta tu s  The probability of being operated 
on by a contracted surgeon also varied across payment status even when 
controlling for obstetric and non-obstetric care.
Employers were the payment group by far most likely to be treated 
by a contracted surgeon, both for obstetric and non-obstetric surgery (see 
table 8.9, page 196). This might be revealing another feature related to em­
ployers use of contracted private hospitals in Rio -  being referred by their 
private physician who would treat them at hospital and/or indicate the sur­
geon who should perform the operation. This social group put a higher 
value upon doctors of their own choice and, have a greater ability (social 
and economic), they make demands according to their preferences. Extra 
payment might also explain employers’ larger rates. Even though under so­
cial security rules the patient might opt for better ‘hotel’ services such as 
staying in a private room, he or she however assumes the payment of these 
extra expenses: extra payment for professional services is not allowed. Nev­
ertheless, this practice seems to occur as pointed out by Aldafsa Foster[56] 
and Aor[157]
Employees, the most frequent payment group in contracted private hos­
pital discharges, were among the payment groups less likely to be treated 
by a contracted surgeon both for obstetric and non-obstetric surgery. The 
same can be said about those patients classified as retired and not-insured.
Not-insured patients had a very high proportion of obstetric surgeries 
performed by salaried doctors and also tended to have a relatively high pro­
portion of non-obstetric surgeries performed by a salaried surgeon. When­
ever a surgery is performed by a salaried surgeon the identification on the 
AIH form for the performance of the surgery is that of the hospital. This 
results in that the hospitals might fill in an AIH form for what appears to be 
fraud without the knowledge of their staff. Nonetheless is has to be signed 
by the Clinical Director. ,
On the contrary, the unemployed showed a feature close to the one pre­
sented by the employers -  a greater tendency to be treated by a contracted
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Table 8.9: Proportional discharge rates by providers’ of care payment scheme 
across payment status for obstetric and non-obstetric surgical discharges.
Provider Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Obstetric
Surgery
Salaried
Surgeons (%) 83.5 77.0 83.7 81.6 89.3 96.0
Contracted
Surgeons(%) 16.5 23.0 16.3 18.4 10.7 4.0
Total (N) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Non-Obstetric
Surgery
Salaried
Surgeons (%) 36.8 16.7 32.6 21.4 33.4 38.1
Contracted 
Surgeons (%) 63.2 83.3 67.4 78.6 66.6 61.9
Total (N) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
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surgeon. This feature was clearer for non-obstetric surgeries than for ob­
stetric surgeries.
This suggests that one alternative way for unemployed patients to get 
access to hospital treatment, specially for those with more serious conditions, 
is through the influence of the middle and upper classes. As a casual informal 
worker for the high income groups, the less prestigious social groups might 
be in a position to obtain access to services through the intervention of their 
more prestigious ‘employers’.
8 .2 .4  N o rm a l D e liv ery  and C aesarian  S ec tio n
Brazil is known to have a very high percentage of caesarian section deliv­
eries when compared with other countries[87, 80, 11]. Caesarian deliveries 
increased in the country as a whole, from less than 15 per cent in 1970, to 
over 30 per cent in 1980[11]. A study examining the delivery practices in 
nine hospitals in the southern part of Brazil found that 41.3 per cent of all 
deliveries were by caesarian section. It also found that rates varied markedly 
across payment status. Among private patients, 75 per cent had caesarian 
deliveries. Insured patients, which included women covered both by pri­
vate and government plans, presented a smaller rate of caesarian deliveries 
(42.1 per cent). And, only 22.1 per cent of indigent patients had caesarian 
delivery[87]. Data for PNAD (1981) also shows that caesarean rates in the 
country are significantly higher among middle and upper income groups[114]
However, it must be emphasized that even the rates for indigent patients 
were well above the rates observed for other countries. National rates vary 
markedly, from 5 per cent of all deliveries in the Netherlands to nearly 20 
per cent in the United States[116].
Data from PNAD (1981) shows a rate of caesarian deliveries of 37.1 per 
cent, among deliveries in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro. The 
study by Barros (1986) in Pelotas, demonstrated:
1. That caesarian deliveries were more prevalent among low risk women 
(33.0 per cent) than high risk women (27.0 per cent).
2. That the higher the income, the higher the prevalence of caesarian 
deliveries.
It clearly indicates an Inverse Care Law[72] applied to obstetric care in the 
country.
A very similar pattern of inequity in obstetric care was observed by Hurst 
(1985) for the United States which is also a country with exceptionally high 
caesarian delivery rates.
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In Brazil, sterilization is an illegal procedure and therefore not reim­
bursed by IN AMP S. Nonetheless, it is a common practice in the country to 
carry out sterilization during a caesarian section. This will generally lead 
to doctors charging the woman extra fees. Barros (1986) demonstrated that 
Tubal Ligation was one major cause of caesarian section. It was the reason 
for 40.0 per cent of all elective caesareans in Pelotas.
Another explanation for the large rates of caesarian sections observed 
in the country is the pressure on doctors to perform a caesarian section 
from the woman herself and from the family. This pressure is intended 
to avoid the pain of labour and/or to diminish the risk of harming their 
bodies. However, there is no clear scientific evidence that surgical delivery 
will guarantee a better outcome either for the mother or the infant, unless 
for very specific medical situations[107]. Despite the large rates of caesarian 
deliveries observed in Brazil, it is fax from being a safe procedure. Caesarian 
section is major abdominal surgery. The literature highlights risks both for 
the mother and baby, associated with caesarian deliveries[136, 131, 80].
The very large rates of caesarian section observed in the country is an 
indicator that a large proportion of unnecessary caesarian sections are per­
formed every year. This results in economic losses for Social Security - money 
which could be spent elsewhere as well as an increased risk of complications 
and deaths for mothers and infants.
The influence of non-medical factors pushing caesarian rates to unac­
ceptable levels led INAMPS to change its’ reimbursement policy for deliv­
ery. Since 1980, the reimbursement for professional services was equalized for 
Normal Delivery and Caesarean Section. This was meant to prevent the per­
formance of unnecessary caesarian sections by reducing financial incentives. 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence that this policy succeeded in reducing the 
levels of caesarian rates in services financed by Social Security[ll, 87].
C aesarian Sections in C ontracted Private H ospitals in R io
Contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro presented a cae­
sarian rate of 25 per 100 deliveries, much smaller than the rate observed 
for the same year for contacted private hospitals in the country as a whole 
(38 per 100 deliveries). It appeared that the cities’ hospitals were adopt­
ing a more conservative approach to obstetric care. Their rate was also 
smaller than the rate observed for all hospitals in the metropolitan region 
(37 per 100 deliveries). However, at least by international standards, the 
contracted private hospitals’ caesarian rate could still be considered large. 
This means that unnecessary caesarian sections were being performed dur­
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ing 1986. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that the second most 
prevalent Principal Diagnosis in patients with a caesarian section was: De­
livery by Caesarian Without Mention of Reason -  ICD-9 669.7. Moreover, 
as presented in chapter V, it has been observed that some high frequency 
diagnoses associated with caesarean section had shown very low reliability.
There is no apparent reason to assume that IN AMPS’ policy of equalizing 
the reimbursement for professional services for performing normal or surgi­
cal delivery would have succeeded in Rio, despite having failed throughout 
the country. Therefore, it is hypothesized that other causes together with 
the reimbursement policy, explain the particular feature of maternity care 
observed for contracted private hospitals in Rio. It is suggested that one of 
the reasons behind these relatively small rates is the fact that the contracted 
private hospitals in the city would not be identified as referral services for 
those women with medium and high gestational risk. This hypothesis is 
supported by the fact that most contracted private hospitals appear to have 
a very basic structure both in terms of personnel and equipment. There is 
some evidence, already discussed in chapter VII, that complex health care 
problems such as Ischemic Heart Disease, are not being referred and treated 
by contracted private hospitals in Rio. This same pattern might be working 
for maternity care.
It is also suggested that the relatively small caesarian section rate is a 
function of the social characteristics of the patients admitted. Women par­
ticipating in a private insurance scheme would prefer to be delivered in a 
hospital without a contract with INAMPS. This would lead to a selection in 
the demand for contracted private maternity care in Rio, which would con­
centrate their patients on those less prestigious and poorer women, among 
the ones entitled to Social Security. As previously discussed, there is evi­
dence that poorer and socially deprived women have a lower chance of having 
a caesarian section, regardless of need.
The other explanation for the observed rates in contracted private hos­
pitals in Rio, is suggested to be related to the provider of care. A large 
proportion of the deliveries (84.4 per cent) jvere performed by a salaried 
surgeon. The literature indicates that the payment scheme influences clin­
ical decisions[l, 35], with salaried surgeons being more likely to perform 
normal delivery than private surgeons[107]. For contracted private hospi­
tals in Rio, the rate of caesarian section was slightly larger for contracted 
surgeons (27.0 per cent) than for salaried physicians (24.5 per cent).
In private contracted maternity units in Rio, the likelihood of a caesar­
ian section increased with age (see table 8.10, page 200), following the same
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Table 8.10: Caesarian section rates by age group.
Age of the Mother Caesarian Section Rate
Under 20 16.00
2 0 - 2 4 21.15
2 5 - 2 9 28.45
3 0 - 3 4 31.33
35 and more 33.00
Note -  Contracted Private Maternity Unities. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
trend observed for the United States[147]. The most plausible explanation 
for this is the larger rate of repeated caesareans among older women. It is 
a common practice among obstetricians in Brazil, to perform a caesarian 
section once the mother had already had a caesarian section[10]. The third 
most frequent Principal Diagnosis among women, who had a surgical deliv­
ery in a contracted private hospital in Rio was: Uterine Scar from Previous 
Surgery -  ICD-9 654>2. This diagnosis means in most cases a previous cae­
sarian section. However, it is recognized nowadays that it is safe to perform 
a vaginal delivery, in women with a previous caesarian section.
Recently a committee of the American College of Obstetricians and Gy­
naecologists recommended that “the concept of routine repeat cesarean birth 
should be replaced by a specific indication for a subsequent abdominal de­
livery, and in the absence of a contraindication, a woman with one previous 
caesarian delivery with a low transverse incision should be counselled and 
encouraged to attempt labor in her current pregnancy” [96].
Fetal Distress -  CID-9 656.3, the most prevalent diagnosis among women 
with surgical delivery, accounted for 18.2 per cent of all caesarian sections. 
It is expected that most of these were not diagnosed by Electronic Fetal 
Monitoring or another more specific diagnostic device. Given the very low 
technological input in these maternity units, it is assumed that most Fetal 
Distress was diagnosed by the use of the traditional stethoscope. Therefore, 
surgeons might be in the position of choosing to perform a caesarian section 
whenever they suspect Fetal Distress. The limited technology available in 
most contracted private maternity units, combined with the fact that, in 
most cases, very little is known about the woman’s pregnancy and the labour 
itself, might induce doctors to perform caesarian section as a safety measure. 
It is known that the number of women attending ante-natal care in the city 
is very low among the poor and socially deprived. On the other hand, large
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proportional discharge rates of Fetal Distress might be indicative of the fact 
that pregnant women axe arriving in hospital at late stages of labour, thus 
increasing the risk of complication. This would be the result of limited 
availability of maternal care for some social groups living in Rio.
8 .2 .5  V a ria tio n s in  C aesarean  S ec tio n  R a te s
The proportional discharge rate for childbirth varied largely across payment 
groups. Those patients classified as employees presented the highest rate 
(41.0 per cent) and those patient classified as retired (which includes the 
retired’s dependents) the lowest (3.25 per cent).
em Rates of caesarean section also varied, with those patients classified 
as self-employed and employer having the highest rates (29.4 per cent and
28.4 respectively) and those classified as unemployed and not-insured having 
the lowest rates (see table 8.11, page 201). These figures suggest that clinical 
decisions were being influenced by the social attributes of the patient e.g. 
those presumably at higher risk of gestational and labour complications were 
having a lower chance of having a surgical delivery.
Table 8.11: Proportional discharge rates for childbirth and caesarean section 
rates by payment status. Per 100 discharges.
Childbirth Proportional Discharge
Rate
Caesarean Section 
Rate
Employee 41.05 24.81
Employer 30.05 28.43
Self-Employed 30.47 29.45
Unemployed 26.88 19.8
Retired 3.25 22.5
Not-insured 28.58 20.6
Total 28.2 24.9
Note — Contracted Private Maternity Units. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
The type of surgeon performing delivery also varied across payment 
group, with employee patients presenting the largest rates of deliveries per­
formed by contracted surgeons (see table 8.12, page 202).
Among those women who had a caesarian delivery, the unemployed 
showed the largest rate of Fetal Distress (32.1 per cent) suggesting a higher 
threshold for this social group in maternity care.
2 0 2
Table 8.12: Proportional distribution of providers of care for childbirth dis­
charges by payment status.
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Salaried (%) 
Surgeon
83.7 76.4 84.0 81.2 90.45 96.4
Contracted (%) 
Surgeon
16.3 23.5 16.0 18.8 9.54 3.5
TOTAL (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note — Contracted Private Maternity Units. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
T esting th e  H ypothesis o f V ariations in Caesarian Section  R ates  
across Paym ent Status
This section was oriented towards testing the hypothesis of variations in 
the rate of caesarian section across payment status. The method employed 
for testing this relationship was presented in Chapter III (Methodology) 
and chapter VII. The null hypothesis being tested is that the explanatory 
variable payment status has no effect on the probability of delivery by cae­
sarian section in contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro. 
The alternative hypothesis is that payment status explains variations in the 
probability of delivery by caesarian section between patients. Discharges 
classified as retired were excluded from this analysis. The hypothesis was 
tested controlling for two main confounding variables : age and the pay­
ment scheme of the provider of care. The variation in the probability of 
having a caesarian section across payment status was statistically signifi­
cant (p < 0.01) even when controlled for age and the payment status of the 
provider of care. This allowed the rejection of the null hypothesis. Varia­
tions in the probability of caesarian section were statistically significant for 
the self-employed (p < 0.01) and the unemployed (p < 0.03).
A new variable was created to substitute in the model for the variable 
payment status, by combining what was not shown to be statistically sig­
nificant. The new variable Pystatus assumed the following values: 1= Self- 
employed, 2=Unemployed and 4=Others.
The relationship between the dependent variable (Caesarian Section) and 
the independent variables in the model (see table 8.13, page 203 ), shows 
that besides payment status, the age of the patient and the payment scheme 
of the provider of care also have a role in explaining variations in caesarian
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Table 8.13: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of caesarian section.
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 314.69 0.0000
Pystatus 2 9.63 0.0081
Age group 2 376.89 0.0000
Payment Scheme 1 6.63 0.0100
Payment scheme*Pystatus 2 8.27 0.0160
Likelihood ratio 10 9.89 0.4502
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group 
categories: 0 -  24 ; 25 -  34 ; 35 and more.
section rates between patients. This is in agreement with existing evidence 
in the literature, as discussed earlier in this section.
Age presented a high chi-square in the fitted model, confirming its im­
portance in the explanation of caesarian section rates. This meant that the 
older the patient, the larger the chance of having a caesarian section. Also, 
the payment scheme of the provider of care implied statistically significant 
variations (p = 0.01) in rates of caesarian section, regardless of the patient’s 
age and social group . The payment scheme of the provider of care appeared 
to be interacting with payment status, indicating that variations in rates of 
caesarian section across salaried and contracted surgeons did not hold the 
same between the payment groups.
Self-employed women, older than 35 years and treated by a contracted 
surgeon presented the largest predicted probability of having a caesarian 
section (see appendix J). This predicted probability was extremely large, 
indicating a rate of 45 per cent of caesarian section among this specific pop­
ulation. On the other hand, unemployed women, younger than 25 years old 
and treated by a salaried surgeon presented the smallest predicted prob­
ability. However, even this lowest predicted probability (0.13) should be 
considered large, when compared with caesarian rates in other countries, as 
presented earlier in this section.
The odds ratio between the self-employed and the unemployed women, 
35 years and older treated by a contracted surgeon, was 1.69. The latter 
indicates that everything else being equal, self-employed women have about 
70 per cent more chance of having a caesarean section in a contracted private 
hospital, when compared with unemployed women.
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For contracted surgeons, predicted probabilities of performing a cae­
sarian section were larger than for salaried surgeons, giving evidence that 
medical practice varies according to the payment scheme of the provider of 
care. This trend was true for all the age groups. The odds ratio of caesarian 
section between contracted and salaried surgeons, for self-employed women 
older than 35 years was 1.58, indicating that, everything else being equal, 
contracted surgeons tend to perform about sixty per cent more caesarian 
sections than salaried surgeons.
The above might be explained by the particularities in the relationship 
salaried and contracted providers establish with hospitals and patients, re­
sulting in variations in the division of work between these professionals. 
Salaried surgeons are more likely to work on a 12 or 24 hours shift basis, not 
therefore being under pressure to shorten delivery time. On the other hand, 
contracted surgeons are more likely to go to the hospital just to perform de­
livery for individual patients. The absence of financial incentives, given that 
reimbursement in contracted private hospitals does not differentiate caesar­
ian section from normal delivery, added to the fact that contracted surgeons 
can control their service delivery in such a way as to increase their financial 
gains, should explain their greater tendency to perform caesarian sections. 
The time spent to perform a surgical delivery is likely to be shorter than 
for a normal delivery. Moreover, given that contracted surgeons appeared 
to be more likely to treat patients in the most privileged social groups, they 
would have a greater possibility of being under patients’ demands to perform 
a caesarian section.
Moreover, the predicted probabilities of caesarian section between con­
tracted and salaried surgeons were larger for those self-employed women 
aged 35 years and older (odds ratio= 1.55) than for unemployed women in 
the same age group (odds ratio= 1.08). This points in favour of the hypothe­
sis that clinical decision is influenced by the social attributes of the patient. 
This might be the result of the demand from patients to have a surgical 
delivery and/or social discrimination performed by physicians themselves. 
The above hypothesis is further emphasized by the statistically significant 
interaction in the fitted model between the social group and the payment 
scheme of the provider of care.
In summary, rates of caesarian section followed the trend already ob­
served in the country: large rates for the most affluent social groups and 
smaller rates for those at the lower end of the social stratification, regardless 
of need. After controlling for age and the payment scheme of the provider of 
care, variations across payment groups appeared to be statistically signifi-
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cant, with self-employed patients showing the largest predicted probabilities 
of caesarian section and the unemployed the smallest predicted probabili­
ties. The payment scheme of the provider of care has been shown to explain 
variations in caesarian sections between patients, confirming the evidence 
presented in other studies that the payment scheme of the provider of care 
influences the rate of caesarian section. Moreover, the payment scheme of 
the provider of care also appeared as a significant variable for explaining 
variations in caesarian section rates between social groups, indicating that 
the clinical decision process is influenced by the social characteristics of the 
patient.
8.3 U se o f Intensive Care U nits
Among the thirty six acute hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro, which 
had a contract with INAMPS in 1986, only eleven were equipped with an 
Intensive Care Unit. Those hospitals were responsible for 27.6 per cent of all 
discharges in that year. The statistical analysis performed for the reliability 
study (see chapter V) showed an inverse association between number of beds 
contracted by INAMPS in each hospital and the existence of Intensive Care 
Units. This feature suggests that more complex hospitals would be treat­
ing fewer social security patients, liberating their beds for other markets, 
most probably those financed by private insurance. In the reimbursement 
mechanism adopted by INAMPS to pay contracted private hospitals (see 
chapter IV), the utilization of intensive care units involves extra reimburse­
ment based on previously established rates for the first 72 hours of stay and 
for the following days. However, this payment mechanism did not appear 
to have given an incentive for the use of intensive care in contracted private 
hospitals in Rio.
In 1986, reimbursement for the use of intensive care units amounted to 
less than 0.45 per cent of total reimbursement paid by INAMPS to these 
hospitals2. Indeed, a very small number of patients discharged have had 
any intensive care treatment (2.3 per cent of all discharges), indicating that 
there is low utilization of intensive care in contracted private hospitals in 
Rio, which might be explained by the low number of contracted hospitals 
equipped with such units and the negative incentive raised by the payment 
scheme in the area of technology-intensive care.
2This calculus was based on the following reimbursement items: 1) Hospital services.
2) Professional services. 3) Diagnostic and therapeutic services. 4) Long length of stay.
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V ariations across paym ent s ta tu s  Use of intensive care units showed 
variations across the social groups (see table 8.14, page 206). Employer 
patients presented the largest proportional discharge rates of utilization of 
intensive care units (4.19 per cent), almost two times the average rate. The 
fact that employers are more likely to have access to the better equipped 
contracted private hospitals, might be responsible for their larger rates. In 
fact, this social group appeared to be over-represented in the discharges of 
some contracted private hospitals equipped with intensive care units.
However, variations in utilization rates of intensive care units could be 
indicating that the employer themselves presented a greater proportion of 
severe patients. This hypothesis was analyzed by looking at variations in 
the average length of stay in intensive care units. The retired were the 
payment group who presented, on average, .longer stays at the intensive 
care unit as would be expected, given their older age and greater chance 
of complications. Employer patients did not show important variations in 
the length of stay at the intensive care unit, when compared with most 
others social groups, further suggesting that their largest utilization rate was 
reflecting the existence of a lower threshold in the better equipped contracted 
private hospitals for this social group. Again, extra payment might explain 
the greater ability of those patients classified as employers to get access to 
better equipped hospitals.
Table 8.14: Utilization rates of intensive care units (per 100 discharges) and 
average length of stay (days) across payment status.
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Utilization 
Rates (%) 1.26 4.19 2.48 2.09 2.66 0.78
Length
of Stay (days) 4.78 5.14 5.08 4.81 5.47 3.56
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
Not-insured patients presented the smallest utilization rates of intensive 
care units. In fact, less than 1.0 per cent of not-insured patients discharged 
from contracted private hospitals have been under intensive care treatment. 
The not-insured also presented a short average length of stay at the intensive 
care unit, when compared with their counterparts, which might indicate a 
less complex case-mix, both in terms of the distribution of diagnoses and
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of severity among this group of patients. Actually, a high proportion of 
not-insured patients were discharged from contracted private hospitals in 
the city for non-complex surgical procedures such as Inguinal Hernia Repair 
and Varicose veins.
8.4 R eim bursem ent Per Discharge T ype
As discussed in chapter IV, contracted private hospitals are reimbursed by 
INAMPS on a Procedure Based Reimbursement Scheme (PBRS), a prospec­
tive reimbursement system based on a fixed payment rate where the units of 
out-put axe Groups of Procedures. Given that reimbursement is a function 
of the main procedure delivered to patients it can be used as a proxy of the 
case-mix between patients. Howe.ver, a range of items within the hospital 
production are paid separately such as intensive care, large length of stay, 
and ‘special procedures’. In this section, reimbursement per discharge ac­
counted for some, but not all, existing reimbursement items. The items not 
included were those lacking information in the data set provided for this 
study by DATAPREV. These were:
1. Materials and medicines.
2. Special procedures.
As presented earlier, normal delivery and caesarean section were the two 
most frequent procedures in contracted private hospitals’ discharges. They 
accounted for more than one quarter of all discharges. The reimbursement 
for these two procedures was equalized by INAMPS, as a means of reduc­
ing financial incentives to carry out unnecessary surgical deliveries. This 
policy was directed at the item professional services, recognizing that medi­
cal practice responds to financial incentives. Nonetheless, caesarian section 
is a more complex procedure. It requires a more specialised professional 
team, longer length of stay and greater resource consumption than normal 
delivery. Thus, the actual full rate of reimbursement for normal delivery on 
the one hand and surgical delivery on the other hand are not the same. For 
1986, in contracted private hospitals in the city, the average total reimburse­
ment for a Caesarian Section was approximately double the average total 
reimbursement for Normal Delivery3. This shows that a reduction in the 
number of unnecessary caesarian sections would bring substantial savings 
for IN AMP S. These resources could be used to increase the availability of
3However, the actual unitary value for each unit of professional services (see page 100) 
was in 1987 slightly higher for normal delivery than for caesarean section.
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Table 8.15: The ‘cost’ composition for surgical and medical procedures 
(childbirth discharges excluded).
Reimbursement
Items
Surgical
Procedures
Medical
Procedures
Hospital
Services 50.9 58.3
Professional
Services 31.2 16.5
Diagnostic and
Therapeutical
Services 9.8 12.9
Intensive
Care 3.9 6.1
Long Length 
of Stay 2.3 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
ante-natal care which should positively respond, further reducing the need 
for caesarian section in the city.
The ‘cost’ composition of discharges varied across surgical (excluding 
childbirth) and medical procedures (see table 8.15, page 208). Variations 
were mainly accounted for by the item professional services, significantly 
more costly for surgical procedures than for clinical procedures. Also, on 
average, total reimbursement per discharge for surgical procedures was 54.0 
per cent more than the average reimbursement for clinical procedures. How­
ever, variations in the median reimbursement, which reduces the influence of 
extreme observations, was less impressive. The median reimbursement rate 
per surgical discharge was 17.0 per cent more expensive than the median 
reimbursement for clinical procedures, indicating that surgical procedures 
present a skewed distribution towards the left hand side, with a few proce­
dures being much more costly than the average.
V aria tions across paym ent groups The self-employed and the employ­
ers were on average the most costly patients in contracted private hospitals’ 
discharges (childbirth excluded) in the city of Rio de Janeiro. They were 
even more costly than retired patients, who should be expected to be the 
most expensive group, given their older age.
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Actually, patients classified as retired were on average 64 years old (child­
birth excluded), which means they were on average twenty years older than 
patients classified as employer and self-employed. Both the employers and 
the self-employed had shown an average reimbursement per discharge about
10.0 per cent higher than the average reimbursement per discharge observed 
for retired patients. However, the observed variations between these two 
payment groups and the retired disappear when the median expenditures 
are compared, suggesting that a small proportion of employers and self- 
employed patients discharged from contracted private hospitals presented a 
more complex case-mix, which then can be seen to be responsible for ob­
served variations in the mean reimbursement per discharge. Indeed, those 
classified as retired consumed 52.2 per cent of the total reimbursement for 
medical procedures and 30.5 percent of the total reimbursement for surgical 
procedures.
Employees had the lowest average reimbursement per discharge, 18.9 per 
cent less costly than the average reimbursement per discharge for retired 
patients. They were followed by the not-insured, who had the second lowest 
average reimbursement per discharge.
Not-insured patients were on average 40 years old (childbirth excluded), 
the same average age as the self-employed. Although it should be noted that 
the not-insured also had a particular age distribution (childbirth excluded), 
with about 50.0 per cent of discharges concentrated in the young adult range 
(15 to 44 years old) but also, showing a large concentration of discharges 
among elderly patients (14.0 per cent). This reflects their age distribution 
in the population as presented on page 137. Not-insured patients’ reim­
bursement per discharge was on average 19.0 per cent less costly than the 
average reimbursement per discharge for self-employed patients, indicating 
a less complex case-mix for these patients.
Unemployed patients were on average 33.8 years old (childbirth ex­
cluded), an age close to the one observed for the average employee patient. 
However, their average reimbursement per discharge was 9.8 per cent more 
costly than the average reimbursement shown by employee patients, suggest­
ing that the unemployed had a more complex case-mix than the employees 
and/or, everything else being equal, they are more costly than the employ­
ees.
The average ‘cost’ composition (see table 8.16, page 210) of treatments 
delivered to patients varied slightly between the payment groups. The un­
employed and the retired presented a somehow larger proportion of payment 
in the item hospital services, most probably reflecting their lower surgical
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Table 8.16: The ‘cost’ composition of the average reimbursement per dis­
charge, across payment status.
Reimbursement
Items
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Hospital
Services 56.0 55.0 54.0 57.0 57.0 54.0
Professional
Services 23.0 21.0 23.0 21.0 19.0 28.0
Diagnostic and
Therapeutical
Services 12.0 13.0 13.0 12.0 12.0 10.0
Intensive
Care 5.0 9.0 6.Q 6.0 6.0 2.0
Long Length 
of Stay 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
rates, as seen before in this chapter. Actually, retired patients’ average 
reimbursement per discharge had the lowest rate for the item professional 
services, the other effect on costs of their lower surgical rates.
On the other hand, the ‘cost’ composition for the average reimbursement 
per discharge for not-insured patients had a larger participation on the reim­
bursement item professional services, reflecting their very high surgical rates. 
This payment group, however, presented the lowest participation in the re­
imbursement item intensive care, which might indicate that not-insured dis­
charges were predominantly located in these less complex hospitals. This 
group, however, presented a high participation in the reimbursement item 
long length of stay, which is an unexpected outcome since patients classified 
as not-insured appeared concentrated is non-complex surgical procedures.
The greater utilization of intensive care unit shown by employer patients 
was also reflected in their average payment rate. On average, the payment 
rate for intensive care delivered to patients classified as employers was 45.4 
per cent higher than the average payment rate for those classified as retired
l
patients. However, employers presented the lowest participation on the re­
imbursement item long length of stay. For this item, the retired and the 
not-insured had the highest participation.
The ‘cost’ composition presented by unemployed patients does not sug­
gest that they were experiencing any important restrictions in the use of
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intensive care and long length of stay compared to the level of use shown by 
employees, the self-employed and the retired.
8.5 Length of Stay.
Length of stay4 varies considerably for apparently the same condition across 
hospitals, countries and financial arrangements [85, 66]. Variations can be a 
function of case-mix, transfer and death rates, supply of services, payment 
scheme and socio-demographic characteristics of the patients. They might 
also be the result of different customs between countries[3].
In this study, variations across social groups within hospitals with sim­
ilar financial arrangements were assessed. It must be noted that the reim­
bursement scheme adopted by INAMPS to pay contracted private hospitals, 
based on a prospective payment approach (see chapter IV), tends to create 
incentives for hospitals to reduce the length of stay of patients as well as 
standardize the length of stay of patients classified under the same Group 
of Procedures.
Hospitals are not reimbursed for the amount of days patients stay at the 
hospital, but for a fixed payment rate based on the procedure performed. For 
each Group of Procedures there is a norm which defines the average length 
of stay for patients classified in that group. Extra costs will only be paid 
when the patient’s stay at the hospital exceeds two times the established 
norm. For acute contracted private hospitals in the city, in 9.2 per cent 
of patients discharged, INAMPS reimbursed the hospital for extra costs in 
length of stay.
The coefficient variation5 for the length of stay of patients discharged 
from the city’s hospitals classified in the same procedure appeared to be 
high, as shown by table 8.17. If length of stay can be assumed as a proxy 
for resource consumption in hospital, as is the case with Diagnosis Related 
Groups (see chapter IV), the observed variations would be suggesting that 
there is a large heterogeneity between patients classified in most of the high 
frequency procedures. Moreover, if there is a large variation within proce­
dures, it is likely that these variations will be even larger within Groups of 
Procedures, which are the real unit of payment in the Procedure Based Re­
imbursement Scheme (PBRS). These results indicate limited homogeneity
4 For calculating length of stay in this study, the patient who did not stay overnight 
was assigned a stay of one day
5 Coefficient of variation is a measure of relative variability. It is calculated by dividing 
the standard deviation by the arithmetic mean and multiplying the result by 100 to express 
the value as a percentage.
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in the unit of output of the PBRS. However, a systematic analysis of these 
variations was outside the scope of this study.
Table 8.17: Coefficient of variation of length of stay for high frequency 
surgical and medical procedures.
Procedures Number Mean Standard Coefficient
Deviation of Variation
Surgical Procedures
1) Congestive Heart Failure (adult) 5925 9.3 7.482 80.45
2) Acute Cerebrovascular Accident 4238 9.5 8.571 90.22
3) Pneumonia not otherwise specified 2321 8.8 7.180 81.59
4) Diabetes 1889 9.6 8.878 92.48
5) Hypertensive Crisis 1683 7.8 6.657 85.35
6) False Labour 1389 1.8 2.312 128.44
7) Acute Asthmatic Attack 1015 6.4 5.405 84.45
8) Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 1014 8.8 6.759 76.81
9) Threatened Abortion 988 2.2 1.536 69.82
10) Acute Coronary Insufficiency 987 7.0 5.970 85.29
11) Breast Cancer 856 5.8 16.174 278.86
Medical Procedures
1) Unilateral Inguinal Herniorrhaphy 795 4.6 3.301 71.76
2) Colpoperineoplasty 629 3.8 1.879 49.45
3) Semiotic Curettage 517 1.6 1.002 62.63
4) Varicose Veins (one leg) 407 3.1 1.210 39.03
5) Varicose Veins (both legs) 391 3.1 1.187 38.29
6) Haemorrhoidectomy 289 3.6 3.406 94.61
7) Circumcision 274 1.1 1.163 105.73
8) Tonsillectomy and Adenoidectomy 241 1.0 0.0 0.0
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
* * *
It appears that established norms for average length of stay in the Sys­
tem of Social Security Inpatient Care (SAMHPS), at least for some of the 
most frequent procedures in discharges from the city’s hospitals, are close 
to the average length of stay observed in the United States, a country where 
hospitals tend to present low mean length of stay when compared with other 
developed countries[144]. For Caesarian section, for instance, the average 
length of stay for Diagnosis Related Groups-DRGs 370 (caesarian section 
with complications and/or comorbidities) and 371 (caesarian section without 
complications and/or comorbidities) the median observed length of stay was
5.6 and 4.8 respectively. The norm average in SAMHPS is 5 days. For In­
guinal Hernia Repair, the observed mean length of stay in the United States
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in 1980[115] was 5 days, in England and Wales it was 5.8 days. The norm in 
SAMHPS is on average 5 days. For tonsillectomy the median length of stay 
observed in the United States was 1.4 (DRG 059) and 1.3 (DRG 060). The 
norm in SAMHPS is on average 1 day. For Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Diseases (DRG 088), the median observed in the United States was 5.9. 
The norm in SAMHPS is on average 6 days. For Specific Cerebrovascular 
Disorders except TIA (DRG 014) the median observed in the United States 
was 8.1. The norm in SAMHPS is on average 10 days.
The establishment of standards for length of stay is not easy, given 
the many imponderables influencing the length of stay at hospitals[115]. 
Nonetheless, inappropriate reductions in the length of stay might have a 
negative impact on the outcome of care and should be avoided. However, 
the assessment of the appropriateness of established length of stay standards, 
does not seem to have been INAMPS’ objective, since the establishment of 
SAMHPS.
The average length of stay in contracted private hospitals in Rio was
6.0 days (median 3.0 days) for surgical procedures and 8.5 days (median 7.0 
days) for clinical procedures. Observed length of stay for some of the most 
frequent procedures in acute contracted private hospitals in the city (see 
table 8.18, page 214) appeared to be over the established norms indicating 
that, at least for those particular procedures, the hospitals were potential 
losers. Inability to reduce the mean length of stay to standard levels might 
induce hospitals to some negative practices such as reducing the intensity of 
services delivered to patients, as a way to reduce losses with serious results 
on the quality of care.
However, as can be seen in table 8.18 on page 214, contracted private 
hospitals in the city did not appear, in general, to be losing out. Partic­
ularly for the area of obstetric care, observed average length of stay was 
below SAMHPS’ standards, indicating that this ha,s been a profitable area 
of care for hospitals in the city. It is also clear that hospitals were less 
successful in keeping within standard lengths of stay for clinical procedures 
than for surgical procedures. However, one important exception among clin­
ical procedures was Acute Cerebral Vascular Accident (Stroke), the second 
most prevalent clinical procedure in contacted private hospitals’ discharges. 
For this procedure, hospitals had an average length of stay well below the 
norm, strongly suggesting the hypothesis raised earlier in this study, that 
these were profitable patients for contracted private hospitals. Indeed, the 
observed mean was lower than in acute hospitals in the United States (15.2 
days) and close to the median (8.1 days). The fact that patients with stroke
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discharged from the city’s hospitals had lower averages than those in North 
America, suggests that the average stay of patients at the city’s hospitals was 
insufficient to provide an adequate standard of care. Moreover, in Brazil, 
the support outside hospital for those low income patients with disabilities 
and chronic conditions is very limited.
Table 8.18: Standard and observed lengths of stay for surgical and medical 
cases.
Length of Stay
Procedures Number Observed Observed SAMHPS
Mean Mean Standards
Surgical Procedures
1) Congestive Heart Failure (adult) 5925 9.3 7.5 7.0
2) Acute Cerebrovascular Accident 4238 9.5 8.0 10.0
3) Pneumonia not otherwise specified 2321 8.8 7.0 8.0
4) Diabetes 1889 9.6 7.2 7.0
5) Hypertensive Crisis 1683 7.8 7.2 7.0
6) False Labour 1389 1.8 1.8 3.0
7) Acute Asthmatic Attack 1015 6.4 4.9 4.0
8) Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 1014 8.8 7.1 6.0
9) Threatened Abortion 988 2.2 2.2 3.0
10)Acute Coronary Insufficiency 987 7.0 5.9 7.0
Medical Procedures
1) Curettage Post-abortion 2156 2.1 2.1 2.0
2) Unilateral Inguinal Herniorrhaphy 795 4.6 4.2 5.0
3) Colpoperineoplasty 629 3.8 3.6 5.0
4) Semiotic Curettage 517 1.5 1.5 2.0
5) Varicose Veins (one leg) 407 3.1 3.1 3.0
6) Varicose Veins (both legs) 391 3.1 3.1 3.0
7) Haemorrhoidectomy 289 3.6 3.1 3.0
8) Circumcision 274 1.1 1.1 1.0
9) Tonsillectomy and Adenoidectomy 241 1.0 1.0 1.0
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Excluded 
outlier (discharges which had been reimbursed for Long Length o f Stay).
V ariations across paym ent s ta tu s  The variation pattern observed fol­
lowed to a certain extent the trends discussed above for reimbursement per 
discharge (see table 8.19, page 215). The retired presented the highest length 
of stay, followed by the employer, the self-employed and the unemployed. 
Employees presented the lowest length of stay both for surgical and clinical 
procedures. Finally, not-insured patients had relatively low average lengths 
of stay for surgical procedures, but appeared in a middle position in clinical
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procedures.
Table 8.19: Length of stay for surgical and medical cases across payment
status.
Length 
of Stay
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Surgical Procedures
Mean 4.8 6.5 6.6 7.4 8.7 5.0
Median 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 3.0
Medical Procedures
Mean 7.3 7.8 8.1 7.9 9.8 8.9
Median 5.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 6.0
All Procedures
Mean 5.0 6.9 6.2 6.3 9.4 5.6
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Excluded childbirth 
discharges, deaths, transfers and long term patients (more than 30 days of length of 
stay).
The unemployed presented relatively high lengths of stay, possibly denot­
ing their greater severity and/or worse living conditions requiring a longer 
stay at the hospital. Relevant evidence was not observed showing that the 
unemployed were experiencing greater constraints than their counterparts , 
in their length of stay at contracted private hospitals.
8.6 Conclusions
This chapter sought to assess the patterns of care delivered by contracted 
private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro as well as to analyze variations 
associated with the social characteristics of the patient.
Contracted private hospitals in the city mainly treat patients without a 
planned admission. Medical cases are more prevalent than surgical cases and 
among surgical patients obstetrics was by far the most common specialty.
Surgical procedures performed by the city’s hospitals appeared to be of 
less complexity than those performed in contracted private hospitals in the 
country as a whole. On the other hand, the most frequent clinical proce­
dures in the city’s hospitals were concentrated on those chronic conditions 
more prevalent in the middle-aged and the elderly populations, denoting 
restricted provision for paediatric patients. In, short, contracted private hos­
pitals were providing services for a restricted range of health problems within 
the demand for health care services in the city.
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Considering the characteristics of the payment scheme adopted by IN­
AMPS to reimburse contracted private hospitals, hospitals in the city ap­
peared likely to be profiting by providing treatment to obstetrical patients 
and to patients with acute cerebrovascular diseases, thereby achieving aver­
age length of stays lower than the average norm defined by INAMPS. The 
impact on the quality of care might be negative. For other high frequency 
procedures, average length of stay was longer than the norm, denoting the 
existence of difficulties to adjust the provision of care to the reimbursement 
mechanism adopted by INAMPS.
The major provider of care for surgical cases was the salaried surgeon, 
particularly of the high frequency and low complexity surgeries in the area 
of obstetric care. As the payment item Professional Services accounted for 
nearly one third of total reimbursement (excluding drugs and special pro­
cedures), hospitals would tend to profit by providing the bulk of routine 
surgeries through salaried surgeons. The law in Brazil for the employment 
of doctors defines a minimum salary of three legal minimum wages, approx­
imately 150 dollars per month for 20 hours of work per week. Low salaries, 
low specialization and high productivity would result in increased income 
for hospitals. The impact on quality of care, however, is very likely to be 
negative.
It was suggested also that the unit of output adopted in the PBRS 
does not group homogeneous patients in terms of resource consumption. 
Heterogeneity between patients classified under the same Group of Procedure 
might induce hospitals to select patients and provide low quality of care.
In general, services provided by the city’s hospitals appeared to be of low 
technological intensity as shown by the low use of intensive care, low surgical 
rates with predominance of low cost surgery, relatively low caesarian rates 
(in comparison with rates in the country), and concentration on medical 
procedures with a ‘cost’ composition with more than fifty per cent allocated 
in the item Hospital Services.
Process of care appeared to vary across the social groups. Observed vari­
ations denote differences in the patient’s ability to demand a certain type of 
care and/or in the way doctors and hospitals judged patients from different 
social groups. Variations, however, respond also to the inequalities existing 
in society, reflecting differences in need and in the capacity of different social 
groups to consume health services. Variations were more evident when com­
paring patients classified as employers with those classified as unemployed; 
two social groups with contrasting social positions in society.
Employers, the less prevalent social group in contracted private hos­
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pitals’ discharges, appeared together with the self-employed as the most 
costly patients. This mainly resulted from the employers’ larger surgical 
rate, larger caesarian section rate, relatively large use of intensive care and 
possibly, greater access to more complex hospitals. They also had the largest 
probability of being treated by a contracted surgeon. This social group ex­
emplifies the predominant pattern of health care among high income groups 
in Brazilian society, namely to consume private health care services based 
on less conventional and more technology intensive care.
On the other hand, the unemployed showed low surgical rates even when 
controlled for health condition (Neoplasms). The unemployed had the lowest 
surgical rates (retired excluded) for all the age groups and both sexes. They 
had also the lowest rate of caesarian section, despite appearing as a right risk 
group for complications in pregnancy. Nonetheless, the unemployed showed 
an average rate of use of intensive care and longer average lengths of stay, 
suggesting that these patients require a larger consumption of resources to 
be properly cared for.
There were also indications that the provision of services for the retired 
in contracted private hospitals is limited to some selected procedures and 
that their access to intensive care was also constrained, suggesting less than 
appropriate care.
An uncommon pattern of use was once more observed for the not-insured 
with emphasis on the extremely large non-obstetrical surgical rates even 
after controlling for age and sex, further suggesting the occurrence of fraud.
Chapter 9
The O utcom e o f Care.
In this chapter contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro 
will be analyzed on the basis of the outcome of care. The probability of 
dying during hospital admission will be assessed as a means of testing the 
hypothesis that patients who differ in their social characteristics vary in their 
probability of having a positive outcome (i.e. of being discharged alive) from 
hospital care.
9.1 H ospital M ortality R ates and th e Q uality o f  
Care.
Outcome of care is one element of the analysis of the adequacy of care 
delivered to patients by health care services. Outcome of care is assumed by 
Donabedian[42] as “a change in a patient’s current and future health status 
that can be attributed to antecedent health care”. In this sense outcome 
is a relevant element of the quality of care. However, it is an element of 
the quality of care to the extent that observed changes are the result of 
the process of care. Quoting again Donabedian (1980), “...changes in the 
health status, they do not serve as a measure of the quality of care until 
other causes for such changes have been eliminated and one is reasonably 
sure that previous care is responsible for the change, which can be ‘truly’ 
called an outcome”.
It is in this fundamental link between process and outcome of care where 
the main shortcomings arise for assessing the quality of care based on the 
outcome approach. Because, in general, a casual relationship between pro­
cess and outcome of care has not yet been surely established.
Hospital mortality rates have been used as an indicator of adequacy of 
care delivered to patients, despite the fact that many uncertainties remain 
about i t ’s validity as an indicator of quality of care[55, 138]. The main
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reason for the frequent use of this variable is the availability of pertinent 
information. Indeed, death is information collected on a routine basis by 
most inpatient services.
Hospital mortality might be the result of various elements related to 
the quality of care, such as -  cross-infections, misuse of medication and 
other therapeutical modalities, diagnostic errors, poor supervision of pa­
tients leading to falls, avoidable perioperative deaths and inappropriate dis­
charge. Most of these could be improved through organizational and ed­
ucative measures. However, one limitation for using hospital mortality data 
as a mean for assessing the quality of care is that the interpretation of this 
data might be biased by a complex range of factors.
• Differences in the case-mix and in the severity of illness between pa­
tients will lead to variations in hospitals’ mortality rates. The mea­
surement of case-mix for the purpose of comparing hospital death rates 
should adjust for patients’ risk of dying. However, available case-mix 
measures[76] might require more detailed information than those read­
ily available in routinely collected hospital statistics. Moreover, their 
validity and appropriateness for the purpose of discriminating patients’ 
risk of dying still presents limitations[137]. Real differences might also 
be precluded by diagnostic coding errors.
• Differences in the age structure of the patient population have also to 
be considered, since there is a correlation between age and the risk of 
dying.
• Early discharge and transfer will imply differences in the chance of dy­
ing at the hospital. This means that when comparing the performance 
between hospitals, those which have higher transfer rates and/or lower 
length of stay might show misleadingly low death rates. To control for 
these variations some recent studies [191, 137] have also taken into 
account those deaths occurring within 30 days of hospital admission.
• Differences in hospital mortality rates between populations might be 
influenced by the proportion of people who died at home or during 
transfer to hospital. The likelihood of dying at hospital is a function 
of the availability and accessability of services. It is also a cultural 
matter. For some societies and social groups dying at home might be 
more highly valued than dying at hospital. In the United States, for 
instance, nearly half of the deaths occur in hospitals[138], indicating 
that, for the North American population, the hospital is regarded as
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an appropriate place for dying. The same does not seem to be the 
case in England, where the terminally ill patient will frequently be 
transferred home to die near to relatives, in a familiar environment. 
This cultural pattern is likely to vary across social groups. This is 
most certainly the case for Brazil, a multi-cultural society, with large 
social inequalities.
In short, hospital mortality rates vary in different patient populations 
and organizational environments.
♦ * *
Pushed by the emergence of the prospective payment system, concern 
over the quality of inpatient care has increased in the United States dur­
ing the last decade. This reimbursement approach, the same as used by 
INAMPS to reimburse contracted private hospitals (see chapter IV), might 
lead hospitals to provide less costly care at the expense of the quality of 
care delivered to patients. Since 1986, hospital-specific inpatient mortality 
data for Medicare patients have been released to the public by the Health 
Care Financing Administration. This was intended to provide the public 
with information on the performance of individual hospitals contracted by 
Medicare, as a means of increasing patients’ choice as well as impacting 
positively on the quality of care.
Some studies were developed aiming at validating hospital mortality 
rates as a measure of the quality of services, by trying to demonstrate the 
link between the process of care and the outcome of death. Dubois (1987) 
conducted an investigation which classified hospitals in relation to the dif­
ferences they have shown in their death rates to expected death rates, by 
using a model for adjusted hospital death rates. Using subjective review by 
expert clinicians, he managed to demonstrate that a significantly high rate 
of ‘preventable’ deaths appeared in the group of hospitals of higher-than- 
expected death rates. However, given the scope of the study, the author 
views its results as preliminary.
In the 1970’s Rutstein et cols. (1976) proposed the use of mortality 
statistics as a way to develop warning signals about the performance of 
health care services. This approach might also raise hypotheses about the 
participation of other relevant social, biological and environmental factors in 
the occurrence of negative health events. Rutstein developed the concept of 
Sentinel Health Event - “a preventable disease, disability, or untimely death 
whose occurrence serves as a warning signal that the quality of preventive
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and/or therapeutical medical care may need to be improved” and provided 
a list of conditions to serve as indexes of the quality of care.
Charlton et cols.[26] based on the list of Sentinel Health Events studied 
fourteen groups of diseases, aiming at developing an indicator of the quality 
of care for the National Health Service in England. This approach has 
also been used to compare the performance of health care systems between 
countries in Europe[75].
The groups of diseases were selected on the basis of those health problems 
for which mortality should be avoidable by the intervention of health care 
services and/or health programmes. They represent different aspects of the 
health care system, ranging from primary care to inpatient services. It is 
a simple monitoring method based on available data, which can spot areas 
where problems in the availability, accessibility and quality of care might be 
occurring and should be looked at in more depth.
An attempt was made by Bauer[12] to validate the above approach. He 
looked at the contribution of morbidity and social and economic variables in 
the explanation of differences of avoidable death rates between Area Health 
Authorities -  AHAs, in England. This study showed that observed differ­
ences were not fully accounted for by the above variables, suggesting that 
variations might also be explained by the structure of the health care system 
and/or the performance of health care services.
9.2 H ospital M ortality R ates in Contracted P ri­
vate H ospitals in the City.
This study was a cross-sectional analysis based on insurance claims and was 
limited to the range of variables on patients’ characteristics, process and 
outcome of care available on the AIH form. This constrained the scope of 
the analysis of outcome of care to one indicator -  hospital mortality rates 
(number of deaths per 100 discharges).
One relevant factor which might bias comparisons in hospital mortality 
rates is the reliability of the information on hospital deaths. The assessment 
of the reliability of data on the AIH form (see chapter V), had shown that 
for contracted private hospitals in the city, data on the AIH form related to 
the variable ‘death’, presented a high rate of agreement with the information 
written in the medical records. However, rates of agreement might diminish, 
whenever the analysis is performed at lower levels of aggregation (condition- 
specific levels), due to errors in the diagnostic coding process.
Moreover, for death of the newborn reliability was low suggesting that
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the perinatal rate measured from AIH forms is lower than the ‘true’ rate.
For all contracted private hospitals in the country in 1986, 2.3 per cent of 
patients were discharged dead[127]. When Mental Illness’s discharges were 
excluded, the hospital mortality rate was seen to rise slightly to 2.4 per cent. 
Cerebrovascular Diseases and Diseases of the Respiratory System accounted 
for more than one fourth of all these deaths. However, for acute contracted 
private hospitals in the city, in the same year, 6.1 per cent of patients were 
discharged dead. This represents a large hospital mortality rate, more than 
double the national figure which also includes chronic hospitals’ deaths.
Cerebrovascular Disease was the most frequent Principal Diagnosis among 
deaths occurring in the city’s acute hospitals (21 per cent of all deaths). The 
hospital mortality rate for this group of diseases was also larger in the city 
(24.2 per 100 discharges from Cerebrovascular Diseases) than in the country 
as a whole (20.7 per 100).
The larger percentage of patients dying from Cerebrovascular Diseases 
in the city’s acute hospitals might be explained by the larger proportion of 
patients in this diagnostic category in these hospitals’ discharges, as pre­
sented in chapter VI. Observed variations do not seem to be accounted for 
by variations in hospitals’ length of stay, since the average length of stay for 
patients with cerebrovascular diseases in acute contracted private hospitals 
in the city appeared to be lower (9.5 days) than for all contracted private 
hospitals in the country as a whole (10.4 days). So the larger hospital mor­
tality rate for Cerebrovascular Diseases observed in the city’s acute hospitals 
points towards differences in patient’s risk of dying and/or in the quality of 
care between the city’s and the country’s hospitals. Indeed, for the most 
frequent causes of deaths in contracted private hospitals, the city’s acute 
contracted private hospitals tended to show larger hospital mortality rates 
than those observed for contracted private hospitals in the country.
The higher hospital mortality rate observed for the city’s hospitals is 
suggested to be to a certain extent attributable to the bigger prevalence of 
elderly in their patients’ population. As discussed in chapter VI, the elderly 
were clearly over-represented in the city’s acute hospitals’ discharges.
Nonetheless, there are indications that these rates are also associated 
with low quality of care. Mortality rates for two conditions highly prevalent 
among patients classified as retired -  Congestive Heart Failure and Acute 
Cerebrovascular Disease (Stroke) -  had very high death rates when com­
pared with death for these same diseases among Medicare (see page 105) 
patients in the United States. A study conducted by Kahn et cols.[91] 
showed that within 30 days of hospital admissions, death rates for Stroke
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was 20.0 per cent and for Congestive Heart Failure was 5.6 per cent. Deaths 
rates for the same conditions during the patient stay in contracted private 
hospitals in the city was:
• Congestive Heart Failure -  12.4 per cent.
• Stroke -  24.2 per cent.
Given that contracted private hospitals’ data do not account for deaths 
occurring after discharge and that early discharge was likely among those 
patients with Stroke as shown in the previous chapter, it is expected that 
these rates would further increase if post-discharges deaths were also consid­
ered. Hence, this comparison further suggests that the health care system in 
the city was not dealing adequately with these patients and that contracted 
private hospitals were delivering less than adequate care
However, the larger mortality rates in the city’s hospitals when com­
pared with deaths rates in contracted private hospitals in the country as a 
whole might be also related to existing inequalities in the accessibility and 
availability of inpatient care between regions in Brazil, which is suggested to 
have an impact on hospital mortality rates. The availability of health care 
services determines patterns of use and influences cultural habits in relation 
to health and to death.
Indeed, observed hospital mortality rates tend to be lower in the poorer 
states of the northeast region than in those states in the more developed 
southeast region, where the city of Rio de Janeiro is located[60].
Nonetheless, problems in the quality of care delivered by contracted 
private hospitals in the city cannot be discarded. The magnitude of the 
observed hospital mortality rate in the city’s acute hospitals, is per se a 
phenomenon which requires further explanation.
Rates of transfer should also be considered in the analyses of hospital 
mortality in contracted private hospitals. Those are in general low complex­
ity secondary hospitals which have to transfer severely ill patients. Some 
of those are patients transferred due to complications acquired during their 
stay at the contracted private hospital. In short, a proportion of patients 
transferred will end up dying in another hospital, some of them due to the 
poor quality of services delivered in the contracted private hospital. Acute 
contracted private hospitals in the city showed a transfer rate of 2.2 per 
cent.
Hospital death rates (see figure 9.1 on page 224), varied largely between 
clinical and surgical patients. Surgical patients had much lower hospital 
mortality rates when compared with clinical patients. The high frequency
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Figure 9.1: Hospital death and transfer rates for medical and surgical pro­
cedures.
D i s c h a r g e s  13714  96% 
T r a n s f e r s  2 3 5  2% 
D e a t h s  2 6 9  2%
S u r g ica l  P r o c e d u r e s
M e d ica l  P r o c e d u r e s
Note -  Acute contracted private hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Excluded 
‘administrative’ discharges (permanencia) and childbirth.
of low-risk surgical patients in the city hospitals’ discharges, as presented 
in chapter VIII, accounts to a certain extent for the observed low surgical 
mortality rates. So, the large hospital mortality rate shown by the city’s 
hospitals are mainly attributable to deaths among clinical patients.
Provider of care Among surgical patients, a variation in the outcome 
of care provided by salaried and contracted surgeons was observed (see ta­
ble 9.1 on page 225). For obstetric patients, transfer rates were similar 
for patients treated by a salaried surgeon or a contracted surgeon, how­
ever, death rates were larger for those treated by salaried surgeons. For 
non-obstetrical patients, transfer rates and, particularly, death rates were 
larger for those patients treated by a salaried surgeon, highlighting the exis­
tence of variations in the outcome of care delivered by doctors with different 
payment schemes. Excessive workload and inadequate qualifications among 
salaried surgeons are possible explanations for this variation. These would 
be stimulated by hospitals as a mean of maximizing their net incomes.
9.2.1 A voidable d ea th s .
The occurrence in contracted private hospitals in the city of deaths amenable 
to health care intervention was ascertained as a means of assessing the vol-
D i s c h a r g e s  
4 1 9 0 0  86%
D e a t h s  
5101 10%
T ran sfers  
1 6 4 3  3%
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Table 9.1: Deaths and transfer rates by providers of care.
Rates Salaried Surgeon Contracted Surgeon
Obstetric Surgery
Transfers (per 100) 0.13 0.18
Deaths (per 1000) 0.31 0.23
Non-Obstetric Surgery
Transfer (per 100) 1.45 1.00
Death 4.41 2.81
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1986.
urne of deaths in these hospitals which are at least potentially preventable.
The list of preventable and manageable health care problems selected 
was based on those suggested by Charlton (1984). These are high frequency 
health care problems for which the outcome of death is considered an ad­
verse event and as such, could be avoided, in a range of age groups for which 
medical intervention is more likely to be effective. Maternal and Perinatal 
Deaths were included in the list, as well as Nutritional Deficiencies ICD-9 
(260 -263), which were added to the group of Deficiency Anaemia. Hyper­
tensive and Cerebrovascular Diseases were combined to diminish biases due 
to coding errors[26] and Respiratory Diseases were considered within one 
single category.
Nonetheless, as these figures are based on inpatient statistics for one 
single sub-sector of care, they do not give a true picture of avoidable deaths 
in the city. By not relying on Death Certificates, they under-estimate deaths 
occurring elsewhere, for instance, deaths from cancer (Cancer Cervix Uteri 
and Hodgkin’s Disease) and from Tuberculosis, health problems for which 
contracted private hospitals are not the most important provider of inpatient 
care in the city, are almost absent in the above figures.
For all deaths occurring in contracted private hospitals in the city (ex­
cluding stillbirth and newborn deaths), 11.6 per cent were classified as pre­
ventable deaths. Put in a different way, for each 100 deaths occurring in 
these hospitals during a year, at least 12 could be avoided by improvements 
in welfare and/or the availability and quality of services. This number would 
probably increase if deaths among patients transferred (see table 9.2 on
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Table 9.2: Deaths and transfers for selected preventable and manageable 
health problems.
Health Problem I C D - 9 Age Group Deaths Transfers Total
Maternal Death 
(rate per 100,000 
live births)
Perinatal deaths 
(rate per 1,000 
still and live births) 
Hypertension and 
Stroke
Cancer of Cervix Uteri
630 -  678
400 -  404 
430-438 
180
all
all
3 5 - 6 4
0 5 - 6 4
8 (32.9)
1004 (40.5)
450 (12.6%)
9 (6.0%)
48
256 (2.4%) 
0.0 (0.0%)
3561 (100.0%) 
139 (100.0%)
Acute Respiratory 
Diseases, Pneumonia 
and Bronchitis
460 -  466 
470 -  474 
480 -  486 490 0 5 - 4 9 32 (1.6%) 62 (3.2%) 1959 (100%)
Asthma 493 05 -  49 02 (0.3%) 08 (1.3%) 634 (100.0%)
Tuberculosis 010 -  018 0 5 - 6 4 2 (8.0%) 1 (4.0%) 25 (100.0%)
Bacterial Diseases (•) 0 5 - 6 4 4 (0.7%) 11 (1.9%) 576 (100.0%)
Appendicitis 540 -  543 0 5 - 6 4 2 (7.7%) 2 (7.7%) 26 (100.0%)
Abdominal Hernias 550 -  553 0 5 - 6 4 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1091 (100.0%)
Hodgkin’s Disease 201 0 5 - 3 4 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 33 (100.0%)
Chronic Rheumatic 
Heart Disease 393 -  398 0 - 4 9 09 (5.0%) o (0.0%) 167 (100.0%)
Acute and Chronic 
Cholecystitis
574 -  
575.1 0 5 - 6 4 10 (2.0%) 07 (1.4%) 502 (100.0%)
Deficiency Anaemia and 
Nutritional Deficiencies
260 -  263 
280 -  281 0 5 - 6 5 98 (15.2%) 39 (6.1%) 643 (100.0%)
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals. Rio de Janeiro -  1 9 8 6 . ICD -  9 codes -  
004, 037, 320 -  322, 382 -384, 390 -392, 680 -  686, 711, 730.
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page 226) were also taken into account.
The high volume of preventable deaths from Hypertension and Stroke 
strongly suggests the need for more effective policies for the control of hy­
pertension, as a means of reducing cerebrovascular morbidity and mortality. 
However, the quality of care in contracted private hospitals is also under 
question, given the age range of patients dying from the above diseases.
The observed large volume of deaths from Nutritional Deficiency and 
Deficiency Anaemia was another warning signal of the gravity of the socio­
economic inequalities in the city. Of those deaths, 26 occurred in patients 
classified as employees. This means death from malnutrition in people work­
ing in the formal labour market, who earn at least one legal minimum wage. 
Death from malnutrition in employed adults is an indicator of the inad­
equacy of economic and social policies in guaranteeing basic standards of 
living for the population. Indeed, this study showed that malnutrition in 
adults was among the twenty most prevalent procedures in acute contracted 
private hospitals’ discharges. Those patients had, in general, high mortal­
ity rates. These were particularly high among those patients classified as 
retired.
The area of maternal care also showed some disturbing figures, strongly 
indicating the inappropriateness of the existing supply and delivery of mater­
nity services in the city. Low quality of care in contracted private hospitals 
is also suggested as being responsible for these figures.
The death of a woman due to complications of pregnancy, delivery or 
puerperium is an unacceptable and avoidable event [101]. Maternal deaths 
in contracted private hospitals in the city were 32.9 per 100,000 live births. 
Despite being a relatively high rate, when compared with rates in some Euro­
pean countries[99], this is apparently a low maternal death rate by Brazilian 
standards. The maternal death rate in the city of Sao Paulo, in 1986, was
99.6 per 100,000 live births[103]. This is a corrected rate, which accounted 
for the under-estimation of maternal deaths observed in ‘Death Certificates’.
Observed maternal death rates in contracted private hospitals have to be 
carefully analyzed. Firstly, these are institutional figures which means that 
they are under-estimated, because they do not account for deaths occurring 
after discharge. The definition of maternal death refers to deaths occurring 
within 42 days after the end of pregnancy, which were related to this event.
Secondly, contracted private hospitals’ maternal death rates do not in­
clude patients dying after being transferred to other services. Actually, if 
all transfers in the major group of diagnoses -  Complications of Pregnancy, 
Delivery and Puerperium -  were assumed to have ended up in death, the
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maternal death rate would have been raised to the alarming figure of 230 
per 100,000 live births. This rather extreme hypothesis is not expected to 
apply, but it is presented to emphasise the great impact that transfer might 
have, biasing the true maternal death rate in contracted private hospital 
patients. Thus, the observed large transfer rate in the area of maternal care 
should be considered as a warning signal, requiring more in depth review, 
on a case by case basis.
The other indicator of the appropriateness of maternal care is the peri­
natal mortality rate. This is the rate of stillbirths plus deaths under 7 days 
of age in the year by the number of births (live and still) in the year per 
1000[97]. Perinatal mortality is associated with income, low birth weight, 
antenatal care and delivery[186].
The longitudinal study of Pelotas[186] investigated all hospital births 
occurring in the city. It observed a perinatal mortality rate of 32.2 per 
1000. Laurenti (1985), also observed a perinatal mortality rate of 35.2 per 
1000 in nine maternity units in the south of Brazil. The observed perinatal 
mortality rate in contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio was 40.5 per 
1000, a large rate when compared with the above figures. As is the case 
with hospital death rates in general, hospital perinatal mortality rates are 
under-estimated, since they do not consider deaths occurring after transfer 
or discharge. The median length of stay for normal delivery was 2 days and 
for caesarian section 4 days, suggesting that some perinatal deaths might 
have occurred at home. It must also be emphasized that the reliability 
study, as presented before, strongly suggested that perinatal mortality rates 
calculated from the AIH form are under-estimated. Moreover, for each two 
hundred babies born alive in a contracted private hospital in the city, one 
was transferred to another hospital.
The magnitude of the perinatal mortality observed in contracted pri­
vate hospitals in the city is particularly worrying, since these hospitals were 
treating, in general, potentially low risk patients, further suggesting low 
standards of care in the area of maternal care.
9.3 Variations in H ospital D eath  R ates across Pay­
ment Status.
Crude hospital mortality rates showed important variations across the pay­
ment groups (see table 9.3 on page 229). The not-insured presented the 
lowest hospital mortality rate for surgical conditions and the second lowest 
rate for clinical conditions. In fact, observed crude hospital death rates for
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patients classified as not-insured and employees appeared to be very close 
to the rate observed for contracted private hospitals in the country as whole 
(2.3 per cent).
On the contrary, patients classified as retired presented the largest hos­
pital mortality rate, both for clinical and surgical conditions, most probably 
also influenced their older age and the poor quality of care. Patients classi­
fied as retired had a total hospital mortality rate of 14.4 per cent. Employer 
patients had also surprisingly large death rates. Indeed, patients classi­
fied as retired, employers, self-employed and unemployed had crude hospital 
mortality rates above the contracted private hospitals’ national rate.
Table 9.3: Hospital mortality and transfer rate by payment status. Per 100 
discharges
Employee Employer Self-
Employed
Unemployed Retired Not
Insured
Surgical Procedures
Transfer Rate% 1.36 1.30 1.56 1.05 2.86 0.14
Death Rate% 0.90 2.60 1.02 1.57 5.20 0.60
Total (N) 8704 77 1280 191 3256 710
Medical Procedures
Transfer Rate% 2.98 3.25 3.00 3.97 3.82 1.89
Death Rate% 5.00 7.80 6.70 6.90 16.30 6.50
Total (N) 21695 154 2669 579 22857 742
All Procedures
Transfer Rate% 1.5 2.1 1.8 2.5 3.6 0.7
Death Rate% 2.3 4.2 3.4 4.1 14.4 2.6
Note — Acute Contracted Private Hospitals (Excluded Childbirth Discharges. Rio de 
Janeiro -  1986.
The probability of dying in a contracted private hospital from a pre­
ventable condition also varied largely between the payment groups. Ex­
cluding those classified as retired, which axe at a lower risk of an avoidable 
death1, the probability of a preventable death ranged from 15.4 per cent 
of all deaths among patients classified as employers to 25.6 per cent of all 
deaths among patients classified as unemployed. These figures point to the 
existence of inequalities in access to those services and goods which might
JThe concept of avoidable death excludes the elderly and those patients younger than 
five years old
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prevent illness and death. Variations were also observed across the payment 
status in perinatal mortality rates, ranging from a relatively low rate for 
employee patients (19.2 per 1,000 births) to an extremely large rate (70.7 
per 1,000 births) for those classified as not-insured patients.
9 .3 .1  T estin g  th e  h y p o th e sis  o f  var ia tio n s in  h o sp ita l m o r­
ta li ty  ra tes  across p a y m en t s ta tu s .
The hypothesis that the probability of a positive outcome (being discharged 
alive) varies between the payment group was tested by looking for the nega­
tive event -  the probability of dying in hospital. The methodology employed 
for testing this relationship was presented in chapter III (Methodology) and 
chapter VII. The null hypothesis being tested is that the explanatory vari­
able payment status has no effect on the probability of dying in hospital, 
for patients admitted to contracted private hospitals in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro.
Discharges classified as retired and those related to childbirth were not 
included in this analysis. To avoid bias, patients transferred and ‘adminis­
trative’ discharges were also excluded. The hypothesis was tested controlling 
for two confounding variables -  age and sex. Severity of illness could not be 
measured.
The variations in the probability of dying at hospital across the payment 
status was statistically significant (p < 0.01) even when controlled by age 
and sex. This allowed the rejection of the null hypothesis. Variations in 
the probability of dying were statistically significant for the unemployed 
(p < 0.03) and for the not-insured. This indicates that observed variations 
in crude hospital mortality rates between the employees, the self-employed 
and the employers, presented in the previous section, were a function of their 
age and sex distribution. When controlled by these variables, variations 
tended to disappear.
A new variable was created to substitute in the model for the variable 
payment status, by combining what was not shown to be statistically signif­
icant. The new variable Pystatus assumed the following values: ^ U n e m ­
ployed, 2=Not-insured and 4=Others.
Age appeared as an important variable associated with the hospital mor­
tality rate in the fitted model (see table 9.4 on page 231). Sex also appeared 
as a relevant variable in explaining variations in death rates between pa­
tients. These two variables appeared to be interacting. That means that 
the mortality rate across the sexes will vary by age group or, inversely, that 
variations between the age groups do not hold the same across the sexes.
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Table 9.4: Values of the maximum likelihood statistics for the fitted model 
to test variations in the probability of dying in hospital.
Source Degrees of Freedom Chi-Square Probability
Intercept 1 823.05 0.0000
Pystatus 2 11.04 0.0040
Age group 3 68.32 0.0000
Age group*sex 3 43.51 0.0000
Sex 1 39.20 0.0000
Likelihood ratio 14 12.53 0.5634
Note — Contracted Private Hospitals. City of Rio de Janeiro -  1986. Age group
categories- 0 -24; 25 - 44; 45 -  64; 65 and more.
The probability of death tended to increase with age for all the payment 
groups and both sexes (see appendix L). The only exception was for women 
younger than 25 years old, who presented larger probabilities of dying in 
hospital than women between 25 and 44 years old. The latter indicates that 
the large utilization rate observed for women between 25 to 44 years old is 
highly concentrated in low-risk health problems.
On the other hand, men had larger probabilities of dying in hospital for 
all payment groups and all age groups, except for those older than 65. For 
the latter age group, women appeared to have a greater risk of dying in 
hospital than men.
Patients classified as unemployed had the largest probabilities of dying 
in hospital for all the age groups and for both sexes, indicating their greater 
severity of illness and/or lower quality of care. Those classified as not- 
insured presented the lowest probability of dying in hospital, for all age 
groups and for both sexes. This clearly reflects the large proportion of not- 
insured patients discharged from low-risk procedures such as Inguinal Hernia 
Repair and Varicose Veins.
The population with the greatest chance of dying at a contracted private 
hospital were those women older than 65 classified as unemployed. The odds 
ratio for the unemployed to the not-insured woman older than 65 was 2.08, 
which means to say that the risk of an unemployed elderly woman dying 
was more than double that experienced by not-insured elderly woman.
At the other extreme, the population showing the smallest predicted 
probability of dying were those women patients classified as not-insured and 
aged between 25 to 44 years old. The odds ratio for the unemployed and not- 
insured woman in the above age group was 2.0. Actually, for this population
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of not-insured patients the observed probability of dying was zero, because 
there was no death in this group during the year 1986 among the city’s 
contracted private hospitals’ discharges.
The low hospital mortality rate observed for not-insured patients might 
be another indicator that hospitals were using this payment group to perform 
illegal practices, since it should remembered that ghost patients cannot die! 
Not- insured patients also had low transfer rates, most probably further 
evidence that only real patients can be transferred.
In short, the large variations in the predicted probability of dying ob­
served between the unemployed and the not-insured were very unlikely to 
be explained on epidemiological grounds, further suggesting the existence of 
fraud. However, the larger chance of dying observed for the unemployed is 
one dramatic outcome of their deprived and low valued life.
9.4 Conclusions.
Contracted private hospitals in the city had a large hospital mortality rate. 
This holds for most of the high frequency diagnostic groups. Despite the 
fact that the population of patients in contracted private hospitals in the 
city was suggested to be older than in contracted private hospitals in the 
country as a whole, there were various elements indicating that the quality 
of care was also one reason for the observed large mortality rates. Maternity 
care, which accounted for one third of discharges, had disturbing indicators 
of low quality of care. Moreover, for each hundred deaths occurring in these 
hospitals, at least 12 were classified as preventable.
Nonetheless, the large mortality rate observed was also an attribute of 
the case-mix in the city’s hospitals, characterized by low-risk surgical pa­
tients and a high frequency of non-surgical adult patients.
The outcome of care provided by salaried surgeons appeared to be worse 
than that provided by contracted surgeons, even after controlling for ob­
stetric and non-obstetric cases, suggesting that patients treated by salaried 
surgeons are more severe than those treated by contracted surgeons and/or 
that the quality of care delivered by salaried surgeons is lower than the 
quality of care delivered by contracted surgeons. The fact that the salaried 
surgeon is more likely to be in hospital when an emergency arrives might 
overload salaried surgeons with the most severe patients.
Those patients classified as retired, on average the oldest among the 
payment groups, had the largest hospital death rates. However, when retired 
patients and childbirth discharges were excluded and after controlling for age
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and sex, those classified as unemployed had the largest probability of dying 
in hospital. The unemployed also presented the largest chance of dying 
from preventable conditions, suggesting that they are admitted in more 
severe conditions than their counterparts and/or experience lower quality 
of services.
On the contrary, the not-insured tended to present the lowest proba­
bilities of dying in hospital among the payment groups. The fact that, 
everything else being equal, the unemployed were dying twice as much as 
the not-insured -  a social group who on average experiences similar social 
and economic conditions -  strongly suggests that their low probability of 
dying in hospital is in part due to the fact that not all of them were real, 
but ghost patients.
However, the extremely large perinatal mortality rate observed for pa­
tients classified as not-insured pointed in a different direction for the area 
of maternity care. Explanations for the above axe not clear, but hospital 
induced practices should also be questioned, given the observed magnitude 
of differences in perinatal mortality between the payment groups.
This analysis strongly suggested poor quality in services delivered by 
contracted private hospitals in the city and also indicated some relevant 
limitations in the health care system and the welfare of people living in the 
city. Existing inequalities in health were further stressed by the observed 
greater chance of dying experienced by the unemployed. Furthermore, it 
added evidence to the hypothesis of fraud suggesting that IN AMPS were 
reimbursing hospitals for non-existent discharges.
Chapter 10
Conclusions and 
R ecom m endations
This study’s main objective was to assess the existence of variations (if any) 
across the social groups (payment groups) in the patterns of use of contracted 
private hospitals in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1986 . Variations indicate 
inequalities in the chance of getting inpatient treatment and benefiting from 
the process of care between individuals in different social positions.
The theoretical framework was represented in a model of determination 
of the use of health care services presented in the first chapter. It was 
assumed that the distribution of morbidity varies across the social groups, 
generating differences in the need for health care services. This has an 
impact on utilization rates. Furthermore variations in utilization, process 
and outcome of care are associated with supply-induced factors which also 
explain variations in use between the social groups.
10.1 Sum m ary o f the R esults
T h e  role o f con tracted  p rivate  hospitals Contracted private hospitals 
in the city in 1986 appeared to be playing a limited role in the delivery of 
inpatient care. The low utilization rates observed for these hospitals in 
1986 suggest that some groups within the employed population in the city’s 
formal labour market had already shifted to the independent private sector 
and these might also indicate a strength in the role of public hospitals in 
response to INAMPS’ policies initiated in the early eighties.
Acute contracted private hospitals in the city showed a limited capacity 
to compete in the hospital market. The delivery of care by these hospitals 
was concentrated in the area of obstetrics, an area with a deficit of beds in 
the city, and in selected diagnostic categories (Congestive Heart Failure and
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Stroke) largely concentrated in the elderly population. The relative large 
proportion of elderly people in the city puts pressure on public emergency 
beds generating a potential demand of retired acutely ill patients for con­
tracted private hospitals. The retired population, dependent on pensions 
from social security, have low incomes and have to rely on the publicly fi­
nanced health care services.
Contracted private hospitals appeared not to be prepared to compete 
for technology-intensive care as shown by their low delivery of services for 
Ischemic Heart Diseases, complex surgery and the negative relationship be­
tween AIH forms paid in each hospital and the provision of intensive care 
beds.
Moreover, these hospitals were providing low quality care. Hospital mor­
tality rates for high frequency procedures appeared to be very large, pointing 
to a less than adequate process of care. It was also suggested that the large 
caesarean section rate observed in these hospitals was due to unnecessary 
surgical deliveries (see chapter V). However, the observed large proportion 
of avoidable deaths and the hospital mortality rates point also to problems 
in the overall health care system in the city, such as deficiency in ante-natal 
care, lack of prevention programmes for the control of Hypertension and in­
efficacy in the referral system, possibly delaying the arrival of patients to the 
hospital, as well as pointing to the appalling living conditions experienced 
by some employed people, the unemployed and the retired population.
The Procedure Based Reimbursement Scheme (PBRS) adopted by IN­
AMPS to reimburse contracted private hospitals was seen to explain some 
of the characteristics presented above. Large variability was observed in 
the length of stay for the most frequent procedures suggesting that pa­
tients classified under the same unit of output are consuming different levels 
of resources at the hospital. This appeared to place an incentive on hos­
pitals to concentrate the delivery of services in the area of obstetric care 
and Stroke which were procedures where hospitals appeared to be profiting 
by achieving average length of stay below standards defined by INAMPS. 
Gains for treating patients classified in ‘profitable procedures’ might subsi­
dize eventual losses incurred by delivering services for patients classified in 
‘unprofitable procedures’.
However, the disturbing mortality rate observed, for instance, for Con­
gestive Heart Failure, suggests that losses due to the delivery of care to 
patients classified in ‘unprofitable procedures’ are also avoided by providing 
less than adequate care. Slowing down the intensity of care delivered to pa­
tients was suggested as one strategy adopted by hospitals to reduce losses.
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The low availability of intensive-care beds pointed in this direction. The 
quantity of diagnostic services written on the AIH form was also larger than 
the quantity of services written in the medical records, raising the question 
as to whether these services were actually delivered to patients. The study 
also pointed to the fact that surgical teams in contracted private hospitals 
appeared not to come up to the minimum standards defined by INAMPS.
Unnecessary admission also appeared as another way hospitals were us­
ing as a means to increase net income. False labour presented a particularly 
large coefficient of variation which was associated with low average length of 
stay, suggesting that some of these admissions were unnecessary admissions.
On the other hand, Breast Cancer showed an extremely large coefficient 
of variation which might lead hospitals to adopt mechanisms so as to prevent 
the admission of some more severe patients in this diagnostic category. For 
instance, there was no admission from Breast Cancer of patients classified 
as unemployed who apparently are more severely ill, everything else being 
equal.
A point was raised in regard to the adequacy of average length of stay 
standards established by INAMPS in relation to the needs of the population 
using these services. For some frequent procedures, such as Congestive Heart 
Failure the hospitals average length of stay was higher than the standard. 
On the other hand, for some procedures, such as Stroke, average and the 
standard length of stay was considered low, suggesting that patients are 
leaving the hospital in precarious health conditions. Stroke is a diagnoses 
largely concentrated in patients classified as retired. The poor condition of 
the bulk of the retired population, the lack of social services and help at 
home would require that patients leave the hospital in stable conditions.
Hospital mortality rates were larger for patients treated by salaried doc­
tors than for those treated by contracted doctors, particularly, for non- 
obstetric surgery, suggesting that doctors contracted by the hospitals are 
less prepared to perform certain procedures and/or work under greater pres­
sure. Actually, the most common surgeon in contracted private hospitals in 
the city was the salaried surgeon. It was also suggested that the preference 
for salaried providers could well be a strategy adopted by hospitals after the 
introduction of the new payment scheme. Hospitals would increase their net 
incomes by absorbing the payment of professional services. Low payment 
and overloading salaried doctors would increase hospitals net income, but 
would decrease the quality of care delivered.
* * *
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The average patient admitted to an acute contracted private hospital in 
the city of Rio de Janeiro was a woman dependent on an employee with 
a Principal Diagnosis in the major group of Complications of Pregnancy, 
Childbirth and the Puerperium. The second most common patient was 
that classified as retired. The average retired patient was discharged from 
Congestive Heart Failure and 111 Defined Cerebrovascular Disease.
Information on whether access to contracted private hospitals in the city 
was already universalized in 1986, although sought, was not obtained either 
through documental or oral evidence. Nonetheless, the very large proportion 
of not-insured patient discharges reimbursed by INAMPS classified as elec­
tive admission was assumed to be evidence that the universalization of access 
had already started in 1986. The validity of this assumption was based on 
the fact that, before the universalization of access, INAMPS would pay con­
tracted hospitals for treating not-insured patients only for emergency care. 
Nonetheless, the relative participation of not-insured patients in contracted 
private hospitals’ discharges was very low.
In summary, contracted private hospitals in the city in 1986 were still 
linked to a strict social insurance concept, delivering care to a restricted 
group of the population who were either currently within or who had been 
previously within the formal labour market and providing low quality ser­
vices for a limited group of low complexity health care problems which were 
considered potentially profitable.
V ariations across paym ent s ta tu s  In spite of the limitations imposed 
by the very selective and relatively small market represented by the con­
tracted private hospitals in the city, the payment categories showed very 
distinctive patterns of use of these services. After controlling for age and 
sex, payment status appeared as a statistically significant explanatory vari­
able in every aspect of use of acute contracted private hospitals for which 
statistical analysis was performed (retired patients excluded). That is to say 
that the likelihood of being admitted from Diseases from the Circulatory 
System, Respiratory Diseases, Diseases of the Digestive System, Infectious 
Diseases, and Neoplasms; of being admitted for surgical treatment; of hav­
ing a caesarian section and of dying while in hospital varied by payment 
status, pointing towards the hypothesis that differences in health ‘need’ and 
supply-induced factors have an impact on the pattern of use of the different 
social groups.
However, statistically significant differences were observed mainly for 
two categories of patients -  the unemployed and the not-insured.
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Patients classified as unemployed showed the highest predicted probabil­
ities of admission (assumed here as equal to discharge) for health problems 
related to social deprivation such as Respiratory and Infectious Diseases. 
On the other hand, patients classified as unemployed presented the lowest 
predicted probability of admission for more costly care such as Neoplasm. 
The fact that patients classified as unemployed showed very low probabil­
ity of admission from Neoplasm in acute contracted private hospitals and 
relatively higher proportional discharge rates for Malignant Neoplasms in 
chronic hospitals indicates that selection mechanisms were operating, pre­
venting the access of these patients to acute contracted private hospitals. 
This might be explained by the fact that the unemployed patient would 
seek for help at later stages of the disease. However, it was suggested that 
damaging practices in the labour market might also be happening, with se­
rious diseases causing unemployment. Nonetheless, supply induced factors 
cannot be disregarded in the explanation of inequalities, as will be further 
argued below.
Unemployed patients have shown the lowest predicted probability of be­
ing admitted for surgical treatment. When controlling for Neoplasm, the 
unemployed also appeared to be least likely patients to receive surgical treat­
ment. In spite of the large rates of caesarian section observed in contracted 
private hospitals, unemployed women showed the lowest predicted probabil­
ity of having a surgical delivery, even though women classified as unemployed 
appeared in greater risk of needing a caesarian section. Discrimination in 
doctors’ decision-making was also suggested as an explanation for the low 
probability of caesarean section observed for unemployed women, since con­
tracted surgeons appeared to perform more surgical deliveries for the other 
payment groups than for the unemployed.
Patients classified as unemployed showed a high mean length of stay 
which suggests that they have a greater severity of illness. This character­
istic is likely to respond to selection against these potentially unprofitable 
patients. The social selection exercised by some hospitals, in order to pre­
serve their ‘status’, can also explain the under-utilization of the unemployed 
in some particular procedures.
Finally, patients classified as unemployed also presented the highest pre­
dicted probabilities of dying in hospital for all age groups and both sexes. 
This consistent pattern across all ages and sexes points towards both the 
hypothesis that patients classified as unemployed are more severely ill and 
towards the theory that unemployment causes poor health. That is to say, 
the poor health of the unemployed cannot only be due to mental and phys­
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ical health forcing people into unemployment. Moreover, it suggests that 
selection mechanisms in the health care system, such as limited access to 
services, delay on referral to hospital and less than appropriate care are other 
social mechanisms undermining the chances of this social group improving 
their health status and survival.
On the other hand, patients classified as not-insured showed a very un­
common pattern of use of contracted private hospitals which can hardly be 
explained on the grounds of variations in need. This strongly suggests fraud, 
most probably by charging INAMPS for admissions that did not occur (ghost 
patients). A point should be made, however, that these practices apparently 
were restricted to some hospitals, since not-insured discharges were not ran­
domly distributed across hospitals. Fraud might have been a response to 
losses incurred by hospitals which treat a more complex case-mix and were 
not fully compensated by the Procedure Based Reimbursement Scheme or 
a perversive response from some hospitals to the universalization process.
The descriptive analysis suggests that patients classified as employers 
also have a significantly distinctive pattern of use of contracted private hos­
pitals. However, the small number of employers involved precluded differ­
ences from appearing in the models tested. Their distinctive pattern would 
be the result of their better health status, selective use of contracted private 
hospitals for more costly care and/or health conditions impacting on their 
social and economic position; their greater chance to choose their preferred 
hospital and/or doctor and to influence doctors’ decision making as a re­
sult of their own more affluent social position; and/or their willingness to 
complement IN AMPS’ reimbursement with extra payment for doctors and 
hospitals, despite this being an illegal practice under INAMPS rules.
The self-employed is a very heterogeneous social category in Brazilian 
society. This category does not allow the discrimination of groups of in­
dividuals with very distinctive material interests and welfare. This might 
explain the absence of a more regular pattern in the use of contracted private 
hospitals among patients classified as self-employed.
V aria tions across th e  age groups and  th e  sexes As expected, age 
appeared strongly associated with hospital admission (retired patients ex­
cluded). For Disease of the Circulatory System, age interacted with sex with 
men showing a greater risk of hospital admission from Circulatory Diseases 
at ages 45 to 64 years and women at age 65 years or more. For Respira­
tory Diseases, the young adult man also showed a greater risk of hospital 
admission than the young adult woman. A similar pattern was observed
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for Diseases of the Digestive System. For Infectious Diseases, men showed 
a much greater risk of hospital admission than women until the age of 44 
years old, when differences between the sexes tended to disappear. These 
patterns were also followed by a greater risk of dying in hospital experienced 
by men younger than 65 years old when compared with women in the same 
age group (childbirth admissions excluded).
The above suggests differences in health care ‘need’ between men and 
women, with men being more likely to need hospital care during productive 
life than women, for non-sex specific major groups of diseases. The greater 
exposure to risk factors at work and the hardship in working life, low wages, 
long daily travelling time experienced by the employed are likely to explain 
the much higher likelihood of serious illness among the young adult man.
Nonetheless, the magnitude of observed differences in the probability of 
using contracted private hospitals for some of the conditions studied points 
also to the existence of selection mechanisms favouring the admission of the 
economically active population to contracted private hospitals.
Selection mechanisms might still be explained by the historically re­
stricted character of the Brazilian compulsory insurance scheme -  to target 
the provisions of services on the working population in the formal labour 
market. This restricted concept is reflected, for instance, in the long-standing 
tendency of INAMPS to contract a relatively low number of paediatric beds. 
Clear evidence of selection in favour of the economically active population 
was shown by the association between sex and discharges from psychiatric 
contracted private hospitals. The differences between the sexes in discharges 
from psychiatric hospitals, largely concentrated on men, could not be ex­
plained on epidemiological grounds. ,
Q uality  o f d a ta  on th e  A IH  form  The reliability study presented in 
chapter V showed problems of incompleteness for some variables, some in­
consistencies due to information on the AIH form not being written in the 
medical records and low reliability for some variables of great relevance for 
monitoring services and epidemiological studies. Particularly, Principal Di­
agnoses and perinatal deaths have low reliability. The low quality observed 
for the most frequent diagnoses appeared similar to the pattern observed 
for the state of Sao Paulo about ten years earlier, suggesting that neither 
the hospitals nor INAMPS had put any effort into improving the quality of 
this extremely relevant medical information. Nonetheless, the quality of the 
information used for payment purpose -  requested procedure -  showed good 
reliability for the most frequently requested procedures. However, it was
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observed that an upgrading of requested procedure which maximized reim­
bursement occurred for 31 per cent of all disagreements in this variable. The 
results of the reliability study must be interpreted with some caution, how­
ever, due to the non-response rate which suggests that observed reliability 
was somehow better than ‘true’ reliability.
10.2 Final Com m ents on Inequalities
This study analyzed a variety of aspects of the use of contracted private 
hospitals across groups of patients in different social positions. The classi­
fication of social position was based on the relations to production and on 
the labour market. Despite the exploratory character of the study, it raised 
the existence of inequalities in the use of contracted private hospitals in the 
city of Rio de Janeiro in 1986. Moreover, as the study was based on data 
for a single sector of care and, given the plural characteristic of the health 
care system in the city, it suggests that inequalities between sectors of care 
are likely to be even larger.
The selective social characteristics of contracted private hospital patients 
can be seen as an indicator of the social stratification in the use of services 
across sectors of care. It points to inequalities in the use of health care 
services, generated by the variety of financing mechanisms creating selective 
health care markets. Within sector inequalities (contracted private hospitals) 
were also influenced by variations in the availability of services in the city 
between the social groups. Moreover, the existence of inequalities within a 
particular sector of care pointed also to other sources of inequality, deriving 
from the payment mechanism, hospitals vested interests, variations in the 
patient ability to interfere in the medical practice and doctors’ ideology and 
financial interests.
10.3 R ecom m endations
Since the date of the empirical research (1986), changes had been introduced 
into the Brazilian Health Care System. In 1989, the Health Law was signed, 
defining the characteristics of the Unified Health Care System (SUS) to be 
implemented in the country by the Ministry of Health. The Unified Health 
System includes all publicly financed health care services and is based on the 
principles of universalization, equity, administrative decentralization with 
an emphasis on the municipal level with democratic participation of the 
population in the system. The command of the system is to be unified
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under the control of the Ministry of Health and local Health Departments. 
The independent private system was left out of SUS. Therefore, the new 
Health Law retained the character of a plural and, potentially, inequitable 
system.
The Procedure Based Reimbursement Scheme was introduced as the re­
imbursement mechanism for public hospitals. The AIH form became the 
instrument of payment for all publicly financed inpatient care. A National 
Inpatient Information System was created, containing information on in­
patient services provided by public and contracted private hospitals in the 
country as a whole.
The positive aspect of the latter was the creation of a comprehensive data 
set with relevant information on the delivery of services by the public and 
contracted private sector. It is recommended that the Ministry of Health 
make it mandatory for independent private hospitals to provide data for 
the National Inpatient Information System to allow the coverage of the 
whole range of inpatient care delivered in the country. This is necessary for 
planning the organization of care at the local level as well as for monitoring 
the equity in the use of inpatient services as a result of the new policy.
The negative aspect is that the implementation of the Procedure Based 
Payment Scheme in public hospitals, now adopted as a blind policy. It 
was not preceded by experimentation directed to assess the impact of this 
payment mechanism on public hospitals. Actually, there is not even a clear 
understanding of the impact it had on the delivery of services by contracted 
private hospitals. However, there axe indications, also pointed to by this 
study, of negative incentives leading to the selection of patients, low quality 
of care and fraud. Moreover, the shortcomings in the unit of output were 
not considered.
*  *  *
The recommendations presented below are mainly concentrated on the role 
the National Information System might play as an instrument of monitoring 
equity in the use of health care service and in improving the quality of 
services. These recommendations were centred on the belief that routinely 
available information can be valuable and relatively inexpensive instrument 
for use at all levels of the system, particularly, the local level. Moreover, 
information is a necessary instrument in the political arena, where the debate 
takes place on how to construct a less inequitable and less discriminatory 
society in Brazil.
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Q uality  o f m edical inform ation The usefulness of inpatient statistics 
is dependent on the quality of data in the system. As a measure directed 
to improve the quality of data on diagnosis, it is recommended that the 
local Health Departments, responsible for the organization and coordina­
tion of the provision and delivery of publicly financed services at the state 
and municipality level, make it mandatory for contracted hospitals to have 
qualified medical record personnel. A training programme should be devel­
oped to qualify public hospitals’ medical record personnel. The use of the 
resume of the 9th Classification of Diseases (WHO) published by INAMPS 
for coding diagnoses must also be reviewed, given that it induces errors and 
ill-defined categories.
Doctors should be made aware of their role in improving the quality of 
inpatient information. Most problems of quality of medical information are 
due to difficulties in the interpretation of original medical documents. A 
face sheet containing a summary of the information on the medical record 
should also be made mandatory in all hospitals. The completion of the face 
sheet summary should be the responsibility of the doctor in charge of the 
patient, who should sign the document thereby assuming responsibility for 
the information. Emphasis should be put on the need for providing data on 
multiple diagnoses.
Consistency of data on diagnoses could be checked regularly by com­
puter. Research should be promoted by the Ministry of Health for the 
definition of criteria and the development of, computer programmes, to be 
used at the local level, for checking the consistency of diagnostic data.
Social class variable It is strongly recommended that the National In­
formation System includes in the AIH form the variable Payment Status. 
The social position of individuals is a determinant of health ‘need’ and of 
use of health care services. Therefore, social class is a fundamental variable 
for epidemiological, health care services research and monitoring of health 
care services. For practical reasons this variable should remain as it is at 
present. That is to say, based on the classification of the different modes of 
contribution to social security. However, given the universalization of access 
to publicly financed services the category ‘not-insured with IN AMP S’ the­
oretically losses its meaning. Furthermore, the variable payment status has 
categories of low discriminating power: the self-employed group together 
individuals with distinctive welfare and life experiences. The same might 
be said of the employee. In this study there was no apparent problem with 
this category, because contracted private hospitals in the city were probably
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concentrated on a sub-group within the employee population with a similar 
level of welfare.
In the context of universalization of publicly financed services, the vari­
able social security entitlement status also losses meaning. This raises the 
theoretical and operational problem of how to classify the class position of 
housewives, students, children and the long-term unemployed.
Therefore, it is recommended that promotion of research be directed at 
the operational classification of social class (or social group) to substitute 
for the category payment status in the inpatient statistics in the country. 
This classification should be based on information available in the Census as 
a means to allow research to link inpatient statistics with population data.
P lace  o f residence It is recommended that the completeness of the in­
formation on the area code of patient’s place of residence be included in 
the systematic checking, before payment, of data in the AIH form. This 
data must also be available in the computerized data set. This is extremely 
valuable information for the identification of the volume and characteristics 
of patients ‘crossing borders’. Both for planning and for the development 
of technical criteria for the allocation of resources between states and mu­
nicipalities, place of residence of patients in the local health care market is 
needed.
H osp ita l m ate rn a l and  p e rin a ta l deaths This study pointed to low 
reliability in the information related to perinatal deaths. This raises the 
need for regular review of a sample of medical records in the maternity 
units. States and municipalities with the necessary technical and financial 
means should monitor on an individual basis all maternal and perinatal 
deaths and whenever possible transfers among this group of patients.
Nonetheless, the National Inpatient Information System can provide 
data for the local level to monitor hospital maternal and perinatal deaths 
and transfers, discriminating by hospital, type of delivery, provider of care, 
social group, diagnoses etc by use of a computer programme. These data 
highlight the existence of risk groups, hospitals with potentially low quality, 
inadequate use of surgical delivery etc.
Again, it is recommended that upper levels of the Health Care System 
finance research aiming at devising technical material and computer pro­
grammes for the monitoring of maternal care at the local level based on 
inpatient statistics.
r
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H osp ita l m o rta lity  and  transfers  This is another indicator easily con­
structed from data on the National Inpatient Information System which can 
be used as an indirect measure of quality of care delivered by hospitals.
Recent developments in the methodology of analyzing hospital mortality 
data and shortcomings in the interpretation of this information should be 
reviewed as a means to devise an appropriate methodology to be used at 
the local level. Computer programmes for the processing data and technical 
material for the analysis of results would need to be developed to allow the 
monitoring of hospital mortality at the local level.
T he  p rocedu re  based reim bursem ent schem e -  P B R S If the present 
payment scheme is to remain as the mechanism adopted in the country to 
finance public services, the assessment of thje impact on public hospitals’ 
finance of the transfer or refusal of patients by the private sector becomes 
mandatory. The transfer and/or refusal of patients classified under ‘unprof­
itable procedures’ is a negative event associated with a prospective payment 
mechanism. The very selective range of health problems contracted private 
hospitals in the city of Rio were treating was largely concentrated on low 
technology intensive treatments and the occurrence of early discharges were 
suggested to be associated with the payment spheme. The burden upon pub­
lic hospitals for treating the bulk of patients presenting a negative relation 
between payment rate and costs will increase public hospitals financial diffi­
culties, lower the quality of care and have a negative impact on inequalities.
Moreover, a review of the unit of output (Classification of Groups of 
Procedures) used by the PBRS is also strongly recommended in order to 
develop a classification system that better discriminates between patients 
with distinctive needs of resource use (costs). The present limitations of the 
classification scheme increase the risks of negative responses to the payment 
scheme, such as selection of patients, lowering the quality of care and fraud.
M orb id ity  Surveillance The follow-up of reasons for admission across 
social groups, age groups and gender provides information on the local pat­
tern of use, changing pattern in health ‘need’, thereby having great use for 
local planning.
This study raised the need for research on unemployment and health 
in the Brazilian context. It also highlighted some health problems in the 
city of Rio not commonly considered by the health care institutions in the 
country, such as malnutrition in the adult population, particularly, among 
the retired.
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* * *
Routine inpatient statistics might also be used for systematic checking 
of sentinel events, monitoring the use of high cost care and/or special pro­
cedures, length of stay etc. Making comparisons between health markets is 
an appropriate methodological approach to raise possible explanations for 
variations in the patterns of use of health care services.
F raud  Even though fraud might be spotted by indirect monitoring, the 
control of fraud cannot rely entirely on such mechanisms and requires sys­
tematic review of medical records and ad hoc studies. Moreover, the ad­
equacy of the classification scheme used for payment and the adequacy of 
values attached to the units of output are important, but not sufficient, 
elements to minimize fraud.
Therefore, the prevention of fraud will only be effective in the states 
and municipalities with an active and representative Health Council1. It is 
recommended that local Health Councils also defines mechanisms to exercise 
control over the routine supervision of care delivered by contracted services.
M onito ring  th e  im pact o f SUS on inequalities in th e  use o f h ea lth  
care services Finally, as a means of having a general assessment of the 
impact of the Unified Health System (SUS) on reducing inequalities in the 
utilization of health care services in the country, it is recommended that ev­
ery five years the National Household Survey include in their main question­
naire a health questionnaire to collect information on perceived morbidity 
and use of health services by sectors care between the social classes.
*  *  *
The impact that the use of information generated by the National In­
patient Statistics System might have on inequalities depends on who will 
have access to it and who will have the means to use it. To transform 
this information into an instrument of political debate for the creation of a 
more equitable and adequate health care system, in Brazil it is necessary 
that all data on the National Inpatient Information System be public and 
easily accessible to allow local governmental institutions, providers of care,
1In December 1990 the law was signed which defined the character of the participation 
of different interest groups in the health sector in the Unified Health System. Permanent 
Health Councils are to be established at each level of the Health System (national, state 
and municipality). Health councils are deliberative collegiate bodies in the Unified Health 
System with representatives of government, providers of care, health care workers and 
consumers. Consumers have half the seats on the Health Councils.
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researchers and consumers to use this information for their own purposes. 
Secondly, whatever the monitoring system adopted by each administrative 
level of SUS (national, state or municipality), the indicators generated by 
the system should be reviewed, discussed and used for decision-making by 
the Health Councils. Thirdly, most local Health Departments will depend on 
technical support and on the development of friendly computer programmes 
for being able to use this information. This should have the financial and 
technical support from the more developed states and municipalities as well 
as from the Ministry of Health. Moreover, great effort should also be put into 
the development of educational material directed to particular social groups 
and their representatives in the Health Councils, as a means of increasing 
their ability to interpret and judge the indicators being used to monitor the 
system, thereby increasing their ability to make choices, participate and to 
defend their own interests.
A ppendix  A
H ospitals in the stu d y ’s data  
set
1. Santa Casa da Misericordia do Rio de Janeiro. (Acute)
2. PolicKnica Geral do Rio de Janeiro. (Acute)
3. Sociedade Espanhola de Beneficencia. (Acute)
4. Associagao Brasileira de Assistencia aos Cancerosos -  Hospital M. K. 
(Acute)
5. Hospital de CKnicas Quarto Centenario do Rio de Janeiro. (Acute)
6. Hospital Adventista Silvestre. (Acute)
7. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Iraja. (Acute)
8. PolicKnica de Botafogo. (Acute)
9. Casa de Saude Santa Helena Ltda. (Acute)
10. Casa de Saude Nossa Senhora do Carmo Ltda. (Acute)
11. Hospital Cardoso Rodrigues Ltda. (Acute)
12. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Campinho Ltda. (Acute)
13. Associagao do Hospital Evangelico do Rio de Janeiro. (Acute)
14. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Sao Jose S/A. (Acute)
15. Assistencia Medico-Hospitalar Sao Jorge S/A. (Acute)
16. Fundagao Clara Basbaum. (Acute)
17. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Nossa Senhora das Gragas Ltda. (Acute)
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18. CPAIMC -  Hospital Sao Francisco de Assis. (Acute)
19. Real e Benemerita Sociedade Portuguesa de Beneficencia do Rio de 
Janeiro. (Acute)
20. Casa de Sau.de Santa Rita S/A. (Acute)
21. Hospital das Clfnicas Brasil Portugal S/A. (Acute)
22. Servigo de Assistencia Social Evangelico. (Acute)
23. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Nossa Senhora da Piedade Ltda. (Acute)
24. Clfnica Nossa Senhora Auxiliadora Ltda. (Acute)
25. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Joari Ltda. (Acute)
26. Hospital da Veneravel Ordem Terceira de Sao Francisco da Penitencia. 
(Acute)
27. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Nossa Senhora da Penha. (Acute)
28. Clfnica Dr. Aloan S/A. (Acute)
29. IBRO -  Instituto Brasileiro de Otorrinolaringologia Ltda. (Acute)
30. Servigo de Assistencia Medica Dr. Faulhaber Ltda. (Acute)
31. Casa de Saude Republica da Croacia. (Acute)
32. Hospital Santa Inez Remogoes. (Acute)
33. SEMIU -  Servigo Medico Infantil Leopoldina Ltda. (Acute)
34. Centro Pediatrico de Jacarepagua Ltda. (Acute)
35. Clfnica Santa Cristina Ltda. (Acute)
36. Sindicato dos Arrumadores -  Hospital Sao Benedito. (Acute)
37. Mordomia Hospital Nossa Senhora das Dores. (Chronic)
38. Clfnica Medica Cirurgica Santa Genoveva. (Chronic)
39. Casa Sao Fernando. (Chronic)
40. Casa de Saude Gabinal Ltda. (Chronic)
41. Clfnica de Repouso Campo Belo. (Chronic)
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42. Clfnica Jardim America Ltda. (Chronic)
43. Casa de Saude Grajau Ltda. (Chronic)
44. Casa de Saude Renoud Lambert Ltda. (Chronic)
45. Casa de Saude Santa Rita. (Chronic)
46. Casa de Saude Affonso McDowell. (Chronic)
47. Hospital Nossa Senhora do Socorro. (Chronic)
48. SEMEL -  Servigos Medicos Leopoldinense Ltda. (Chronic)
49. Clfnica de Repouso Santa Edwiges Ltda. (Psychiatric)
50. Sanatorio do Rio de Janeiro. (Psychiatric)
51. Casa de Saude Saint Roman Ltda. (Psychiatric)
52. Casa de Saude Humaita Ltda. (Psychiatric)
53. Clfnica Monte Alegre. (Psychiatric)
54. Clfnica das Amendoeiras. (Psychiatric)
55. Clfnica Sao Raimundo Nonato Ltda. (Psychiatric)
56. Associagao Espiirita Obreiros do Bern. (Psychiatric)
57. Sanatorio Santa Juliana. (Psychiatric)
58. Clfnica da Repouso Valencia Ltda. (Psychiatric)
59. Clfnica da Gavea. (Psychiatric)
60. Casa de Saude Dr. Eiras. (Psychiatric)
A ppendix B
R eliability  study
1. Santa Casa da Misericordia do Rio de Janeiro .
2. PolicKnica Geral do Rio de Janeiro.
3. Sociedade Espanhola de Beneficencia.
4. Associacao Brasileira de Assistencia aos Cancerosos -  Hospital M. K.
5. Hospital de Clmicas Quarto Centenario do Rio de Janeiro.
6. Hospital Adventista Silvestre.
7. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Iraja.
8. PolicKnica de Botafogo.
9. Casa de Saude Santa Helena Ltda.
10. Casa de Saude Nossa Senhora do Carmo Ltda.
11. Hospital Cardoso Rodrigues Ltda.
12. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Campinho Ltda.
13. Associacao do Hospital Evangelico do Rio de Janeiro.
14. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Sao Jose S/A.
15. Assistencia Medico-Hospitalar Sao Jorge S/A.
16. Fundagao Clara Basbaum.
17. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Nossa Senhora das Gramas Ltda.
18. CPAIMC - Hospital Sao Francisco de Assis.
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19. Real e Benemerita Sociedade Portuguesa de Beneficencia do Rio de 
Janeiro.
20. Casa de Saude Santa Rita S/A.
21. Hospital das Clinicas Brasil Portugal S/A.
22. Servigo de Assistencia Social Evangelico.
23. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Nossa Senhora da Piedade Ltda.
24. Cli'nica Nossa Senhora Auxiliadora Ltda.
25. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Joari Ltda.
26. Hospital da Veneravel Ordem Terceira de Sao Francisco da Penitencia.
27. Casa de Saude e Maternidade Nossa Senhora da Penha.
28. Cli'nica Dr. Aloan S/A.
29. IBRO -  Instituto Brasileiro de Otorrinolaringologia Ltda.
A ppendix C
Variables used in the  
analyses of principal 
com ponents.
1. Percentage of contracted beds.
2. Number of beds contracted for surgery.
3. Number of beds contracted for obstetrics.
4. Number of beds contracted for clinical medicine.
5. Number of beds contracted for other specialties.
6. Number off beds contracted for intensive care.
7. Occupation rate.
8. Number of accounts paid.
9. Average length of stay.
10. Mortality rate at forty-eight hours.
11. Accounts paid for surgical procedures.
12. Average length of stay for surgical procedures.
13. Mortality rate for surgical patients.
14. Accounts paid for obstetric procedures.
15. Average length of stay for obstetric procedures.
16. Accounts paid for clinical procedures.
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17. Average length of stay of clinical procedures.
18. Mortality rate for clinical patients.
19. Accounts paid in paediatrics.
20. Average length of stay in paediatrics.
21. Accounts paid for chronic patients.
22. Average length of stay for chronic patients.
A ppendix  D
Sam ple.
Table D .l:  Sample of hospitals, AIH forms and non-responses.
Hospital AIH form Non-responses
1 Assistencia Medico-Hospitalar Sao Jorge 137 02
2 Casa de Saude e Maternidade Iraja 448 85
3 Casa de Saude e Maternidade Joari 228 07
4 Casa de Saude e Maternidade 330 82
Nossa Senhora da Penha
5 IBRO -  Instituto Brasileiro 31 01
de Otorrinolaringologia Ltda
6 Santa Casa da Misericordia 513 200
do Rio de Janeiro
7 Policlinica de Botafogo 122 101
8 Real e Benemerita Sociedade Portuguesa de 39 39
Beneficencia do Rio de Janeiro
9 Associacao do Hospital Evangelico 83 83
do Rio de Janeiro
10 Hospital da Veneravel Ordem Terceira 03 03
de Sao Francisco da Penitencia
TOTAL 1934 603
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A ppendix  E
D iseases o f the circulatory
system  — predicted
probabilities.
Table E .l: Predicted Probabilities for Diseases of the Circulatory System -  
Contracted Private Hospitals -  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted Values
1 1 35-44 woman 0.453
2 4 65 and more woman 0.430
3 1 45-64 woman 0.416
4 4 45-64 man 0.393
5 1 35-44 man 0.390
6 4 65 and more man 0.385
7 1 65 and more woman 0.369
8 4 45-64 woman 0.362
9 1 45-64 man 0.326
10 4 35-44 man 0.243
11 1 25-34 man 0.230
12 1 65 and more man 0.224
13 1 25-34 woman 0.202
14 4 35-44 woman 0.198
15 1 15-24 man 0.176
16 4 25-34 man 0.144
17 4 15-24 man 0.120
18 1 15-24 woman 0.090
19 4 25-34 woman 0.078
20 4 15-24 woman 0.036
21 1 0-14 woman 0.030
22 1 0-14 man 0.016
23 4 0-14 woman 0.015
24 4 0-14 man 0.013
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A ppendix F
D iseases o f the respiratory
system  — predicted
probabilities.
Table F .l: Predicted Probabilities for Diseases of the Respiratory System 
- Contracted Private Hospitals -  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted Values
1 1 0-14 woman 0.49514
2 4 0-14 woman 0.48159
3 1 0-14 man 0.47422
4 4 0-14 man 0.45088
5 2 0-14 woman 0.40182
6 2 0-14 man 0.37274
7 1 15-24 man 0.17556
8 4 15-24 man 0T6238
9 1 25-34 man 0.16152
10 1 65 and more man 0.15550
11 4 25-34 man 0.14920
12 4 65 and more man 0.14356
13 1 65 and more woman 0.12891
14 2 15-24 woman 0.12303
15 4 65 and more woman 0.11872
16 1 35-44 man 0.11732
17 1 45-64 man 0.11430
18 2 25-34 man 0.11262
19 2 65 and more man 0.10819
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Population Pystatus Age Group
20 4 35-44
21 4 45-64
22 1 45-64
23 4 45-64
24 2 65 and more
25 2 35-44
26 2 45-64
27 1 35-44
28 4 35-44
29 2 45-64
30 1 15-24
31 1 25-34
32 4 15-24
33 4 25-34
34 2 35-44
35 2 15-24
36 2 15-24
Sex Predicted Values
man 0.10794
man 0.10513
woman 0.09765
woman 0.08968
woman 0.08883
man 0.08052
man 0.07836
woman 0.07575
woman 0.06943
woman 0.06655
woman 0.06296
woman 0.06256
woman 0.05764
woman 0.05728
woman 0.05123
woman 0.04239
woman 0.04212
A ppendix  G
D iseases o f the d igestive
system  — predicted
probabilities.
Table G.l: Predicted Probabilities for Diseases of the Digestive System -  
Contracted Private Hospitals -  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted Values
1 3 25-34 man 0.37855
2 3 35-44 man 0.37779
3 3 45-64 man 0.32140
4 4 35-44 man 0.29737
5 1 35-44 man 0.25731
6 3 65 and more man 0.25398
7 1 25-34 man 0.23984
8 4 35-44 man 0.22345
9 2 25-34 man 0.21875
10 2 35-44 man 0.21848
11 3 less than 24 man 0.21036
12 4 45-64 man 0.19840
13 1 45-64 man 0.18160
14 2 45-64 man 0.17222
15 4 65 and more man 0.15355
16 1 65 and more man 0.10068
17 1 35-44 woman 0.09841
18 2 45-64 woman 0.09755
19 4 15-24 man 0.09554
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
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Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted
4 25-34 woman 0.08875
2 65 and more man 0.08759
1 45-64 woman 0.08563
2 35-44 woman 0.08089
4 65 and more woman 0.08010
2 15-24 man 0.07544
3 45-64 woman 0.07151
4 45-64 woman 0.07123
2 65 and more woman 0.06665
3 35-44 woman 0.06497
1 less than 24 man 0.06406
2 less than 24 woman 0.06324
2 25-34 woman 0.06264
1 25-34 woman 0.06242
1 65 and more woman 0.05844
3 65 and more woman 0.05782
3 25-34 woman 0.04722
4 35-44 woman 0.03334
4 less than 24 woman 0.03083
1 less than 24 woman 0.03056
3 less than 24 woman 0.02293?
A ppendix H
N eoplasm s — predicted  
probabilities.
Table H.l: Predicted Probabilities for Neoplasms -  Contracted Private Hos­
pitals -  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted Values
1 3 35 and more woman 0.17495
2 1 35 and more woman 0.16910
3 4 35 and more woman 0.12447
4 3 35 and more man 0.1006
5 1 35 and more man 0.09643
6 4 35 and more man 0.06938
7 2 35 and more woman 0.06013
8 1 less than 34 woman 0.05142
9 3 less than 34 woman 0.04430
10 1 less than 34 man 0.04315
11 3 less than 34 man 0.03715
12 2 35 and more man 0.03246
13 4 less than 34 woman 0.02574
14 4 less than 34 man 0.02150
15 2 less than 34 woman 0.00525
16 2 less than 34 man 0.00437
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A ppendix I
Infectious D iseases —
predicted probabilities.
Table 1.1: Predicted Probabilities for Infectious Diseases -  Contracted Pri­
vate Hospitals -  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted Values
1 1 0-24 man 0.17631
2 4 0-24 man 0.13461
3 1 0-24 woman 0.09404
4 2 0-24 man 0.08081
5 4 0-24 woman 0.07014
6 1 25-44 man 0.04540
7 2 0-24 woman 0.04089
8 4 25-44 man 0.03340
9 1 45 and more woman 0.03057
10 1 45 and more man 0.02751
11 4 45 and more woman 0.02240
12 4 45 and more man 0.02014
13 2 25-44 man 0.01916
14 1 25-44 woman 0.01300
15 2 45 and more woman 0.01279
16 2 45 and more man 0.01148
17 4 25-44 woman 0.00948
18 2 25-44 woman 0.00538
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A ppendix J
Caesarian section — 
predicted probabilities.
Table J .l: Predicted Probabilities for Caesarian Section -  Contracted Pri­
vate Hospitals -  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Provider Predicted Values
1 1 35 and more contracted 0.47630
2 1 25-34 contracted 0.42665
3 1 35 and more salaried 0.36219
4 4 35 and more contracted 0.34969
5 2 35 and more contracted 0.34762
6 4 35 and more salaried 0.33237
7 1 25-34 salaried 0.31724
8 4 25-34 contracted 0.30555
9 2 25-34 contracted 0.30361
10 1 less than 24 contracted 0.30065
11 4 25-34 salaried 0.28944
12 2 35 and more salaried 0.25422
13 2 25-34 salaried 0.21809
14 1 less than 24 salaried 0.21162
15 4 less than 24 contracted 0.20267
16 2 less than 24 contracted 0.20120
17 4 less than 24 salaried 0.19050
18 2 less than 24 salaried 0.13877
263
A ppendix K
Surgical procedures —
predicted probabilities.
Table K.l: Predicted Probabilities for Surgical Procedures -  Contracted 
Private Hospitals -  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted Values
1) 3 15-24 man 0.7933
2) 3 25-34 man 0.7376
3) 3 35-44 man 0.7035
4) 3 35-44 woman 0.6876
5) 4 15-24 man 0.6335
6) 3 25-34 woman 0.5624
7) 2 15-24 man 0.5554
8) 1 15-24 man 0.5551
9) 3 45-64 man 0.5398
10) 1 35-44 woman 0.4663
11) 4 35-44 woman 0.4547
12) 4 25-34 woman 0.4508
13) 4 25-34 man 0.4493
14) 3 45-64 woman 0.4355
15) 1 25-34 woman 0.4252
16) 3 65 and more man 0.4117
17) 1 25-34 man 0.4113
18) 2 35-44 woman 0.3987
19) 3 15-24 woman 0.3758
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Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted Values
20) 4 15-24 woman 0.3736
21) 2 25-34 woman 0.3209
22) 2 25-34 man 0.3137
23) 1 15-24 woman 0.3118
24) 2 15-44 woman 0.3069
25) 4 45-64 woman 0.3019
26) 4 35-44 man 0.2900
27) 1 35-44 man 0.2892
28) 3 less than 15 man 0.2891
29) 4 less than 15 man 0.2740
30) 1 45-64 woman 0.2669
31) 4 less than 15 woman 0.2502
32) 2 35-44 man 0.2402
33) 4 45-64 man 0.2300
34) 2 45-64 woman 0.2164
35) 1 45-64 man 0.1929
36) 3 65 and more woman 0.1873
37) 4 65 and more man 0.1653
38) 2 less than 15 man 0.1603
39) 2 45-64 man 0.1566
40) 2 less than 15 woman 0.1479
41) 1 65 and more man 0.1444
42) 3 less than 15 woman 0.1405
43) 2 65 and more man 0.1352
44) 1 less than 15 man 0.1255
45) 4 65 and more woman 0.1255
46) 1 less than 15 woman 0.1178
47) 1 65 and more woman 0.1140
48) 2 65 and more woman 0.1043
A ppendix L
D eath  — predicted  
probabilities.
Table L.l: Predicted Probabilities for Death -  Contracted Private Hospitals 
-  City of Rio de Janeiro.
Population Pystatus Age Group Sex Predicted
1 1 65 and more woman 0.21120
2 1 65 and more man 0.17835
3 4 65 and more woman 0.16762
4 4 65 and more man 0.14035
5 2 65 and more woman 0.11825
6 1 4 5 - 6 4 man 0.10577
7 2 65 and more man 0.09806
8 4 45 -  64 man 0.08169
9 1 45 -  64 woman 0.08146
10 4 45 -  64 woman 0.06253
11 2 4 5 -6 4 man 0.05593
12 1 2 5 -4 4 man 0.04395
13 2 4 5 - 6 4 woman 0.04253
14 1 0 - 2 4 man 0.03443
15 4 2 5 - 4 4 man 0.03342
16 4 0 - 2 4 man 0.02612
17 2 2 5 - 4 4 man 0.02251
18 1 0 - 2 4 woman 0.02246
19 2 0 - 2 4 man 0.01754
20 1 25-44 woman 0.01725
21 4 0 -24 woman 0.01698
22 4 25 -  44 woman 0.01303
23 2 0 - 2 4 man 0.01137
24 2 25-44 woman 0.00871
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